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GLOSARY 
 
Some terms that will be used throughout this thesis will carry a specific meaning. For 
ease of reference these terms and their definitions are listed here.  
Cognitive flexibility: Another term for mental flexibility or set-shifting. These terms 
refer to the ability to shift to a different thought or action according to changes in a situation 
(Hill, 2004).  
Context blindness: impartment in the spontaneous use of context in information 
processing and sense making (Vermeulen, 2015) 
Context: Everything in a given situation that influences the meaning of a target 
stimulus. Context can be external (environment surroundings) or internal  (concept, previous 
experiences, knowledge, expectations, emotions, arousal; Kokinov, 1997)  
Emotion: The phenomena that accompany situations that tend to elicit approach and 
avoidance behaviours (Gaigg, 2012)  
Social Game: An idealization of a social interaction. A social interaction reduced to its 
basic elements (Colman, 1995)  
Other-regarding behaviour: This includes behaviours that are directed toward others 
such as altruistic action, action motivated out of fairness, and cooperative behaviour in the face 
of incentives to take advantage of others.   
Payoff: The gain that results from decision making and that depends on the rules of the 
‘social game’.    
Players: The decision makers involved in a ‘social game.’ 
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Pot: The amount of any money to be split in a ‘social game’,  also referred  to as ‘pie’ 
or ‘stake’. The pot can be made up of money, goods, time. 
Preferences: The categorical order in which a person organises the available choices. 
Rational models suggest that individuals prioritise choices that give an optimal material payoff.  
Prosocial: The term prosocial behaviour refers to acts that are beneficial to other 
people, for instance helping, sharing, comforting, donating, or volunteering, and behaviours 
that are mutually beneficial such as cooperation (Declerck & Boone, 2016) 
Other-regarding preferences: The tendency to care about the motives underlying the 
action of others during decision making, their payoffs and wellbeing (House et al., 2013) 
Examples of other-regarding preferences are trust, fairness-concerns, inequity aversion, 
reciprocity and altruism. These behavioural dispositions have been recognized in the 
economics literature as important elements for smooth and efficient economic exchanges, for 
instance when entering formal contracts is not feasible (Camerer, 2003a) 
Self-interest: In the context of standard economic models of decision-making self-
interest is displayed when an individual is solely motivated to maximize their own gain. 
Self-serving bias:  The tendency “to conflate [blend together] what is fair with what 
benefits oneself, thus  people tend to arrive at judgments of what is fair or right that are biased 
in the direction of their own self-interests” (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997, pp.110). 
Social Cognition: The cognitive processes involved in understanding social agents and 
their interactions. 
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Abstract 
When humans interact with one another, the decisions they make often appear to be 
irrational in a purely economic sense. People are willing to sacrifice resources in order to affect 
positive outcomes for others and they often forgo opportunities to maximise benefits for 
themselves in order to avoid disadvantaging others. Explanations for such phenomena remain 
contested. The current thesis seeks to shed light on some of the factors that contribute to social-
decision making by comparing decision making in typically developing individuals and 
individuals diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder – a condition characterised by difficulties 
in many of the domains that are suspected to play a role in guiding social-decision behaviour. 
In four experiments, variants of a paradigm known as the Ultimatum Game were implemented, 
which requires individuals to decide whether or not to accept or reject fair or unfair monetary 
offers. In Experiment 1, a one-shot UG was implemented in which participants provided one 
response as proposer and one as responder. In experiment 2, as responders, participants were 
asked to decide over intentionally vs randomly made unfair offers while skin conductance 
response was measured. In experiment 3, a cognitive manipulation was implemented, and 
participants were asked to respond with and without time pressure to fair and unfair offers 
made by human proposers. Finally, in experiment 4 participants played as proposers and 
responders a multi trial Mini UG. Here, participants decide over an unfair offer which is 
presented four times along with an alternative offer that varies in levels of fairness each time. 
In addition, across all experiments a number of traits, that are thought to play a role in 
regulating decision behaviour in this scenario were assessed through self-report and 
13 
 
performance measures, including theory of mind, inhibition, empathising and systemising. The 
results from the Ultimatum Game task showed that there are no substantial behavioural 
differences between ASD and control participants (TD). However, in two of the experiments, 
differences emerged which suggested that  the two groups differed in the cognitive processes 
recruited to respond to levels of fairness. Specifically, in experiment 2 ASD participants were 
less influenced by whether or not unfair offers were proposed by a human or computer 
counterpart and in experiment 3 rejection rates were more strongly associated with a measure 
of theory of mind than in the TD group. These results are discussed in the framework of 
cognitive theories of ASD and models of economic exchange suggesting that inequity aversion, 
e.g. Cultural norms, and  fairness reciprocity are not stable preferences but differently motivate 
decision behaviour depending on the context. Further research needs to be undertaken to 
identify how executive control and dual theories of moral judgements affect decision behaviour 
in repeated interactions.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Theories of social exchange are based on the assumption that decision makers have 
homogeneous identical preferences and follow rational and logical principles that lead them to 
optimal choices. However, growing evidence is suggesting a different viewpoint in the factors 
underlying decision making. Social decision-making studies are showing that diverse motives 
stemming from individual psychological differences and the interaction with their social 
environment explain the deviation from the rational model. In this thesis, I examined these two 
views and  present research on  the role that individual differences on personality and cognitive 
style play in social-economic decision making in typically developing individuals (TD) and 
individuals diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD).  
Decision making in social contexts relies on the ability to understand the intention, 
emotions and beliefs of others and on the capacity to recognize that others may think differently  
from ourselves. However, through interaction we learn that also these perceptions may change 
depending on the context where the interaction takes place, thus the ability to swiftly perceive 
changes in the context is also necessary for successful judgement of the available choices in a 
decision-making scenario.  
Scientific research on decision making in social contexts has largely focused on social 
situations where individuals are involved in a social exchange in which there exists a conflict 
between choices that either favour the self or the other. These scenarios usually challenge social 
norms such as trust, altruism and fairness. The Ultimatum Game (Güth, Schmittberger, & 
Schwarze, 1982) represents such a situation in which fairness is manipulated  and the current 
thesis will draw on this paradigm to examine social decision making in typically developing 
(TD) and autistic adults (ASD). This is of interest because ASD is characterised by differences 
in many of those processes that are thought to play an important role in shaping social decision 
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making, such as the ability to attribute mental states to others (mentalizing), to think logically 
and systematically about situations (systemizing) and to integrate emotion-related processes 
with ongoing cognitive processes. Examining social-decision making in paradigms such as the 
UG in this population, can therefore contribute to our understanding of the role of these 
processes in social decision making as well as contribute to our understanding of some of the 
core features of ASD. 
Before setting out the empirical work of this thesis in Chapters 2-5, the literature review 
presented in the current chapter will be organised as follows. The first section will provide an 
introduction to the defining and associated characteristics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
along with an overview of some of the theories that have been developed to explain these 
characteristics, particularly focusing on the evidence concerning the social-cognitive domain. 
This is followed by an account of social decision making from the perspective of game theory, 
with a particular focus on what game theoretical tasks such as the ultimatum game have 
revealed with respect to typically developing participants. This section will conclude with a 
summary of studies in social and general decision making in ASD,  although this evidence will 
be highlighted again, when relevant, in the context of the individual empirical chapters.  
1.1 Autism 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a heritable and lifelong neurodevelopmental 
condition, characterized by impaired communication and social interaction and restricted and 
repetitive interests and behaviours. According to current DSM-5 criteria (DSM-5:American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013)1, the social-communication difficulties include deficits in 
social-emotional reciprocity; deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviours used for social 
interaction, and deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships. 
                                                          
1 Diagnostic and statistical manual for developmental disorders 
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Restricted and repetitive behaviours encompass stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, 
use of objects or speech; insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines or stereotyped 
patterns of verbal or nonverbal behaviour; highly restricted interests and, hypo or hyper 
sensitivity to sensory stimuli. Although these are the core features of the condition, comorbidity 
with other conditions is very common: About 70% of the population with an ASD diagnosis 
have other comorbid psychiatric disorders such as ADHD, depression or anxiety; and medical 
conditions such as epilepsy, sleep disturbances and gastro-intestinal problems are also common 
(Simonoff et al., 2008). 
 Diagnosed cases of autism have increased in recent years, rising from prevalence 
estimates of 1/150 people in 2000; to 1/68 in 2010 and 1/59 in 2014 (Center for Disease, control 
and prevention, 2018; https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/data.html/). However it is not clear 
yet if the rise in diagnosed cases is due to an increased awareness about the condition, or due 
to a genuine increase in the frequency of the disorder (Pessah et al., 2008). On balance, the 
evidence indicates that the true prevalence of ASD is likely to be around 1% of the population 
around the world and the number of cases in males exceeds those found among females (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2011; Bertrand et al., 2001). This may be explained because women are more 
naturally driven to communication and social interaction, allowing them to compensate for the 
difficulties in social-communication that are clinically defining of the condition (Lai et al., 
2011). It may also be the case, however, that diagnostic tests and assessments are less sensitive 
to the diagnosis in females on the autism spectrum because these instruments have been 
developed and calibrated with a ‘male-dominated’ view of ASD.  
When autism was first identified by  Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944)2 there was no 
clarity about whether the condition was biologically determined, or if it developed during 
                                                          
2 Translated into english by Uta Frith et al., (1991) 
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childhood as a result of environmental factors. At that time, a damaging theory grew in 
popularity, which claimed that a poor or disrupted relationship between the new-born child and 
the caregiver was the most likely cause of the condition – the so-called refrigerator mother 
hypothesis (Bettelheim, 1967). Since then, the condition has been extensively studied and 
although its causes remain unclear, it is now undisputed that ASD is a disorder of 
neurobiological origin. Some factors that contribute to its aetiology have been identified at 
multiple levels of description: genetic factors, associated with heritability and genetic mutation 
(Huguet, Benabou, & Bourgeron, 2016); environmental factors, associated with maternal age  
(Hallmayer et al., 2011; Pardo & Eberhart, 2007); neurobiological factors associated with 
irregularities in the connectivity between areas of the brain (Di Martino et al., 2014; Kana et 
al., 2014; Keehn et al., 2013) as well as more focal abnormalities in areas of the ‘social brain’ 
(Damasio & Maurer, 1978).  
Finally, explanations of autism have also been sought at the psychological level, which 
will be the principal focus of the current thesis. Of most relevance, at this level of description, 
are theories that seek to explain the core difficulties individuals on the autism spectrum have 
in multiple aspects of social cognition, which describes the capacity to attend to, recognize and 
interpret interpersonal cues that guide social behaviour and the processes that allow individuals 
to adapt flexibly to the demands of social interactions (Baez & Ibanez, 2014; Green, Horan, & 
Lee, 2015; Mcdonald, 2013; Happé, Cook, & Bird, 2017). The next sections will provide a 
more detailed overview of the social-cognitive and emotional characteristics of ASD along 
with the theories that seek to explain them and with a focus on those factors that, from each 
theory, contribute to explain decision behaviour.   
18 
 
Social and emotion-related processing models.  
Social and emotion-related processes have been the focus of attention in ASD research since 
the syndrome was first described (Kanner, 1943) and a large number of studies have been 
carried out that have examined how autistic individuals understand and respond to the emotions 
of others (see Gaigg, 2012; Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 2013; Nuske, Vivanti & 
Dissanayake, 2013 for reviews). This area of research is relevant to the current thesis, because, 
interpersonal emotional processes have been found to play an important role in moderating 
social-decision making, as explained in more detail in the introduction of Chapter 3.   
Despite some inconsistencies in findings, it is generally agreed that, compared to 
control groups, interpersonal affective behaviours in ASD are characterized by differences in 
the processing and expression of emotional information. For instance, it is generally found that 
autistic individuals find it more difficult to identify facial emotional expressions compared to 
comparison groups, particularly when the emotions displayed are subtle, or complex (see 
Harms et al., 2010 & Uljarevic & Hamilton 2013). To give an example, Philip et al., (2010) 
invited 46 adults (ASD & TD,  gender and age matched) to do a series of tasks. First, using the 
Ekman Faces Test from the Facial Expressions of Emotions, FEEST (Young et al., 2002), 
participants were asked to select a text label (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear or 
surprise) to describe the emotion expressed in a face presented to them on a computer screen. 
In a second condition, participants were presented with more a sensitive measure, also from 
the FEEST – the Emotion Hexagons task. This task although similar in structure to the Ekman 
test, is more sensitive because the stimuli are computer manipulated (morphed) to generate 
subtler degrees of expressing different emotions and also emotions that represent a blend of, 
for example, fear and anger. The two groups performed significantly differently in these tasks, 
with ASDs consistently performing worse than controls when identifying anger, sadness and 
fear. In addition, the results showed that the ASD group performed significantly lower than 
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TDs in the Benton Test of Facial Recognition (Benton et al., 1983), which examines basic face 
recognition ability. Since previous studies had also demonstrated general face processing 
difficulties in ASD (Pelphrey et al., 2002; Sasson, 2006), this might indicate that emotion 
processing difficulties are a consequence of broader face processing difficulties. Other studies, 
however, have shown that autistic individuals do not only have difficulties identifying 
emotional information in facial expressions but also in body gestures (Dalton et al., 2005; 
Libero, Stevens, & Kana, 2014) and intonations of the voice (Demopoulos et al., 2015; Stewart, 
Mcadam, Ota, Peppé, & Cleland, 2013) suggesting that emotion recognition difficulties are not 
modality or stimulus specific.  
The difficulties autistic individuals have with the identification of emotions in others 
has also been shown to affect how they respond to and express emotions. For instance, a 
number of studies suggest that autistic individuals mimic the expressions of others differently 
(Forbes, Pan, & Antonia, 2016; Helt et al., 2010) and that their emotional expressions are more 
difficult to ‘read’ than the expressions of typically developing individuals (e.g., Brewer et al., 
2016). More generally autistic individuals also demonstrate a lower quality and reduced 
frequency of social-emotional overtures during social interaction (Begeer et al., 2008) and are 
less likely to respond with concern or empathy to the emotional distress of others. In pioneering 
studies by Sigman and colleagues, for example, (e.g., Kasari et al, 1990; Sigman et al., 1992) 
autistic children were less likely than typically developing children to orient to, and show 
concern for, an adult who pretended to hurt themselves. Interestingly, however, the autistic 
children were not entirely insensitive to the emotional expressions of others and often 
demonstrated typical physiological arousal responses (e.g., Lombardo et al., 2007; Trimmer, 
McDonald, & Rushby, 2017)  
Based on the wealth of evidence that has accumulated, there is now a general consensus 
that ASD is characterised by atypicalities in multiple facets of interpersonal emotional 
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processing. However, there is less agreement about the causes of these difficulties and a 
number of different explanations have been offered. First, the social motivation theory argues 
that human interaction is typically rewarding and that the social emotional difficulties in ASD 
may be the result of atypical development in the neural network (including amygdala, striatum 
and orbital-frontal cortex) that would normally mediate the experience and seeking of such 
social reward (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012a). According to this view, 
early emerging abnormalities in this social-reward network, makes the autistic child less 
interested in the social environment, thus compromising the development of a broader social 
brain network, including regions dedicated to face processing (Kanwisher, 2000) mental state 
understanding (i.e., superior temporal sulci, medial prefrontal cortex, temporal poles, see 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003), and empathy/interpersonal affective behaviours (i.e., anterior 
cingulate cortex, anterior Insula, amygdala, striatum Baron-cohen, 2005; Singer, 2006; Singer 
& Lamm, 2009).  
A second view, proposed by (Bachevalier & Loveland, 2006; Loveland, 2005; 
Loveland, 2001) is the self-regulation account, which suggests that it is not only the perception 
of social-emotional signals that represents a challenge for ASD but also that the behaviour 
regulation in response to these signals is compromised. Unlike the social-motivation theory, 
however, the behavioural self-regulation account suggests that the social-emotional difficulties 
experienced by autistic individuals do not necessarily arise from a lack of interest in social 
stimuli, but rather a difficulty knowing what emotional expressions (and social-communicative 
signals more generally) afford in terms of behavioural responses. In other words, autistic 
individuals are not socially less motivated, and do not even have fundamental difficulties 
understanding the meaning of emotional expressions – instead they have difficulties initiating 
appropriate behavioural responses. This view is in line with the evidence from the studies by 
Sigman and colleagues (e.g., Sigman et al., 1992; Corona et al., 1998), which found typical 
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physiological but atypical behavioural responses to the distress of others. Corona et al., 
measured ASD children’s responsiveness to the pretend pain expressed by an experimenter 
after hurting her knee. The attention and comforting gestures given to the experimenter were 
quantified by measuring the frequency, latency and duration of attention given to the 
experimenter (Rated on a 1-6 scale, from no interest to comforting behaviour); rating the facial 
expression (positive, negative or neutral) in response to the observed pain and by taking cardiac 
measures. Although ASD’s cardiac response was similar to controls, ASD looked at the 
experimenter’s knee less often, for a shorter amount of time in total, and took longer to first 
look at her. Similarly, other studies have shown that autistic children, although aware of the 
emotional display of others, were less responsive compared to control groups (Loveland, 1997).  
Distinct from both of the perspectives above is a third view; the interpersonal 
relatedness account. Like the self-regulation account, this view also acknowledges that in the 
context of interpersonal processes, both perception and action need to be considered to 
understand the socio-emotional characteristics of ASD. However, greater emphasis is placed 
on the interpersonal bond that is fostered through a child’s ability to regulate and co-ordinate 
their behaviours in response to others. Specifically, Hobson argues that the quality of a child’s 
early interactions with her caregivers sets the foundations for social-cognitive development and 
the child’s emerging ability to identify with the feelings, intentions and attitudes of others 
(Hobson, 1995, 2012). In autistic children, early interpersonal engagement is disrupted and 
therefore subsequent capacities never fully mature. Evidence for this view stems from studies 
which suggest differences in the quality of interpersonal engagement of autistic and non-
autistic children. For instance, Hobson & Lee, (1998) showed that autistic children are rated as 
less engaged with an experimenter during very basic social interaction, i.e. saying ‘hello and 
good bye’. In this study, participants were asked to take part in a ten-minute task, but the focus 
was on the quality of ‘intersubjective engagement’ of the child whilst greeting and saying good-
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bye to the experimenter, which was video recorded. Ratters blind to the children’s diagnosis  
then watched the recordings to identify indices of intersubjective engagement during the short 
interaction in the form of verbal or nodding responses, smiling, eye-to-face contact and/or 
combinations of eye-contact, smiling, verbalization and waving good bye. Relative to typically 
developing comparison participants, during the greeting, ASD children, made less eye-to-face 
contact, less smiles, and showed fewer instances where they combined eye-to-face contact with 
smiling and speaking. Similarly, at the farewell, ASD waved less, and when they did, the 
gesture  was rated as appearing odd.   
So far, the three accounts just described consider the ASD developmental trajectory to 
begin at birth with abnormalities in what Kanner referred to as an ‘innate ability to form 
affective contact with people’. In other words, the theories place considerable emphasis on 
interpersonal emotional processes. By contrast, an alternative theory considered the starting 
point of the developmental trajectory of ASD to begin with the abnormal maturation of a 
cognitive mechanism that would lead to abnormalities also in interpersonal emotional 
processes. The mentalizing theory (or Theory of Mind Theory – ToM), suggests that the 
disorder begins with the failure to develop a so-called shared attention mechanism, which 
typically matures around 9 months of age (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Happe, 2005; see also  
for a review Boucher, 2012). The mentalizing account rests on the premise that much of our 
interaction with others is influenced by the basic assumption that others have similar minds to 
ours. On this basis, we view others as having their own perspective of the world, and we try to 
understand, describe, explain and predict their behaviour in terms of mental phenomena such 
as beliefs, desires, intentions and feelings. This tendency to infer mental states to others was 
first referred to as “Theory of Mind” by Premack and Woodruff (1978), as ‘taking an 
intentional stance’ by Dennett (1988), and as ‘mentalizing’ by Frith (1989). 
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Similar to the other three accounts described above, the mentalizing theory’s 
proponents agree with the idea that ASD is the result of a social brain dysfunction. For instance, 
Baron-Cohen (2005; 1995) argues that theory of mind (ToM) is regulated by a distributed 
circuit involving superior temporal and medial prefrontal regions as well as the amygdala 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; see also Frith & Frith, 2003; Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2009), 
which are commonly also considered part of the ‘social brain’. In Baron-Cohen’s view, the 
components of this system evolved independently and gradually became interdependent to 
provide increasing flexibility in adapting to ever more complex social environments. More 
specifically six neuro-cognitive mechanisms are said to comprise the mentalizing system. The 
Intentionality Detector (ID), Eye Direction Detector (EDD) and Emotion Detector (TED), are 
the first to mature, and by 9 months of age allow the child to understand agent-object relations 
in terms of wanting, seeing or being “angry” at something. Although the development of these 
mechanisms is delayed in ASD, Baron-Cohen argues that these mechanisms are not 
fundamentally impairment. Next and by 18 months of age, typically developing children 
develop the shared attention mechanism (SAM) which enables the child to accomplish more 
elaborate representations and interactions with the world that includes triadic relations between 
the self, an agent, and an object. This developmental milestone is indicated in typical 
development by children beginning to show objects of interest to caregivers and generally seek 
to initiate the sharing of attention with others (Charman, 2003; Charman et al., 1997;  Jones & 
Carr, 2004) for a review (P. Mundy, 2017). The absence of such sharing of attention is the first 
reliable clinical marker for an ASD diagnosis.  
The last mechanisms to develop in Baron-Cohen’s mentalizing system, and the 
mechanisms that are argued not to reach functional maturity in ASD, are the Theory of Mind 
Mechanism (ToMM) and The Empathizing System (TESS), which are responsible for 
‘cognitive’ vs. ‘affective’ theory of mind processes respectively. ToMM is thought to allow 
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children to attribute mental states to others and to themselves, therefore providing an 
understanding that others may hold different beliefs from our own, and that the intentions and 
desires that guide their behaviour may be different from those of  our own. TESS, on the other 
hand, is thought to allow children to respond to the mental states of others with appropriate 
empathy and emotion (TESS).These two mechanisms are usually (Bowler et al., 2005) but not 
always compromised in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2001; Boucher, 2012; Frith, 2001) and there is 
some suggestion that particularly cognitive ToM is a source of difficulty whereas affective 
ToM processes may be relatively preserved (see Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Lombardo, 
2013; Mazza et al., 2014) although the evidence here is mixed. It is worth noting that, even 
when autistic individuals appear to engage mentalizing skills, they often do so through 
controlled and effortful reasoning, rather than intuitively (Senju, 2012). Since this distinction 
between effortful and intuitive mentalizing will be relevant to some of the evidence presented 
in later chapters, it is useful to consider how mentalizing is typically assessed. 
The assessment of ToM has been possible by implementing tasks for children and 
adults. The False Beliefs task, has been the most widely used ToM test for children (Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983). It typically involves presenting children with a short narrative (enacted with 
two dolls, or two-real people) in which Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. Sally puts a 
marble in the basket and goes out for a walk. While she is outside, naughty Anne takes the 
marble from the basket and puts it into her own box. Now Sally comes back from her walk and 
wants to play with her marble. Children are then asked, ‘where will Sally look for the marble?’. 
The obvious answer, that Sally will look for the marble inside her basket because she thinks 
the marble is still there, is usually given by typically developing children from the age of around 
4 years ( Perner & Lang, 1999), whereas autistic children at the age of 4-6 consistently show 
difficulties with this task and respond that Sally will look for the marble in the box (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Senju et al., 2009).  
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The  smarties task, also known as the ‘unexpected contents task’ (Perner, Leekam, & 
Wimmer, 1987) is another test developed with low requirements for language abilities, to 
assess mental state understanding in self and others. In relation to self, the task assesses 
understanding that you yourself can be misled, or be deceived, whereas in others it probes 
recognition that others can be misled or deceived. In this task, the participant is shown a 
Smarties tube and is asked what they think is inside. Once they respond, the participant is 
shown that the tube actually contains a pencil. The tube is then resealed with the pencil inside 
and the participant is asked two ‘false belief’ test questions. The ‘Other-person’ test question 
requires the participant to predict what another person, who has not yet seen the actual contents 
of the smarties tube, would believe was inside (before they were allowed to look). This question 
is designed to assess the participant’s awareness of another person’s false belief. Participants 
are also asked what they, themselves, thought the tube contained before they were allowed to 
look inside. This is the ‘Self’ test question and is thought to assess the participant’s awareness 
of their own prior false belief. Until the age of between 3 to 4 children assume other people 
will expect to find pencils in the smarties tube. Furthermore, they are unable to appreciate that 
their past representation of an object was different from their current representation (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). Children claim that they expected to find pencils when they first opened the 
box, a phenomenon called hindsight bias. Individuals with ASD perform as poorly on the self-
test question as they do on the other person test question: they will expect the other person to 
know what they themselves know, i.e. that the tube is full of pencils instead of smarties, as they 
do not recognize that the other person has not actually seen the pencils in the container (Fisher, 
Happé, & Dunn, 2005).  
As interest in the mentalizing account has grown over the years, other tasks have been 
developed and adapted for research purposes to address mentalizing in participants of varying 
ages and ability levels. For instance, the Strange Stories task (Fletcher et al., 1995;  Happé, 
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1994) is suitable for both children and adults. In this task participants are presented with a set 
of 24 short written vignettes about everyday situations where people say things they do not 
literally mean. The 12 themes include irony, double bluff, lie, white lie, persuasion, pretence, 
figure of speech, joke, misunderstanding, appearance/reality and forgetting. In all cases, 
participants are asked to answer a question about the story that probes their comprehension of 
the text and a mentalizing question which usually takes the form of ‘Why did X say Y’? 
Answers are given in a self-paced fashion and scored on a 0-2 scale according to the extent to 
which participants attribute mental states to others to explain their behaviour (White et al.,, 
2009,pp. 1109-1117). ASD participants generally perform poorer on this task, which has been 
interpreted as the result of a lack of understanding of mental states and context processing  
rather than due to poor text comprehension (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Murray et al., 
2017). Other vignette based tasks include recognition of faux pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; 
Gregory et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1998), which describes a particular case of an action reflecting 
an involuntary socially inappropriate behaviour. The faux pas is presented to participants in a 
series of stories, (10 for children and 20 for adults), which resemble everyday situations. After 
reading the story participants answer questions to assess comprehension, as well as questions 
about the intention and beliefs of the characters. Similar to the Strange Stories Test, autistic 
individuals tend to have difficulties on the faux pas test (Baron-Cohen et al.,1999) although 
autistic adults frequently perform fairly well, which has been linked to moral development and 
learned (rehearsed) abstract knowledge about social rules (Stone, 2002).  
Although the Strange Stories and Faux Pas tests are generally appropriate for use with 
older participants, one of the main disadvantages is that performance depends very heavily on 
participant’s verbal and general intellectual ability. Moreover, because the tasks necessarily 
provide participants with ample time to read and consider the text carefully, participants might 
arrive at the ‘correct’ answer not by engaging mentalizing but by drawing on their knowledge 
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of social conventions – i.e., by ‘hacking out’ a solution. To overcome these limitations some 
non-verbal tasks have been developed and tasks that are thought to rely on a more intuitive 
ability to attribute mental states to others. These tasks include the Animations task, (Abell, 
Happé, & Frith, 2000; Castelli et al.,2000; Salter et al.,2008) and the Reading the mind in the 
eyes test (RMIE - Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In the Animation task, participants are presented 
with short animated clips showing moving triangles. Participants are required to give a 
concurrent verbal description of what they think is happening. At the end of the animation they 
are asked to categorize the video either as depicting: ‘‘no interaction’’ (random), ‘‘physical 
interaction’’ (goal directed, e.g., chasing one another), or ‘‘mental interaction” (e.g., mocking) 
and, for ‘mental interactions’ answer questions about what the mental states portrayed may 
have been. ASD participants usually produce fewer accurate mentalizing descriptions of the 
animations and are less accurate in correctly identifying the mental states the triangles are 
meant to enact (White et al., 2011). The reading the mind in the eyes test (RMIE - Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001) requires participants to recognize mental states in photographs of the eye-region 
of faces, by selecting one of four words that best describe the expression. The test is primarily 
thought to be a measure of affective theory of mind (TESS) since many of the mental states 
that need to be inferred are emotional and performance appears to dissociate from other, 
cognitive, theory of mind tests (see Oakley, Brewer, Bird & Catmur, 2016). 
 It has become one of the most widely used tests of mentalizing for adults, in part 
because it can be administered and scored relatively easily but also because it is not as 
susceptible to ceiling effects as the other tasks, generally yielding a relatively normal 
distribution of performance across individuals. Because of these advantages, the RMIE will be 
used as a measure of mentalizing in the experiments reported in this thesis and a fuller 
description of the test will be included in Chapter 2.  
From Mentalizing to Systemizing and Empathizing 
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Despite the differences among the theories outlined in the previous section (social 
motivation; self-regulation; interpersonal engagement & mentalizing), all share the idea that 
ASD is primarily characterised (and probably caused) by abnormalities in fairly domain-
specific social-cognitive or social-affective processes. This provides for good explanations of 
the core social-communication impairments that clinically define the disorder, but the theories 
that are based on such domain-specific assumptions do less well in explaining the broader 
cognitive characteristics of the disorder and also some of the non-social clinical characteristics 
such as the presence of repetitive and stereotyped behaviours and interests. To account for these 
additional features of the disorder, the mentalizing theory was expanded to include the 
suggestion that difficulties attributing mental states and feelings to others might be 
accompanied or even offset by superior logical reasoning skills in ASD. Specifically, Baron-
Cohen (2002) proposed the so called Extreme Male Brain (EMB) Hypothesis of ASD, which 
is based on the premise that there are two brain types that mature in gender specific ways due 
to the hormonal environments in which male and female brains mature. In this view the female 
brain is biased to empathizing, while the male brain is geared toward systemizing (Baron-
Cohen, 2005; Goldenfeld, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2005). Empathizing is the drive to 
identify another person’s emotions and thoughts, and to respond to these with an appropriate 
emotion (i.e., a concept that necessitates ToM). Systemizing, on the other hand, is the drive to 
analyse the variables in a system and to derive its underlying rules. While empathizing makes 
it possible to predict another person’s behaviour on the basis of their thoughts and feelings, 
systemizing would facilitate an understanding of behaviour in terms of fairly rigid rules. 
Typically, people would possess these abilities in equal measures, with the average woman 
tending somewhat more toward empathizing than systemizing, and the average man being more 
inclined to systemizing rather than empathizing. According to the Extreme Male Brain 
Hypothesis, autistic people have an unusually strong tendency for systemizing instead of 
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empathizing, thus leading to a clinical profile that is characterised by weaknesses in social-
cognitive and social affective domains but strengths in areas such as computing, engineering 
and mathematics (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003).  
 Most of the evidence in support of the Extreme Male Brain Hypothesis stems from 
studies employing the Empathizing and Systemizing questioners developed by Baron-Cohen  
(2002) to capture these processing styles. Each questionnaire asks individuals to indicate to 
what extent certain behavioural and cognitive traits are characteristic of them, which allows for 
the calculation of separate empathizing and systemizing scores as well as a difference score 
that reflect the extent to which someone leans more toward one vs. the other type of processing.  
According to Baron-Cohen, the discrepancy between E and S can be used to classify 
individuals into one of five profiles. Type E (E >S): individuals whose empathy is stronger 
than their systemising. Type S (S >E): individuals whose systemising is stronger than their 
empathy. Type B (S = E): individuals whose empathy is as good (or as bad) as their systemising 
(B stands for ‘balanced’). And finally, two types of extremes; Extreme Type E (E >>S) includes 
individuals whose empathy is above average, but who are  impaired in systemising and extreme 
Type S (S >>E),  which includes individuals whose systemising is above average, but who are 
challenged when it comes to empathy. 
While typically developing individuals tend to score fairly similarly on both 
questionnaires (i.e., Type B), women often achieve greater empathizing than systemizing (Type 
E), and men greater systemizing than empathizing scores (Type S). Data from groups of autistic 
individuals consistently shows considerably higher systemizing than empathizing scores (i.e., 
an extreme Type S male profile of scores). This pattern of preferring systemizing is thought to 
contribute to the urge of ASD individuals to collect information within restricted areas of 
interest so as to understand the underlying rules governing a certain topic. Additional evidence 
for strong systemizing in ASD stems from studies comparing the performance of TD and ASD 
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participants in physics and mathematics in school tasks. Performance of ASD children (8-11 
years old) was reported to be above the level of typical teenagers, which suggests that compared 
to the general population autistic individuals have a remarkable ability to understand and 
manipulate complex systems such as scientific phenomena and machines (Baron-Cohen, et al., 
2001). As discussed in more detail shortly, the E-S concept is of interest in relation to social-
decision making where both empathising (and affective theory of mind) as well as systemizing 
are thought to play a role. 
All in all, the theories of ASD outlined thus far argue that the core clinical difficulties 
of ASD result from atypicalities specifically in social processes (see Gaigg, 2012 for a review). 
However, whilst these theories provide a useful framework for understanding the core social-
communication difficulties associated with ASD, they fall somewhat short of providing 
explanations for some of the non-social characteristics such as sensory processing difficulties 
and repetitive behaviours. Thus, a number of other theories have been developed that are more 
domain-general in nature.  
Cognitive perspectives of Autism. 
The core characteristics of ASD have not only been explained with reference to 
abnormalities in relatively domain-specific social-affective or social cognitive processes but 
also in terms of more domain general differences in the function of certain perceptual and 
executive function processes. Although these approaches to ASD will not be as pertinent to the 
topic of the current thesis as the theories just outlined, it is important to consider the evidence 
for them at least briefly to provide a comprehensive picture of the autistic phenotype. 
Executive Functions 
Executive functioning (EF) refers to the ability to flexibly allocate mental resources to 
guide thoughts and actions in light of internal goals and a considerable amount of evidence 
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suggests that ASD is characterised by difficulties in at least some facets of EF  (Hill, 2004; 
Robinson et al., 2009a). EF relies on top-down control mechanisms to regulate goal-directed 
behaviours and includes functions such as cognitive and behavioural inhibitory control; 
working memory and cognitive flexibility (Diamond, 2014). Built on these core domains are 
other functions such as reasoning, problem solving and planning, which are all supported by 
frontal areas of the brain, particularly the prefrontal cortex (Duncan & Owen, 2000).  
The evidence in relation to EF in ASD suggests that working memory and cognitive 
flexibility constitute particular areas of weakness in this disorder, with the evidence concerning 
other EF domains painting a more mixed picture (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Demetriou et al., 
2017).  For instance, a number of studies have demonstrated working memory impairments in 
ASD using n-back tasks, which require participants to monitor sequentially presented stimuli 
for certain repetitions that are separated by a certain number (n) of intervening stimuli. Autistic 
participants typically perform worse at lower number of intervening stimuli, suggesting that 
they have difficulties maintaining and/or updating the stimulus sequence in working memory.  
Similarly, autistic individuals have also been shown to have difficulties on measures of 
cognitive flexibility such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Berg, 1948; Grant & 
Berg, 1948). Here participates are asked to sort cards which show different numbers of symbols 
in different colours according to rules that the participant needs to discover through trial-and-
error and feedback. Unbeknownst to the participant, the rules that govern the feedback are 
changed periodically so that, at first, sorting according to the colour of the symbols is correct 
and at a certain point sorting by the number of symbols is correct. A considerable amount of 
evidence indicates that autistic individuals have difficulties switching from one rule to another, 
thus making perseverative errors (i.e., continuing to sort according to a rule that no longer 
yields positive feedback) (Kaland, Smith, & Mortensen, 2008; Pellicano, 2010; South, 
Ozonoff, & Mcmahon, 2007) 
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According to a number of authors, EF dysfunction might contribute to a number of the 
core clinical characteristics of ASD, including in both the social and non-social domains 
(Ozonoff et al., 1991; Russell, 1997). Specifically in the non-social domain EF dysfunction can 
account for need for sameness, strong tendency to stick to routines and stereotyped behaviour, 
lack of impulse control, and difficulties switching between tasks and initiating novel actions 
(Miller et al.,2015; Robinson et al.,2009b), all of which can lead to perseverance but also be 
detrimental for social interactions, which require flexibility. For instance, in day-to-day social 
life, we adapt to novel and possibly unexpected situations by drawing on our experiences 
through which we learn about agreed-upon conventions and views on how to behave, known 
as social codes. Through learning and experience we become aware that some of these codes 
(in fact most of them) are not universal and what is acceptable in one situation with a specific 
group of people may not be acceptable in a different situation or a different group of people. 
This learning involves the ability to monitor and understand other’s point of view (i.e., ToM) 
but also the ability to exert self-control to inhibit context-inappropriate responses and more 
generally to adapt flexibly to different circumstances. Failure to engage the EF system would 
compromise this latter ability and decrease the flexible selection of behaviours that are 
appropriately adapted to different social exchanges (Hughes, 2001; Leung et al., 2016) in a 
way that is expected by other people involved in the interaction.  As discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 2, some evidence already indicates that autistic individuals have difficulties adapting 
their behaviours flexibly as a function of the outcomes of their decisions in certain gambling 
tasks (e.g., Yechiam et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2006), suggesting that EF difficulties may also 
impact on social decision making.  
Weak Central Coherence / Enhanced Perceptual Functioning: 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of studies documented a phenomenon in 
ASD that could neither be explained by the mentalizing, nor the EF theories of the time – 
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namely that autistic individuals appeared to have a very detailed-focused perceptual style, often 
at the expense of ignoring ‘the bigger picture’. Clinical anecdotal evidence, for instance, 
suggested that autistic children often completed puzzles even when the puzzle pieces were 
face-down! Other reports suggested that autistic children often failed to recognise familiar 
adults because of changes in clothing or hairstyle (see Frith, 1989). This led Frith and 
colleagues (see Happé & Frith, 2006, for a review) to suggest that ASD was characterised by 
what they called weak central coherence (here after, WCC), which they defined as an 
impairment in the processing of global unifying meaning or gestalt, in the face of preserved 
processing of feature information and local detail. 
A considerable amount of evidence has accumulated in support of the WCC from 
studies that show that autistic individuals tend to outperform comparison participants on tasks 
that require participants to identify details in complex global shapes (e.g., Shah & Frith, 1983) 
or to assemble puzzles for which the resulting global form makes the assembly of the local 
pieces generally difficult(e.g., Shah & Frith, 1993; Happé, 1996). Since the initial formulation 
of the theory, however, the emphasis has shifted from the notion that autistic individuals are 
impaired in processing the global picture or ‘gestalt’, to the suggestion that they are biased to 
process local detail, which can often lead to a detriment in processing global information. For 
example, Mottron and colleagues, proposed that the pattern of observations across WCC-type 
tasks is a reflection of superior low-level perceptual processes that can, under some 
circumstances, interfere with otherwise intact global perceptual processes -the so called 
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) theory (see Mottron et al., 2001; 2006). Similarly, in 
their own review of the theory, of more than 50 studies, Happe and Frith (2006) concluded that 
the evidence is robust for a local bias rather than for impaired global processing.  
Similar to EF difficulties, WCC is thought to have consequences for some aspects of  
the social difficulties in ASD  (Russell et al.,2012) and not only the non-social characteristics. 
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For instance, WCC has been argued to contribute to the difficulties ASD have with interpreting 
gestures and body language, which need to be  processed coherently and as a part of the wider 
context otherwise resulting in an inaccurate interpretation of the social overture and the 
interaction. WCC has also been offered as an explanation for the face emotion processing 
difficulties that characterise ASD, as well as some of the language difficulties. Specifically 
people with autism often take things literally because they pay less attention to the context in 
which language is used (Wang et al., 2006 ; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2001).  
As this overview of the clinical and broader cognitive characteristics of ASD illustrates, 
the disorder affects many different processes and abilities that contribute to a clinical picture 
that is characterised primarily by difficulties in social communication and interaction. As the 
next section will illustrate, many of the social-cognitive processes that are considered to 
function atypically in ASD are thought to play an important role in social decision making. The 
next sections will first cover aspects of general decision making in the autism, followed by  
social decision making in the neurotypical population, with a particular focus on game theory, 
before returning to what we know about social decision making in autism.   
1.2 Social Cognition & Social decision-making 
  
Social decision-making falls under the umbrella of social cognition. In ability terms, 
social cognition is the capacity to attend to, recognize and interpret interpersonal cues that 
guide social behaviour (McDonald, 2013). In their review, and ahead of presenting some other 
definitions, Happé, Cook, & Bird (2017,p.244) define social cognition3 as “the processing of 
stimuli relevant to understanding agents and their interactions”. Other definitions (Baez & 
Ibanez, 2014, p.2) go on to make specific the link between social cognition and context: “it is 
                                                          
3  Cognition in this framework includes emotion (Ruff & Fehr, 2014) 
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a complex set of processes sub-serving adaptive social interactions”. The structure of social 
cognition is not yet fully defined, however broadly speaking, social cognition involves a 
complex set of processes sub-serving adaptive social representations and interactions (mind 
reading, emotion recognition, decision making, moral judgement, reinforcement and learning) 
and for each of these processes different strategies are involved depending on the specific 
context.  With the exceptions of reinforcement and learning which are not part of this research 
project, these processes are explained in detail in chapters 2-5.   
Since general decision making is involved in social decision making, we describe first 
what is known about general decision making in the Autistic population, and then we go into 
the specifics of social decision making in the general population before returning to the autistic 
population and the description of its behaviour during social decision making.  
General Decision-Making Studies in ASD 
A number of studies have investigated personal non-social decision making in ASD,  
which suggest that compared to typical controls, ASD participants show less response to 
contextual cues, more consistency in the choices they make (De Martino et al., 2008) and less 
reliance on intuitive thinking styles (Brosnan, Lewton, & Ashwin, 2016). For example,  De 
Martino et al, required participants (IQ and aged matched adults with ASD & TD controls) to 
choose between a sure option and a risky gamble while skin conductance (GSR) was measured. 
The monetary prospects were presented as either loss or gain. For example, if participants 
initially received £50, they were then required to choose between the options of gambling with 
a 40% chance of keeping all £50 and a 60% chance of losing all £50, and a sure option framed 
either as a gain “keep £20” or a loss “lose £30”. The two groups did not differ in their decision 
behaviours and the net gains they achieved. However, behavioural data showed that ASD had 
a reduced susceptibility to the framing effect, i.e. their choices were less affected by whether 
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an outcome was described as  ‘keeping’  or ‘losing’. Additionally, although higher levels of 
GSR were observed in ASDs they showed no difference in GSR response to loss and gain 
framing, unlike control participants who showed a stronger response to loss-framed outcomes 
than gain-framed outcomes. The authors argued that their results indicate that ASD participants 
fail to incorporate emotional context into the decision-making process. This reduction in the 
framing effect, although normative, may reflect a difficulty in the ability to take into account 
subtle contextual cues that are part and parcel of making decisions in the uncertain social world.  
On the other hand, Brosnan, Lewton, & Ashwin, (2016a) examined the relation between 
ASD and reasoning styles. In their study, participants (young adults with ASD & TDs) 
completed The Rational-Experiential Inventory-Short, a self-report questionnaire which 
measures engagement in, and enjoyment of cognitive activities (Rational component) and 
engagement and confidence in one’s intuitive abilities. In addition, participants also completed 
the original version of the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT), a task in which participants are 
presented with three questions that have a salient intuitive answer that is incorrect, thus 
requiring deliberation to find the correct answer. Behavioural results from the CRT showed 
that accuracy was higher in the ASD group, and these participants self-reported lower intuition 
levels compared to TDs on the Rational-Experiential Inventory-Short. Thus, the results 
suggested that autistic individuals have a tendency towards deliberative rather than more 
intuitive reasoning, which fits with the notion of increased systemizing in ASD as postulated 
by the extreme male brain hypothesis. More details about the CRT are given in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis. Together with the results of De Martino et al., (2008), these two studies provide 
evidence to suggest that there is a bias away from context-sensitive intuitive thinking and ASD 
may be associated with a greater tendency to engage more explicit rule-based  analytic thinking.  
Other aspects of the more general decision-making literature also point toward more 
deliberative rather than intuitive decision-making styles in ASD. For instance, studies using 
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self-report test batteries show that compared to TD individuals, ASD participants more 
frequently report experiencing difficulties in day-to-day decision making that would typically 
rely on intuitive rather than more deliberative processes. In Luke (2012), for example, ASD 
participants reported difficulties in decision making when decisions needed to be made under 
time pressure, requiring changes in routine or talking to others. In this study, ASD participants 
significantly more often than TDs also reported that they experienced higher levels of anxiety 
as a result of, and during decision making, as well as more decision-making avoidance. Both 
groups, however, reported similar degrees of reliance on rational decision styles suggesting 
that situations that would typically encourage reliance on intuitive decision making are 
experienced as more stressful for ASD participants because of the limitations they impost on 
relying on more deliberative processes. These results were further supported by Levin et al 
(2015) who, in addition to analysing data from self-report questionnaires, did a thematic 
analysis of data acquired through face-to-face interviews with young adults (TD vs ASD). And 
a study by Gaeth et al. (2016), who examined decision making in the general population in 
relation to self-reported autism-related traits, also supported the notion that such traits are 
related to a tendency for more deliberative rather than intuitive decision making styles. 
Specifically, participants who were classified as meeting cut-off criteria for ASD on a self-
report measure reported to be less impulsive decision makers. 
 In all three studies discussed above, the authors, Levin et al (2015), Gaeth et al. (2016) 
Luke (2012), are cautious about making generalizable claims based on their data, noting that 
the results should be considered preliminary and exploratory. They did this primarily for two 
reasons: First, selection criteria of ASD participants did not necessarily include the clinical 
verification of ASD by the experimenter, which raises questions about the extent to which the 
observations truly reflect characteristics of ASD. Second, in all three cases data was collected 
using a combination of standardized and unstandardized instruments, which questions the  
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validity of the data. Nevertheless, the data across studies appear to be consistent in indicating 
that ASD may be characterised by a more deliberative rather than intuitive decision-making 
style, which, in the context of game-theoretical paradigms discussed earlier, might lead to the 
expectation of more rational (economically speaking) choices.   
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Table 1.1 Summary of Studies in decision making in ASD 
Reference Features Paradigm Interaction4 Participants 
TD (ASD) 
Results 
Human PC No.  Age 
(De Martino, 
et al.,  2008) 
Framing effects 
GSR 
Gambling X X 15 (14) 34 ASD are less sensitive to 
the experimental context 
ASD high risk averse 
ASD showed absolute 
higher GSR 
Levels of GSR were 
unaffected by (Gaining 
vs Loosing) 
 
(Chiu et al., 
2008a, 
2008b) 
Reputation 
Brain activity 
(fMRI) 
 
Iterated trust 
game  
 
 X 16 (14) 15 ASD and TD made 
similar decisions as 
trustees and investors 
Groups showed different 
brain activity patterns 
 
(Wako 
Yoshida, 
Dolan, & 
Friston, 
2008)  
Executive 
Function 
Cooperation  
Accuracy-
rewarded  
 
Stag-hunt game  
 
 X 17 (12) 32 ASD and TD Groups 
have similar reaction 
times, earnings and 
cooperative rates.  
Less strategy’s changes 
were observed in the 
ASD group  
High IQ levels were 
associated with higher 
levels of cooperation  
(Izuma et al., 
2011) 
Reputation 
Mood  
Reaction Time 
Other’s 
presence (CPT) 
 
Dictator  
 
X X 11 (10) 29 In the ASD group the 
presence of other does 
not increase prosocial 
behaviour or reduce 
reaction time. 
 
  
(Luke et al, 
2012) 
General 
Decision-
Making Style 
Questionnaire 
(Standardized 
 X 40 (38) 34 ASD reported 
significantly more 
                                                          
4 It refers to whether participants interact with another human participant or with a computerized agent.  
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Inventory 
(GDMS) 
Self -reported 
anxiety 
Cognitive style 
 
and not 
standardized) 
Self -reported 
decision avoidance and 
higher levels of anxiety  
Time pressure, routine 
changes and talking to 
other were significantly 
more often reported by 
ASD to be detrimental to 
daily decision making.  
Reported reliance on the 
rational or dependant 
styles was not 
significantly different 
between groups (TD vs 
ASD).   
 
 
(Cage et al., 
2013) 
Reputation 
Theory of Mind 
Confederate 
Dictator  X X 20 (19) 34 Responses to the observer 
effect were not predicted 
by ToM levels. 
ASD were not affected by 
the observer effect when 
making donations to 
charity 
Reciprocal behaviour in 
human receivers 
similarly affect TD and 
ASD. 
 
(Levin et al., 
2015) 
Theory of Mind 
Decision 
making style 
Social 
Functioning 
Scale 
 
Self -reported 
Interview 
X  15 (15) 18-30 Less likely to make 
intuition based- decisions 
More risk averse 
(Brosnan et 
al., 2016) 
Cognitive and 
thinking style 
Dual Process 
Accounts 
(E-S) Theory 
 
CRT 
Self -reported 
(standardized) 
  18 (17) 29 Levels of ASD are 
associated with lower 
intuitive and greater 
deliberative reasoning 
styles. 
 
 
(Gaeth et al., 
2016) 
Decision 
making style 
Self-assessment 
for ASD traits. 
Self-reported 
(standardized) 
Mturk   
 
 X 91 (91) 31-37 Thinking Style, Attitude 
Toward 
Risk and Perception of 
Social Norms are 
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predictive of difficulties 
in everyday decision 
ASD was associated with 
more decision- making 
difficulties at home, 
school and work.  
ASD recognized 
problems with personal 
relations but failed to 
acknowledge the 
significance in their lives 
 
(Pantelis & 
Kennedy, 
2017) 
Theory of mind 
Strategic 
reasoning 
 
Beauty Contest. X X 51 (30) 26 ASD and TDs showed 
similar levels strategic 
Reasoning and response 
distribution. 
 
Social decision Making  
There are commonalities between social and non-social decision making: Both require 
the evaluation of outcomes, are influenced by learning from experience, and often involve the 
formulation (explicitly or implicitly) of predictions of the consequences of choices. However, 
in social decision making, these factors are all intertwined with an inherent uncertainty about 
the behaviour of others. Unlike in non-social personal decision making, where an individual 
need only to consider their own preferences (e.g., how much risk to take to achieve certain 
outcomes, how soon an outcome should be achieved, how much effort to exert to achieve a 
certain outcome etc.), in social decision making, individuals consider not only such personal 
preference but also the effect of a potential decision on one or more other people. Therefore 
social decision making relies to a great extent on the ability to create an accurate model of other 
people’s goals and intentions (Lee & Harris, 2013). Examples of social decision making 
include how two people agree on the strategies to achieve a common goal, or to achieve an 
individual goal that depends on how the other person behaves. 
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Social decision-making research is concerned with understanding how humans reach 
decisions that affect and are affected by others (Sanfey et al., 2003); decisions that are therefore 
typically informed by both self and other-regarding preferences (Lee, 2008; Rilling et al., 
2008). Most people successfully accomplish social decision making by flexibly engaging 
different cognitive mechanisms to strategically and simultaneously process information from 
social and non-social domains ( Frith & Frith, 2008a; Mcdonald, 2013), however there is also 
evidence suggesting that this flexibility may be absent in individuals with brain lesions in 
specific areas of the cognitive and reward network and for people with psychopathological 
conditions such as schizophrenia (Green et al., 2015) and autism  (Wass, 2011), the latter of 
which is the focus of the current research. 
One of the challenges in research in social decision making is how to effectively 
operationalise and mimic in a laboratory setting the complexity of the context in which 
naturalistic social decisions are taken and to isolate the factors that affect social decisions. In 
recent years, a body of work has emerged that seeks to overcome these challenges by using 
relatively simple  game theoretical scenarios to emulate the social environment and allow easier 
examination of the social decision-making process. The main reason for the growing interest 
in these paradigms is that ‘good’ performance requires not just a consideration of the options 
from the decision maker’s perspective, but also from the perspective of at least one other 
participant in a given scenario. Thus, the outcome to a player is contingent on the choices made 
independently by two or more players. In games of this nature, a player can benefit from 
considering the perspective and goals of other players, thus  implying a degree of mentalizing. 
It is worth nothing, that game theory paradigms are not simulations of the real world, 
and do not necessarily represent the structure and the relations that evolve in social situations. 
The games do, however, mimic some of the demands that are involved in social decision 
making and are often administered in an ecologically valid way by ensuring that the decisions 
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participants take have real consequences for themselves and others they interact with (e.g., 
loosing/winning/taking/giving money).Therefore, in these paradigms a human interaction is 
reduced to its simplest form and each experimental situation provides a pre-determined number 
of choices that participants can make, thus providing some experimental control over many of 
the factors involved in social behaviour (Wang, Yang, Li, & Zhou, 2015). The next section, 
will provide a general overview of research on decision making in game theoretical paradigms, 
followed by a section that focusses on the emerging literature in this area involving participants 
with an ASD diagnosis. 
Social decision making and game theory.  
Game theory is a mathematical model for the study of human conflict and cooperation 
within a competitive situation. The key pioneers of game theory were mathematicians John von 
Neumann and John Nash, as well as economist Oskar Morgenstern (Ellison, 1988), who 
introduced the concept of a “Game” as a metaphor for interactions with pre-defined rules and 
consequences. Game theory seeks to describe decision making in such interactions by assuming 
that decision makers behave fairly rationally to minimise losses and maximise gains. Game 
theory has provided a very useful framework for formally describing social decision behaviour 
and a number of game theoretical paradigms have been developed to examine  how  human 
behaviour is affected by factors such as rewards (punishment), altruism, reputation and 
cooperation. As the evidence described in forthcoming chapters of this thesis demonstrates, 
experimental results  have shed light on the complex nature of human interaction, which often 
violates the assumptions of economically maximising ‘rational’ decision makers.  
The simplest games involve two players, who make decisions independently from one 
another, with no opportunity to discuss the decision with, or even see, the other player. Players 
make a choice from two or more options, and financial payoffs for each player depend on the 
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combination of choices made by the two players. For example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
paradigm (Colman, 1995), two players are asked to decide whether or not they wish to 
cooperate with the other player to obtain, for example, some financial reward. The two players 
must make the decisions independently and they are told that if neither of them cooperates, the 
earnings will be lower (e.g., £1 for each player) than if they both decide to cooperate (e.g., £3 
for each player). Critically, they are also told that if they choose not to cooperate, while the 
other player cooperates, the earnings will be greater than in any other scenario for themselves 
(e.g., £5), whilst the other player will not receive any payment. In One-shot games, it would 
seem most rational not to cooperate since such a decision would guarantee earnings of at least 
£1 and possibly even £5, whilst cooperation might result in no earnings and at best £3. Thus, 
the dilemma is that individually, players are always better off defecting than cooperating, no 
matter what the other player chooses to do. Yet mutual defection leads to a substantially worse 
financial outcome than mutual co-operation. Perhaps because of this, although the 
economically rational is for both players to defect, in most studies, a sizeable proportion of 
players chooses to cooperate (see, e.g., Sally, 1995).  
Similarly, in the Ultimatum Game, which will be discussed at greater length shortly, 
one of two players (the proposer) is given the opportunity to split an amount of money (e.g., 
£10) with the other player (the responder). If the responder accepts the amount offered, the 
money is paid out accordingly but if the responder rejects, neither player receives any amount. 
Rationally, the proposer should offer the minimum amount possible under the assumption that 
a rational responder should accept any offer greater than 0. By contrast, however, it is 
consistently found that proposers usually offer 50% of the pot and responders typically reject 
offers that are less than 30% of the pot (Camerer, 2003c; Güth & Kocher, 2014; Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986a). The irrational nature of the proposer’s behaviour is even more 
striking in a non-strategic version of the Ultimatum Game known as the Dictator game in which 
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responders have no choice but to accept the proposed offer. Despite the fact that proposers in 
this scenario are guaranteed to receive the money they choose to allocate to themselves, they 
often give at least some to the responder (Kahneman et al., 1986).  
As this brief overview of some of the game theoretical literature illustrates, human 
social decision making often violates assumptions of economically rational behaviour. A 
considerable amount of evidence suggests that a number of interacting factors influence the 
magnitude of the deviations from rational decisions, including factors related to the decision 
maker such as their personality traits, their social-cognitive and social-emotional dispositions 
and their cultural background (Ruff & Fehr, 2014) but also contextual factors related to the 
game-theoretical scenario, such as any information about the other players involved (e.g., their 
socio-economic status or character), or manipulations of the nature of the task (e.g., single vs. 
multi-trial interactions; the size of potential gains and losses, etc). Given the relatively simple 
nature of game theoretical paradigms and the fact that they provide ecologically valid insights 
into the nature of human social interaction, it is somewhat surprising that only relatively few 
studies have examined social-decision making through such paradigms in ASD.      
Game theory in autism  
Hill, Sally & Frith (2004) were among the first to examine the possible consequences 
of theory-of-mind impairments in autism on decision behaviour in a version of the prisoners’ 
dilemma paradigm. Fifteen ASD adults and 15 age-matched TD adults were invited to play a 
set of three multi-trial (16 trials) prisoner’s dilemma involving either computer or human 
counterpart players. In two of the games, competition was promoted by encouraging 
participants to win as much money as possible, once whilst playing with a human counterpart 
(the experimenter), and once whilst playing with a computer counterpart. In the third game, 
they played with the human partner, a confederate, and cooperation was encouraged by telling 
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participants that any gains would be split between the two players at the end of the trials (though 
players were informed about their gains on a trial by trial basis). In addition to the prisoner’s 
dilemma scenarios, participants also completed a series of first and second order theory of mind 
tasks, which revealed the expected group differences whereby the ASD group performed 
worse5. Contrary to predictions, however, there were no group differences in the responses to 
the different versions of the prisoner’s dilemma games, despite the fact that both groups were 
sensitive to the different instructions that encouraged either more or less co-operation. 
Interestingly, neither group demonstrated differences between the two types of counterpart 
players (human vs computers). Specifically, in interviews following the tasks participants 
reported using the same strategy when playing either of the partners, concerning themselves 
mostly with maximising their rewards than thinking about the feelings and thoughts of the 
partner. Furthermore, there was no relationship between ToM performance and levels of 
cooperative behaviour. 
Downs & Smith (2004) also observed no group differences between 10 autistic children 
and a non-clinical comparison group on a multi-trial ‘tit-for-tat’ prisoner’s dilemma game, in 
which an imaginary counterpart player always made the decision that the participating child 
had made on the previous trial. The rate of co-operation was similar between the autistic and 
non-clinical comparison group, despite the fact that groups differed on a social-emotional test 
which indicated that autistic children had characteristic difficulties in attributing feeling states 
to others. Together with the findings by Hill et al., (2004), this suggests that despite social-
cognitive difficulties, neither children nor adults with an autism spectrum diagnosis differ in 
terms of their social-decision making, at least as far as the prisoner’s dilemma scenario is 
concerned. 
                                                          
5 Theory of mind tasks used: 1st order Sally- Anne task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983); 2nd order the Coat story 
(Bowler, 1992). 
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More recently, Tayama et al., (2012) also carried out a tit-for-tat prisoner’s dilemma 
experiment with 29 Japanese ASD adolescents and 28 age and IQ matched controls. Somewhat 
differently to the study by Downs & Smith (2004) and Hill, Sally & Frith (2004) the authors 
of this study used a variable pay-off matrix whereby repeated decisions not to cooperate would 
lead to progressively worse losses. The TD group were outperformed by the ASD group in 
terms of the overall number of points won. It was reported that while TD participants pursued 
personal gain by strategically trying to defect, and adjust their strategy to win points, the ASD 
group adopted a more consistent strategy probably motivated by a desire to discover the 
‘hidden’ rules of the game. The authors interpreted their findings in line with Baron-Cohen’s 
extreme male brain hypothesis, suggesting that ASD participant’s tendency for inflexibly 
sticking to a rule once it had been implemented may be a reflection of their tendency to 
systemize.   
In addition to studies concerning the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm, social decision 
making has also been examined in two studies using the Dictator game. Izuma et al., (2011) 
asked participants whether they wanted to donate part of a financial endowment or none to a 
charity, once in the presence of an unknown witness and once alone. The results showed that 
in the presence of others, TDs but not ASD donated more and responded faster than in the alone 
condition. In Cage et al. (2013) instead, participants were presented with a series of dictator 
choices but asked whether they were willing to lose some money so that a charity or a person 
(reciprocity condition) could gain some money. Unlike TD participants, ASD were not affected 
by the observer effect when making donations in the charity condition. However, when 
motivated by reciprocal behaviour in the receiver i.e. interacting with a person,  no differences 
were observed between TD and ASD groups. Together these two studies demonstrate that the 
decisions autistic individuals make are less affected by the effect of an observer and in none of 
the groups were the decisions made by participants predicted by ToM levels.  
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Additional studies examining social decision making have used the Stag-Hunt (Skyrms, 
2003), the Trust Game (J. Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) and the Beauty Contest (Nagel, 
1995) paradigms. In the former, Yoshida et al., (2010, 2008) asked ASD and TD participants 
to take part in a computerized version of the Stag Hunt. In its narrative form, two hunters have 
to decide independently whether to go to hunt a stag or a hare. A stag is the preferable option, 
however both hunters are needed in order to catch a stag, whereas a hunter can capture a hare 
alone. Thus, hunters face a dilemma: choose to hunt the stag, but risk catching nothing if the 
other hunter does not also choose to hunt the stag, or hunt the hare, and settle for a smaller 
reward. As such, the stag hunt is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma. Yoshida et al., used a 
multistep spatial hunt which finished when a prey was caught. Over the course of the multistep 
hunt, the computerized agent switched strategy unexpectedly, thus requiring the participant to 
adjust their strategy continuously and behave optimally in response to the change. The results 
showed that although ASD participants demonstrated intact understanding of the task, they did 
not show as strong an ability to adjust to the other player’s strategy. Performance showed 
difficulties in cognitive flexibility as ASD participants relied more on a fixed strategy even if 
the strategy had already proven to be unsuccessful. However, ASD and TD had similar reaction 
times, ended the task with similar profits, and had similar cooperation rates. 
In another game theoretical study that compared choices of ASD and comparison 
participants Chiu et al., (2008a, 2008b) investigated the brain mechanisms underlying social 
decision making during a Trust Game, also known as the investor game. In its basic form, one 
player (‘‘Investor’’) is endowed with a certain amount (usually money with adults) and chooses 
to send some portion of the endowment to the other player, the ‘‘Trustee’’. This chosen amount 
is tripled on its way to the Trustee, and the Trustee then decides what fraction of the tripled 
amount to repay to the Investor. This pay-repay cycle and the two decisions within it (invest, 
repay) constitute a round of play. The basic exchange is repeated within the interacting partners 
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for a number of rounds. The amount of money invested is a measure of the trust the investor 
has on the other but also carries the message; “trust me since, I trust you”. There were no 
differences between the choices made by the ASD and comparison group. However, in the 
ASD group no increased brain activity was seen in the mid cingulate cortex, an area related to 
self-reflecting in social situations, which suggest that ASD participants were less aware of the 
effect of their investment in the Trustee’s eyes. The authors argued that lower activation in this 
area reflect a diminished ability in ASD to simulate their reputation in the eyes of others. 
However, these results again indicate that behaviourally, the choices made by ASD and control 
participants are very similar.  
Pantelis & Kennedy (2017) implemented a Beauty contest game in which participants 
(Adults ASD & TD) were asked to simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. The 
mean of all choices for the given round is calculated, the only winner in that round is the 
decision-maker whose number is closest to a target number which is announced at the 
beginning of the game. The winner in this game is the player who chooses a number which 
represent 2/3 of the average of all numbers chosen by all players which were in total 250 
students. Apart from the obvious arithmetic competence to make the calculation, the game 
requires players to acknowledge that whatever reasoning strategy they follow, is likely to be 
followed by other players, thus decision behaviour in this game relies on components of theory 
of mind. There were no differences in the mean response between the two groups, suggesting 
that ASD participants used as much strategic reasoning as TDs.   
  
50 
 
Summary 
The literature reviewed in this section suggests that the performance of ASD and TD 
participants is overall fairly similar across a number of game-theoretical decision-making tasks. 
However, ASD participants appear less affected by the presence of observers (Chiu et al., 
2008a, 2008b;  Izuma et al., 2011), unless the interaction overtly suggests the possibility for 
reciprocation (Cage et al., 2013) and whilst they often respond with similar speeds in game-
theoretical tasks, and show similar patterns of cooperative behaviour as TD participants 
(Yoshida et al., 2008), different brain mechanisms seems to be involved when ASD individuals 
make decisions that involve others (Chiu et al., 2008; Frith & Frith, 2008b). Although theory 
of mind processes might be expected to be a source of group differences in social-decision 
making in ASD, several studies find that theory of mind levels do not predict decision 
behaviour in interactive games (e.g., Cage et al., 2013; Pantelis & Kennedy, 2017). In terms of 
results from other non-social decision making tasks, results show that ASD participants are less 
responsive to contextual manipulations, applying more consist decision making strategies 
across different experimental conditions instead (De Martino et al., 2008). Finally, studies also 
suggest less reliance on intuitive and more on deliberative thinking styles (Brosnan et al., 
2016). Table 1.1 provides an overview of some of the key existing decision-making studies in 
ASD, that have shaped our understanding of social and general decision making. These 
represent some of the crucial studies that motivate an investigation into decision making in 
ASD, and I will return to them throughout this thesis since a number of features of this literature 
are worth highlighting in relation to their effects in social decision making and autism.  
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1.3 Ultimatum Game 
 As the previous section illustrates, game theoretical decision-making paradigms are 
very informative about the processes involved in social decision making and a small number 
of studies have taken advantage of this to shed light on the social interaction difficulties that 
characterise ASD. The current thesis builds on this existing literature by examining social 
decision making in autism specifically in the context of the Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth et al., 
1982). The UG resembles a social interaction in the form of a simple economic exchange. In 
the standard UG, a One-shot, two-stage game6, two players are endowed with a certain amount 
of money (i.e. the Pot). In stage one, one of the players, who is designated the proposer, is 
asked to decide how to split the money between himself and the other player, who is designated 
the responder and who usually remains entirely unknown to the proposer. The responder is 
informed of the split that the proposer has made and chooses whether to accept it or to reject 
it. If the responder accepts the offer, the money is split as stated by the proposer. However, if 
the responder rejects, neither of the players gets any money.  
In scenarios such as the UG, where power is asymmetrically distributed between 
players, non-cooperative and self-interested models of social exchange would assume that both 
players would try to get the best possible outcome for themselves. If both players in the UG 
also assume that the other player will seek to maximise the income for themselves, the 
proposer’s best strategy would be to offer the minimum positive amount in the knowledge that 
the responder will accept given that any offer is better than receiving nothing (Ingolf Stahl, 
1972; Rubinstein, 1982a). Thus, if the game is played with a £10 pot, self-interested economic 
theories predict that the proposer7, should offer a £9:£1 split meaning that the proposer received 
                                                          
6 It is called One - shot because the players only interact once; and it is two stages because there are two 
decision moments in the game: stage 1 (the proposer decide how to split the money) stage 2 (the responder 
decide how to respond to the offer made by the proposer in stage 1) 
7 In the UG literature it is customary that the first number refers to the amount the proposer seeks to keep for 
themselves, whereas the second number refers to the amount that is offered to the responder. 
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£9 and the responder £1, because the responder will accept £1 instead of giving this offer up 
and receive nothing. However, ever since the UG was first tested by Güth et al., (1982) these 
predictions have been consistently violated across laboratory and field experiments and across 
different participant groups and societies. Instead, in most cases, about 50 percent of players 
choose an egalitarian decision strategy; Proposers generally tend to offer between 40 and 50% 
of the endowment and responders typically reject offers of less than 30% of the total pot. Offers 
lower than 20% are rare and almost always rejected; conversely, occasionally (although not 
very often) proposers even offer amounts higher than 50% of the pot. These are commonly 
known as hyper-fair offers, which are not often rejected, although this does also happen (for 
reviews of the UG literature see Camerer, 2003c; Güth & Kocher, 2014; Kahneman, Knetsch, 
& Thaler, 1986a; Debove et al 2016). 
These consistent non-normative behavioural findings on the UG, which go against the 
canonical predictions of self-interested maximization, have stimulated research across different 
disciplines to identify the conditions needed to promote fairness among individuals, and to 
understand the situational factors and psychological mechanisms that lead to the acceptance or 
rejection in ultimatum game-like scenarios. The sections that follow will provide an overview 
of this literature, starting first with a description of the effects on decision behaviour of 
manipulations to the structure of the UG, followed by a consideration of the role of individual 
differences in decision behaviour. 
Structural manipulations of the UG  
 The UG has been administered in a variety of different formats and with different 
instructions and broadly speaking decision behaviour seems robustly guided by a tendency to 
offer fair amounts and to reject unfair offers. When effects are observed as a result of 
experimental manipulations, it often appears to confirm that participants in the UG are 
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motivated more by the adherence to pro-social norms and consideration of others than by self-
interested strategies to maximise personal gain. For instance, there are two commonly used 
procedures by which participants are asked to make their decisions in an UG: the strategy 
method (SD) and the direct method (DM) (Brandts & Charness, 2011; Oxoby & McLeish, 
2004). In the strategy method, proposers and responders are asked to make their decisions 
simultaneously. Under this procedure, players are not assigned a specific role to play in the 
game but are instead prompted to indicate the offer(s) they would make if they happened to be 
allocated to the role of proposer, and to indicate whether they would be willing to accept each 
possible offer if they happen to be assigned the role of responder. In the direct method, by 
contrast, participants make decisions knowing their role, thereby knowing that responders will 
only decide when the offer from the proposer is disclosed to them. Initially, some evidence 
suggested that the strategy method might lead proposers to make more unfair offers, and 
responders to accept more unfair offers than the direct method. 
 Gehrig et al., (2007), for example, invited participants to choose from a set of 20 
possible splits, an offer to be passed to a responder, whilst being informed that responders were 
simultaneously making their decision on how they would respond to each possible offer. The 
results showed that proposers made more unfair offers and responders accepted more unfair 
offers than that which would be expected in the direct method, leading the authors to conclude 
that in situations in which the participants are uncertain about the decisions of the other players, 
a self-interested maximizing strategy prevails, whereby proposers are more likely to make 
unfair offers, and responders are more likely to accept all offers. Weber, Camerer and Knez 
(2004) reported similar findings but argued that the need to make multiple responses in short 
succession might be the reason why participants adopt the self-interested strategy of offering 
the least amount possible but also accepting any amount offered. Presumably the strategy 
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method minimises social considerations and makes the game more abstract, and any unfair 
offers less visceral and personal. 
Despite early suggestions of differences across the strategy and direct method, 
subsequent reviews of the literature indicated that findings were rather inconsistent and the two 
methods often lead to overall similar offers (i.e. 40 - 50 percent of the pot) and rates of rejection 
(Brandts & Charness, 2011). The current thesis will primarily make use of the direct method 
for examining decision behaviour on the UG in ASD because the role of social-cognitive and 
social-emotional processes is of prime interest in this context.  
Another task-related factor that has received attention in the UG literature is the amount 
of information participants are given about the other players involved in the UG scenario. 
Typically, the UG is played without providing the players with any information about the other 
player involved, under the assumption that providing such information may bias decision 
behaviour (Charness & Gneezy, 2008). In fact, providing certain kinds of information tends to 
have fairly strong effects on the decisions of both proposers and responders. For instance, 
providing information that gives clues about the socio-economic status of players 
systematically alters decision behaviour whereby unfair offers from seemingly poorer and/or 
disadvantaged proposers tend to be accepted more often than unfair offers from seemingly rich 
proposers, and offers to the former tend to be higher than offers to the latter kinship  (MacFarlan 
& Quinlan, 2008). Similarly, as stated by Charness and Gneezy (2008), information about the 
character of other players (e.g., whether they tend to be kind or mean) tends to affect decision 
behaviour toward them with negative trait attributes leading to lower offers and greater levels 
of rejections of unfair offers, whilst positive attributes tend to lead proposers to offer more and 
responders to accept less. These effects have been explained by the fact that information about 
the players such as this provides a context within which to understand the motivations of the 
other players behaviour.  
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In addition to the effects of providing specific character attributes about players in 
social-decision making paradigms, some studies have also looked at the effects of player 
anonymity. For instance, (Charness & Gneezy, 2008) explored how UG behaviour might be 
affected by providing participants with some minimal knowledge about the other players 
involved. In a 2 x 2 design, they had 60 students playing either the UG or the Dictator Game 
whilst having (or not) information about the other player’s family name. Both games were 
played in their standard one-shot form, i.e. one interaction8. Results indicated that names had 
a significant effect on the Dictator Game behaviour but not on the UG behaviour. Specifically, 
in the dictator game, offers were significantly more generous in the name condition than in the 
no name condition, whereas in the UG participants made the standard offer for this game 
(50:50) and rejected offers below 30 percent in both conditions. The increased offers in the 
name condition in the Dictator Game, suggests that a lack of anonymity promotes more pro-
social attitudes and decision behaviours, possibly by reminding participants of the social norms 
that might typically guide their behaviours. The fact that UG decisions were not affected by 
the anonymity manipulation suggests that pro-social motives might play a more significant role 
in this compared to the dictator game by virtue of the fact that responders can influence the 
outcome of the proposer’s decisions. Proposers, in this context, need no reminder of the social 
norms that guide their behaviour because the nature of the task, with a clearly defined role of 
responders, might serve that function. And responders might not alter their decisions when 
given names of the proposer because they are also naturally guided by motives to safeguard 
social norms and fairness.  
Additional evidence for the role of prosocial attitudes in UG decision behaviour stems 
from studies that have manipulated the extent to which a participant’s behaviour remains 
                                                          
8 To recall, the Dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986) is  structurally similar to the ultimatum game, in that one 
player is given a sum of money to split between themselves and a second player. However, in this case, the 
second player has no recourse – they must accept the split. 
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anonymous, rather than manipulating the amount of information that is available to them about 
other players. For instance, evidence from repeated games, where participants interact more 
than once, suggests that participants guard their reputation by adhering more closely to 
prosocial values and norms of fairness than in one-shot games (Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 
2000). Conversely, other data show that in contexts where there is a high degree of anonymity 
for players (e.g. Games over the internet where people do not know other’s player name, how 
they are or  how they look like) proposers make significantly smaller offers than is typically 
the case (Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996). However when anonymity is low, such as in 
iterated games in which a player’s previous decisions become shared knowledge, fair offers 
are not only the norm but unfair behaviour is more readily punished with rejection than is 
normally the case (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Perhaps the clearest indication that decision 
behaviour (and in particular the urge to reject unfair offers) is motivated by pro-social values 
stems from studies which show that responders in the UG, and in other game theoretical 
scenarios are not only willing to forgo personal gain in order to punish unfair behaviours, they 
are even willing to incur a cost for discouraging unfairness (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Gintis et al., 2003). 
The final task manipulation to be considered in this section, which also lends support 
to the notion that pro-social values play a significant role in decision behaviour in the UG, is 
the manipulation of the size of the pot and the nature in which it is presented to participants. 
Such manipulations are of interest because such manipulations either change the stakes of the 
game (proposers and responders could potentially forgo a large sum of potential earnings) or 
the sense of entitlement players feel for a certain share of the money, e.g. Different appreciation 
might be given to money people have worked for compared to money they happen to find. It 
is noteworthy that this attitude towards unexpected money may be culture-dependant.   
Manipulations of this kind therefore provide an interesting way to pitch self-interested 
57 
 
strategies against more pro-social values (e.g., how much money would you be willing to forgo 
in order to punish unfair behaviour; and how much of a pot you feel entitled to would you give 
up). 
Hoffman et al., (1996) compared the decision behaviour of 96 university students in 
two conditions with a different pot size of either $10 vs $100. Additionally, in half of the 
participant pairs (48 participants) proposer and responder roles were arbitrarily assigned by the 
experimenter (the random condition), whereas for the other half of participants the game was 
framed as a selling/buyer scenario (the entitlement condition), in which participants’ allocation 
to proposer or responder role was ostensibly on the basis of how well they scored in a general 
knowledge test. Results showed that in the random condition there was no significant 
difference in the distribution of proportional offers as a function of pot size, but rejection rates 
were higher in the $10 condition than the $100 condition. However, in the entitlement 
condition, the pot size modulated both proposer and responder behaviour. On average 
proposers offered less, and rejection rate was lower than in the random condition. Rejection 
rate in the smaller pot was interpreted by the authors as a sign of “respect” towards the proposer 
earned entitlement. Whereas, rejection rate when the pot was $100 was perhaps “a sign of 
reduced sympathy” towards a greedy proposer. All in all, the results suggest that individuals 
engage more self-interested strategies as the pot increase and this effect is even more 
pronounced when they feel entitled to the pot.  
To further this line of research, Andersen et al. (2011) examined the effects of a pot-
size manipulation in an ecologically very valid context. Specifically, they carried out a study 
in an Indian village that was economically relatively deprived, using the local currency (Rupee) 
to create four pot types. The smallest pot was the equivalent to less than an hour of work 
whereas the largest pot was equivalent to half a year of salary (in dollars $0.41, $4.1, $41, and 
$410). Participants (n=916) were randomly assigned to the role of proposer or responder in 
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each of the four pot-size conditions. The median offer was only 20% of the pot, which is a 
considerably lower percentage than the 50% to 40% commonly found in previous UG pot 
(Camerer, 2003c; Güth & Kocher, 2014; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986a). More 
importantly, there was an increase in the percentage offered as the size of the stake increased, 
suggesting that proposers may be less willing to risk losing high values due to rejections by the 
proposer. Similarly, an inverse relation between pot-size and rejection rates (i.e. rejection rate 
in the smallest pot was higher than rejection rate in the largest pot) suggests that in the role of 
responder participants were less willing to sacrifice large amounts of potential earnings to 
punish unfair behaviour. These findings suggest that – for responders at least – with sufficiently 
high stakes, self-interested motives start to dominate an otherwise very robust tendency to 
behave pro-socially in the UG. 
Another group of researchers, exploring the effect of pot size in UG-decision behaviour 
changed the pot altogether, and instead of money used time as currency. Berger et al. (2010) 
reasoned that in the standard UG, participants may feel that they should behave fairly because 
the pot of money they make their decisions over is provided by the experimenter and therefore 
any decision does not incur any real cost to the participant (Burger, 2009). To overcome this 
potential bias, Berger et al., (2010) used time instead as the value to decide over. Time is not 
provided by the experimenter but represents a natural ‘resource’ that people typically value and 
do not want to give up unless for good reason. Berger et al. expected, therefore, that compared 
to monetary stakes, offers of time would be less generous and rejection rates lower. In the 
experiment, participants were asked to bargain anonymously over waiting time to collect their 
fees for having participated in some experiments. The proposer was asked to split 60 minutes 
of waiting time with another randomly assigned partner with the typical instruction that the 
responder could either accept or reject and therefore affect whether both partners would wait 
for the proposed amounts of time (if accepted) or each have to wait 60 minutes (if rejected). 
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The modal offer was thirty minutes, and only one offer was rejected: the split suggested the 
responder to wait 40’ and the proposer 20’. Contrary to the standard rational prediction, the 
results suggested that participants in this variant of the UG behaved just as fairly as is the case 
in the typical UG scenario, suggesting that even when decisions incur certain costs, pro-social 
attitudes or value appear to dictate that such costs should be shared equally. 
Overall, the evidence outlined in this section suggests that decision behaviour in the 
UG is fairly robust across different implementations of the basic paradigm. Irrespective of 
whether proposers and responders make their decisions simultaneously or successively, 
whether the game is played for real or hypothetically, whether the pot size is small, moderate 
or large and whether there are costs involved in taking one decision over another, participants 
reliably behave irrationally in a purely monetary sense, upholding and protecting social values 
of fairness and equity over attempting to maximise personal gains. That said, structural 
variations in experimental design can influence the extent to which people relatively weight 
fairness and monetary gain considerations. 
In addition to structural elements, there are also considerable individual differences in 
UG behaviour, which have attracted considerable interest as a source of information about what 
psychological factors contribute to other-regarding preferences vs. more self-interested social-
decision making. These will now be discussed. 
Cultural and individual differences 
A number of studies have examined the influence of cultural factors on UG behaviour, 
to determine whether the values that appear to motivate fair decisions in this paradigm are 
universally upheld and, if not, understand what societal and cultural factors might make people 
behave in more self-interested ways. In a large cross-cultural study (Henrich et al., 2001) 
examined whether UG behaviour was affected by the survival practices (nomadic, subsistence 
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agriculture and sedentary agriculture practices) of participants from 15 small -scale societies 
in 12 countries from different parts of  the world. The pot size was the equivalent to two days’ 
salary, and the currency used was chosen based on the community’s trading customs, either 
their local money or goods. The findings from proposers showed that mean offers ranged from 
26 to 58%, which represented a larger range than that observed in industrialized societies 
(between 44 and 50%). Similarly, the acceptance threshold was 16% rather than the 30-40% 
that is typically observed (Camerer, 2003c; Güth & Kocher, 2014; Daniel Kahneman, Knetsch, 
& Thaler, 1986a) and hyper-fair offers were often rejected. In none of the groups the homo 
economicus maximizing behaviour was observed that would lead to minimal offers that would 
often be accepted. However, the wide range of offers and lower threshold for acceptances 
suggests that trading and social norms within the community may influence the extent to which 
social-decision making is driven by pro-social vs. more self-interested motives. 
 A few years later, Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2003) examined whether academic level 
would impact UG decisions, based on the assumption that non-academic participants would 
rely more on social norms of fairness when making their decisions, whereas academics will 
rely more in rational game theory models, the issue was examined by implementing an online 
experiment. The authors used a novel approach to create a diverse pool of participants 
(diversity in academic background, age, gender and geographical origin) by inviting student 
and non-student readers of the Berliner Zeitung from both Berlin and Innsbruck to play an UG. 
This newspaper was selected as readers were known for not having a high academic 
background. Participants were asked to play both roles as proposers and responders over 10 
independent trials that added up to a total pot value of 1000 Deutche Mark (around £600) - one 
of the largest pot sizes to be examined in the literature. Payment of participants was supported 
by the newspaper. Decisions were paid to three pairs randomly chosen and according to their 
decisions. Geographic origin of the participants had no effect on decision behaviour. The split 
61 
 
mode was half of the pot (DM-500) and acceptance rate increased as the offer increased. 
Against the prediction, strategic fairness was suggested to have motivated decision behaviour 
similarly in this pool of participants. Against the prediction, levels of education did not 
differentiate between those with self-interested and prosocial preferences. Interestingly, 
comparing responses by medium, i.e. those who submitted their responses via email, fax or 
post, it was reported that responder using email were more likely to make decision based in 
self-interested motives than those who submit their responses by fax or via post. Since internet 
is more commonly used by young readers who in addition are likely to be within the education 
system, the results were used to partially support the initial hypothesis.  
The two studies by Henrich et al., (2001) and Güth, Schmidt and Sutter (2003) are 
among the representative studies that have examined cultural and educational influences over 
UG decision making, suggest that learning,  cultural shared value and rules of social exchange 
that apply in day-to-day life influence UG behaviour at different levels. In his review Henrich 
et al., (2005) suggested that prosocial behaviour increases with market integration and relates 
to the value assigned to cooperation in daily life.   
In addition to the broad cultural factors that have been found to affect social decision 
making in the UG and other game-theoretical paradigms, a number of individual characteristics 
have also been found to play a role, including a person’s ethical dispositions and concerns for 
equity, and also their analytical skills and attitudes towards risk (Brandstätter & Güth, 2002). 
Since many of the characteristics that are suspected to play a role in determining decision 
behaviour in the UG are also known to vary systematically across gender, for example, it is 
interesting that some gender differences do, indeed, exist in UG behaviour. Specifically, 
whereas proposer behaviour does not differ systematically between men and women (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001), as responders women tend to reject significantly more unfair 
offers than men do (Solnick, 2001). Furthermore, both Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Croson 
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and Buchan (1999) found that men and women behave similar  in environments not involving 
risk, as the UG, meaning that as responders players may have other reason to accept/ reject 
than the one given by default in nature in the form of gender. Despite the mixed results in 
regards to the effect of gender in the UG behaviour, the existing results are worth mentioning 
given the extreme male brain theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 2002). This theory suggests that 
ASD behaviour represents an extreme version of typical male behaviour relative to female 
behaviour. Thus, if men accept more unfair offers than women, then ASD participants might 
be expected to accept even more than male of female neurotypical controls.  
Although in the UG players know in advance the consequence of their decisions, 
García-Gallego et al. (2012) found that aspects of risk aversion explain decision behaviour  in 
an UG framed as an interaction between employer and employee. The risks involved in the UG 
are very different for the proposer and responder roles, since the responder faces a completely 
risk-free decision, whereas the proposer faces the risk of having their offer rejected. Thus, 
attitudes toward risk (e.g., risk aversion) should play less of a role for responder than proposer 
behaviour. García-Gallego et al., (2012) confirmed this prediction by showing that risk-averse 
individuals tended to make higher offers than non-risk averse individuals, whilst no such 
association was found in relation to responder behaviour.  
In relation to ASD, studies suggest that autistic individuals tend to be generally more 
risk averse, possibly as a result of increased levels of anxiety and the associated ‘fear of failure’. 
For instance South et al. (2011) used a version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, in which 
participants (ASD & TD) were asked to “pump” a virtual balloon without reaching the 
explosion point, which varied randomly across balloons. The two groups did not differ in the 
number of risky pumps per trial, and both groups showed similar skin conductance level. 
However, it was found that the frequent anxiety in the cognitive profile of ASD correlate with 
risk taking and an increased motivation to avoid failure and punishment as measured by the 
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BIS component of the BIS/BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994). Further evidence by  (Bejerot, 
Eriksson, & Mörtberg, 2014; Robertson et al., 2018) confirmed that anxiety is a recurrent issue 
for ASD. Taken together this evidence suggest that as proposers, autistic individuals are likely 
to make egalitarian offers during the UG. As responders the evidence is less clear. The stronger 
emotional reactivity in anxious individuals may lead individuals to have oversensitive reactions 
to inequitable UG- offers and reject more often (Grecucci et al., 2013), however high anxiety 
could also increase acceptances rates to avoid confrontation (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & 
Fresco, 2002).  
Among the most important factors thought to contribute to individual differences in 
social-decision making, and one that is related to the concept of risk aversion, is the sensitivity 
of individuals to the emotional salience of events. There is a growing consensus in the social-
decision making literature (and the decision making literature more generally) that humans 
deviate from the rationality predicted by normative laws of social exchange (Simon, 1986) 
because of the emotional salience of different decisions and their consequences (Loewenstein, 
2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). Processing of emotion-related 
information is crucial for goal attainment and for social exchange, for instance when forming 
mental models about other’s intentions and goals (Fessler, 2007; Singer et al., 2005). Emotions 
have been reported to shape behaviour (Damasio, 1994) and guide decision making (Haidt, 
2001; Rilling & Sanfey, 2011) and impairments in emotion-related processing due to brain 
injury increases risk taking (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). Critically, studies have 
shown that participants’ decisions tend to be guided by physiological markers (so-called 
somatic markers) that are argued to represent the emotional salience of the different decks in a 
decision-making task and these Somatic Markers tend to guide decision behaviour before 
participants can explicitly reason about what motivates their decisions (Bechara et al., 1997).  
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Much of the research underlying the somatic marker hypothesis has used the Iowa 
Gambling Task. This task requires participants to choose cards from one of four decks with the 
aim to win as much money (or as many points) as possible. Each choice leads, probabilistically, 
to certain amounts of winnings and losses. Some decks yield on average greater wins than 
losses, whilst the other decks are disadvantageous. Neurotypical participants generally learn to 
choose advantageous decks (Bechara et al., 1997). However, with lesions in the ventro-medial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), who have relatively intact cognition but struggle with emotional 
processing, tend to continue to choose the disadvantageous decks. Furthermore, unlike 
controls, vmPFC patients did not show anticipatory changes to skin conductance response 
before choosing from disadvantageous decks, suggesting that they did not have the same 
automatic emotional response to available options that could guide decision making (Bechara 
et al., 1997;  Bechara & Damasio, 2005). These results have implications for UG behaviour 
because studies by Sanfey et al., (2003) and Van’t Wout et al., (2006) suggest that somatic 
markers also guide responder behaviour with increased arousal typically associated with higher 
rates of rejection. I will come back to this topic in chapter 3.   
Another factor that has been the focus of interest in the context of the social decision-
making literature is the role of cognitive style. According to several authors (Evans & Frankish, 
2012; Daniel Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 
2011) while some people tend to make choices primarily on the basis of intuition, others tend 
to rely on more controlled reasoning, which have respectively been referred to as System 1 and 
System 2 modes of information processing. System 1 is thought to process information fast, 
automatically and based on heuristics and operate independent of general intelligence and 
working memory abilities, whereas system 2 is regarded as slow, deliberate and analytical, 
depending on general intelligence and working memory. Previous studies have examined 
System 1 and 2 through the CRT task (3i-CRT: Frederick, 2005). In addition to play as 
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responder in a UG, participants were asked by Calvillo et al., (2015) and  De Neys et al., (2011) 
to complete the cognitive reflection task (3i-CRT: Frederick, 2005).  The test, fully described 
in Chapter 3, is a behavioural task to measure difference an individual’s tendency to over-ride 
an intuitive response and engage in a deliberative reasoning style. As noted briefly above, in 
the task, participants are presented with a number of mathematical problems which have two 
responses: an apparent correct answer, labelled in this context, intuitive; and a correct response 
to which people arrive by deliberation. Accordingly, individuals come up with correct 
responses after successfully suppressing intuitive answers. Accuracy in the 3i-CRT was found 
to predict acceptances of unfair offers.  As noted earlier, evidence in relation to ASD suggests 
better performance on the CRT (e.g., Brosnan et al., (2016a) suggesting that ASD might be 
characterised by a greater tendency to accept unfair offers. 
The final individual difference factor that is worth pointing out is the role of sex 
hormones in UG decision behaviour, most notably testosterone and oxytocin. These hormones 
have started to get the attention of decision making researchers since levels of such hormones 
have been found to be relevant for the study of preference building and social status. From an 
adaptive perspective to explain human behaviour, it has been shown that high testosterone 
individuals are more willing to engage in conflict whereby this kind behaviour operates as 
reputation management mechanism to establish a position within the social hierarchy (Book, 
Starzyk, & Quinsey, 2001). In the UG, for instance, rejection is considered a form of 
punishment that serves as a psychological mechanism to subordinate group members that 
represent danger to the punisher or to the status of the wider community (Clutton-Brock & 
Parker, 1995). Burnham (2007), asked twenty-six male adults to play as proposers and 
responders in one-shot UG with a $40 pot, giving participants the option as proposers to only 
choose either $5 or $25 offers out of $40. Testosterone measures were taken from saliva before 
and on the day of the experiment. Results showed a significant correlation between high 
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testosterone levels and high rejection rate of the unfair offers. Zak et al., (2009) extended these 
findings to proposer behaviour using an experimental rather than correlational procedure. The 
study was also done with a male pool of participants who received artificial testosterone, 
applied in the form of gel and spread in their shoulder and upper back. Compared to participants 
who received the placebo, testosterone receivers showed reduced generosity of the offers by 
27% and this participant also reject more unfair offers.  
Turning to the effects of oxytocin, a hormone associated with generosity and empathy 
evidence is given by the  same group of  researchers (Zak, Stanton, & Ahmadi, 2007) who 
tested the effect of oxytocin in decision behaviour. Oxytocin was administrated to male 
participants through intranasal infusion. As proposer, oxytocin’s receivers were 80% more 
generous than participants on placebo. However, no effect was observed in responder 
behaviour. As concluded by the authors themselves, the effect of testosterone and oxytocin in 
UG decision behaviour is still speculative and more evidence is needed. More generally, there 
is evidence suggesting that high testosterone hinders oxytocin receptors binding, and this effect 
becomes of particular interest to this research project. According to the E-S theory of autism 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002) high testosterone is associated with autism and since testosterone levels 
hinder oxytocin binding, lower levels of empathy are expected in this group, which will be then 
associated with less generous offers when playing as proposers. On the other hand, in the 
general population testosterone seems to play a more central role in male behaviour than in 
female behaviour, therefore this effect may be heightened by autism, resulting in higher 
rejection rate of unfair in the ASD group.    
Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the main clinical and associated cognitive 
characteristics of Autism Spectrum Disorder, highlighting that ASD is primarily a disorder of 
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social-communication and social affective behaviours that is thought to be the consequence of 
a combination of developmental differences in low-level perceptual and higher-level cognitive 
domains. Many of these differences – in Theory of Mind, Social-emotional processes, 
Executive Functions and the balance between a tendency to systemize vs. empathize – all 
appear relevant to how individuals make decisions in social encounters. The second section of 
this literature review, therefore outlined research on the UG in the general population. The UG 
is a simple and interesting game-theoretical paradigm for examining a whole variety of decision 
making strategies and motivations – including economic rationality, fairness, reciprocity, 
insight into the strategies of others. Unlike individual decision-making tasks, the UG requires 
from participants the ability to understand the broader social context in which decisions need 
to be made and research on this paradigm highlights that many of the processes that appear to 
guide decisions are those that tend to be implicated in the cognitive phenotype of ASD. The 
aim of the work presented in the following chapters, therefore, is to scrutinize social-decision 
making in ASD on variants of the UG to establish to what extent ASD is characterised by 
atypicalities in the social-decision making domain. In the first study, presented in Chapter 2, 
decision behaviour is examined in the most basic version the One-shot UG and a number of 
individual difference factors are examined (e.g., Theory of Mind) to establish what predicts 
certain decisions in ASD vs. TD participants. In the second study, the role of emotions in UG 
responder behaviour is then assessed in more detail in a multi-trial UG that permits the 
examination of emotional responses using GSR, as participants decide over offers presented 
by human vs computer proposers. In Chapter 4, information processing styles are probed by 
imposing a time pressure manipulation while participants responded to different fair and unfair 
offers of a UG and the Cognitive reflection task was also used to quantify System 1 vs. System 
2 processing styles. Finally, in the fourth study set out in Chapter 5 a modified version of the 
standard UG is implemented, known as the mini-ultimatum game, which provides insight in to 
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the extent to which responders consider the intentions of offers from proposers (rather than the 
absolute value of the proposed amounts).  
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2 EXPERIMENT 1: ONE SHOT ULTIMATUM GAME  
 
The last few decades have seen an increasing interest in understanding the impact of 
social cognitive processes on the decisions people make in social interactions. Contrary to a 
classic assumption in economic exchange, which suggests that out of rationality people are 
self-interested and material-maximisers, it is now largely agreed that our preferences reflect 
not just the material outcomes, but other wider social cognitive considerations such as 
preferences for reciprocity, fairness, and the consideration of how a particular choice will be 
perceived by others. The ultimatum game (UG), outlined in the previous chapter, is amongst 
the most widely used paradigms to illustrate how prosocial motives can lead to violations of 
economic rationality (Güth et al., 1982).  
Briefly, to reiterate, in the UG a proposer decides how to divide a given amount of 
money between themselves and a responder, who can either accept or reject the proposal. If 
the responder accepts, the money is distributed as the proposer suggests, but if the responder 
rejects then neither player receives anything. Rational theories of economic behaviour predict 
that proposers will offer the lowest positive amount of the total pot possible since a rational 
responder should accept any amount above zero (Rubinstein, 1982b; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). However, contrary to this prediction, results from the UG consistently 
show that neither the proposer nor the responder conform to the expectation that people behave 
to individually maximize their gains. Instead, the modal offer proposers normally make is 50% 
of the total pot, and at least half of responders reject offers below 25 - 30% of the stake 
(Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Güth et al., 1982; Rubinstein, 1982b).  
As outlined in chapter 1, a number of social-cognitive and social affective processes 
have been identified as likely contributors to the systematic violations of economic rationality 
on the UG. These processes include those that are reliably implicated in the clinical and/or 
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broader cognitive characterisation of ASD, such as understanding other people’s intentions 
(ToM: Theory of mind) and emotions (Empathizing) and the drive to understand the logical 
rules that govern cause and effect relations (Systemizing). And processes about which less is 
still known in the context of ASD, such as the balance between the behavioural activation 
(BAS) and behavioural inhibition (BIS) systems, which guide the seeking of rewards versus 
the avoiding of risk and losses respectively. The following sections will examine these 
processes again in more detail to derive predictions about how autistic adults might behave as 
proposers and responders in the UG paradigm.  
Theory of mind: Given the nature of the UG paradigm, it is relatively uncontroversial 
to suggest that the ability to anticipate other’s actions in terms of their thoughts and desires 
should play an important role in guiding decision behaviour. Yet, experimentally, it is not easy 
to demonstrate the role that ToM plays in this context. One approach that illustrates the role of 
ToM indirectly, and which will be the focus of the next chapter, is to compare UG-decision 
behaviour between conditions where either a human generates offers or offers are generated 
randomly by a computer or a roulette wheel. Such studies show greater rejection rates of unfair 
offers from a human than a computer proposer (Blount, 1995; Van’t Wout et al, 2006), 
arguably, because participants base their responder decisions, at least in part, on considerations 
about the intentions that motivated unfair proposals. Other evidence stems from brain imaging 
studies that indicate that brain regions typically associated with ToM functions are activated 
during the UG (Rilling et al., 2004). Most relevant to the current chapter, however, are studies 
that seek to examine the role of ToM more directly, either by comparing decision behaviour 
between groups of participants who differ with respect to their ToM abilities, or by examining 
associations between decision on the UG and performance on tasks that are considered to 
provide a valid measure of ToM ability. 
71 
 
In typical development, ToM abilities are thought to first emerge at age of around 4 
years, at which point most children pass standard 1st order standard false belief tasks, such as 
the Sally-Anne test described in Chapter 1 – in other words, they understand that someone else 
can hold beliefs that differ from reality and/or their own beliefs. By age 6-7 years, most 
typically developing children also begin to understand 2nd order belief situations (e.g., John 
thinks that Mary thinks that it is raining) and continue to grow in parallel with the development 
of executive functions, specifically those concerned with inhibitory control (Dumontheil, 
Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Im-Bolter, Agostino, & Owens-Jaffray, 2016). In the context of 
this typical trajectory of ToM development, it is interesting that UG behaviour differs between 
children of different ages. For instance, Harbaugh, Krause and Liday (2003) compared decision 
behaviour of children under the age of 11 years against the standard reported findings for adult 
behaviour in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games. Compared to the adult data, the children made 
smaller offers as proposers, and more often accepted unfair proposals as responders. Güroǧlu, 
Van Den Bos and Crone (2009) extended these findings by comparing 9, 12, 15 and 18-year 
olds on their proposer and responder behaviour in a mini-UG paradigm. With this design the 
authors controlled distributive and intentional fairness by limiting the distributional options 
available to proposers. Proposers had to choose one of two offers, one option was always an 
unfair 8-2 offer, whilst the other option was either fair (5-5), even more unfair (10 - 0) or hyper-
fair (2-8). If participants as responders cared only for distributive fairness, their decision would 
only depend on the amount they were offered. If they cared about the proposer’s intention, they 
would be expected to reject offers when the proposer had the option of making a fairer offer, 
but not if the offer was the fairest available to them. Similar to Harbaugh et al., (2003), younger 
children were less likely to choose the fairest option available to them than the older children 
with a linear increase in fair decisions across the four age groups. Furthermore, as responder 
younger children were less sensitive to the options the proposer would have had to choose from 
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than older children, again with linear changes across ages. Together, these findings suggest that 
children from age 9 onwards increasingly take into consideration the intentions of others when 
making decisions in the UG. 
Although the studies just mentioned are in line with the suggestion that ToM plays a 
role in social decision making, they do not directly assess ToM involvement. More direct 
evidence in this sense, stems from a study by Takagishi and colleagues (2010), who compared 
UG behaviour between those who pass and those who fail a ToM task. Specifically, sixty-eight 
typically developing five-and-a-half-year-old children (M = 65.8 months; SD = 7.0) were 
invited to take part in a one-shot UG, with the children randomly paired and randomly 
designated to play either as proposer or responder. The experimenters developed a set-up that 
allowed children to interact face-to-face while bargaining over ten candies. Children in the 
proposer role were instructed to choose candies for himself and to leave the remaining candies 
for their partner in the tray that all candies were initially presented in. Children were told what 
would happen if the child in the responder role accepted or rejected the candies they were 
offered – adults who were present during the interaction would either distribute the candies 
according to the proposal or take them away. Following the UG interaction, all children 
completed the Sally-Anne task as a measure of ToM (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985). Eighty three 
percent of children who passed the false belief task made a fair proposal (5 candies to the 
responder) while only 36% of those who failed to pass the false belief task proposed a fair 
offer. In the role of responders, children rejected offers that were below 50% (five candies) and 
this behaviour was unaffected by theory of mind scores.  
A few years later the authors replicated and extended these findings to show that 
cognitive aspects of ToM, rather than emotional aspects appear to contribute to UG decision 
behaviour in young children (Takagishi et al., 2014). As in their earlier study, the authors 
compared young children (M = 56 months, SD =10.0) who had either passed or failed the Sally-
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Anne test on their UG decisions. In addition, however, children in this study also completed an 
emotional perspective taking task – The Denham task (Denham, 1986) – which required 
children to label the emotions that would be experienced by characters in short stories. 
Regression analyses showed that cognitive (i.e., Sally-Anne test) but not emotional (i.e., 
Denham task) facets of ToM influenced proposer behaviour, with Sally Anne passers making 
fairer offers than failers, as in the earlier study. Interestingly, responder behaviour was 
negatively associated with Sally-Anne test performance whereas understanding of emotional 
states as measured by the affective perspective task was not predictive of UG behaviour.  
The authors suggest that participants’ familiarity with one another, may be the 
explanation to the differences observed in the responder behaviour of these two studies. 
Contrary to the first study (2010) where participants did not know one another, in the latter 
(2014) all children taking part in the study belonged to the same class. This familiarity  may 
have led those with good cognitive ToM to avoid rejecting unfair offers to elude upsetting the 
relationships with peers. The responder effect observed here was not observed in the early 
study therefore further evidence is needed to clarify the role of ToM in responder behaviour. 
Given the well-established ToM difficulties associated with ASD, and the evidence just 
outlined, it follows that autistic individuals should be less likely to make fair offers in an UG 
than typically developing comparison groups. To examine this issue Sally & Hill, (2006) asked 
sixty-nine children between 6 and 10 years of age, with and without autism spectrum disorder, 
to play 16 rounds of a dictator game (DG) and 16 rounds of an UG with the experimenter as 
the partner. The child and experimenter alternated their roles every 4 rounds and on each round 
the stake was 10 points (stickers) with the children encouraged to win as many points as 
possible. During the Dictator Game, participants first played in the role of dictator for four 
rounds, then observed the decisions of the experimenter for four rounds before acting as 
Dictator again for four rounds and ending this task one more time observing passively for four 
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rounds. The experimenter in this task, offered approximately the amounts offered to him when 
taking the role of Dictator. In the UG the roles alternated in the same manner every four trials 
with the child beginning as proposer. The confederate, in the role of responder, would always 
reject offers of less than 40% of the total pot, and as proposer would offer approximately the 
same amount of points as the child had previously offered.  
As proposers in the UG, children with and without ASD, who failed a second order 
ToM task9, offered nothing or only one point out of 10 only on the first trial. From round two 
and as the game progressed, the difference between passers and those failing the ToM task 
disappeared for all ASD and TD but not for children below 6 years of age. In this group, the 
mean offer remained scattered over all the possible options until the end of the game, which 
according to the authors, may be due to their not yet developed ability to predict consistency 
in other people’s behaviour. DG behaviour further confirmed these results. Comparison 
between the size of the offers made in the Dictator vs UG games showed that whereas the size 
of the offer dramatically increased as typically developing children go from dictators to 
proposers, the change in the size of the offers made by ASD children was almost unnoticeable 
and not statistically significant. ASD participants stuck to either one of two strategies: offer 1 
(maximizing strategy) or 5 stickers (inequity aversion rule). This suggests that while TD 
children may use their ToM abilities to anticipate reaction to unfair behaviours, ASDs may 
struggle to adjust their strategy in response to the change in the receiver’s role.  As responders, 
children below 6 years of age as well as children with ASD accepted more small offers, and 
ASDs more often rejected offers that were beneficial to the responder (hyper-fair offers), i.e. 
                                                          
9 First-order false belief understanding was assessed in all participants using the Sally–Anne task (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and second order false belief understanding was assessed using the 
Birthday Puppy story (Sullivan et al, 1994) 
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40% for the proposer – 60% for the responder. Thus, reciprocity fairness per se cannot not 
explain responder behaviour. 
A similar trend was observed with an adult sample in a study by the same researchers 
Sally & Hill (2003, unpublished). Both ASD and TD adults similarly and fairly split the pot in 
the UG. As responders and compared to children’s behaviour in the 2006 study, who accepted 
offers that represented 23% of the pot, in the current study adults showed a higher acceptance 
threshold, which lead them to more often reject offers that were below 32% of the total pot. 
Differences between groups were present only on the first but not for the remaining trials, 
suggesting that repetition may have introduced some learning effects, which, in the case of the 
ASD group, may have contributed to compensate for the diminished ToM abilities as reported 
from the ToM task scores10. 
It is interesting to note that the pattern of results described by Takagishi et al., (2014) 
on one-shot UG, compared to Sally & Hill's (2006) observations on a multiple trial paradigm, 
suggests that repetition and reciprocation has an effect in UG-behaviour whereby children learn 
to adapt to the nature of the interaction, moving toward more equitable and fairer decisions that 
they may not display in one-shot scenarios. The findings suggest, that one-shot games might 
be more sensitive to the role of Theory of Mind in decision behaviour, which is why the current 
study will use such a one-shot paradigm to further extend the findings of Sally & Hill (2003, 
2006). More generally, further exploration of the relation between UG decisions and ToM is 
important considering that the evidence to date is not entirely consistent  and still relatively 
scarce. Given that ToM difficulties are a well-established feature of the social-cognitive 
characteristics of autism, studying UG decision behaviour in this group can shed new light on 
the role of ToM in game-theoretical decision making paradigms.  
                                                          
10 Second order false beliefs task: For adults, the Coat Story (Bowler, 1992) 
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Systemizing - Empathizing: Whilst the limited number of studies to date, that have 
examined UG behaviour in ASD have focused on the role of ToM impairments in this social-
decision making scenario, no studies to date have formally considered the role of some of the 
other characteristics of ASD in this context. As noted in Chapter 1 and as suggested by Baron-
Cohen et al., (2003), ASD individuals have an increased tendency to process situations in a 
“systemizing” rather than an “empathizing” way (see also Baron-Cohen, 2009), where 
systemizing refers to the drive to analyse, understand, predict, control and construct rule-based 
systems, whereas empathizing refers to the drive to identify another person's emotions and 
thoughts, and to respond to these with an appropriate emotion. In the context of the UG, it is 
reasonable to assume that both processes might be engaged to predict the behaviour of others. 
Empathizing could be involved in terms of attributing our own emotions, goals, values etc. to 
the other player in the interaction, whereas systemizing could be involved in terms of 
constructing and applying rules for seeking to predict the other’s behaviour and for guiding 
own decisions. Interesting in this context, is that Sally and Hill (2006) in the study described 
above, observed that on the multi-trial UG, autistic children more than then comparison group, 
consistently adhered to a strategy across trials rather than adapting their behaviour to the 
behaviours of the partner. Specifically, autistic children frequently opted for either a fair 
strategy throughout all trials or for a ‘keep it all’ strategy, offering the minimum amount 
possible as proposers and accepting low offers as responders. Assuming that this pattern of 
behaviour is partly a reflection of the greater tendency to systemize in ASD, it would be 
expected that a greater tendency to systemize would be related to a greater tendency to adopt a 
‘keep it all’ strategy, which would also be in line with rational economic theory – a theory 
which should provide a logical and systematic description of human social-economic 
behaviour. In a study by Ramsøy et al., (2015) in which a prisoner dilemma was framed either 
as cooperate or compete, a relation was found between empathizing and cooperation rates, i.e. 
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adults participants  who scored high in the empathizing measure responded faster and cooperate 
more, but such an effect was absent when the game was framed as compete. These results 
although not specifically related to the E-S theory, give support to the same theory’s suggestion 
that individual differences in empathy may reflect the extent to which individuals let such 
process affect decision-making. Furthermore, in ASD high systemizing / low empathizing 
biases might make decision makers less sensitive to the social aspects of the interaction 
(Memari et al., 2015), which could lead decision makers to be less sensitive to the social 
consequences of their decision, e.g. reject to punish.  
BIS/BAS In addition to examining the role of Theory of mind and the balance between 
systemizing and empathizing on UG decision behaviour, the current study will also examine 
how individual differences in the behavioural inhibition (BIS) and behavioural activation 
(BAS) systems might impact decisions on the UG. In the general population, the study of 
individual differences associated with the behavioural activation system (BAS) and the (BIS) 
behavioural inhibition system (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1994)  have been useful to assess 
individual differences in reward sensitivity; additionally variation in sensitivity of BIS and 
BAS has been thought to reflect more general individual differences in personality traits 
associated with  social and emotional responding (Franken & Muris, 2006) 
BIS is thought to form the basis of anxiety and result in behavioural withdrawal, 
whereas BAS is considered to mediate reactions to reward (Elliot & Thrash, 2002) and result 
in behavioural approach and risk taking. An approach bias (BAS) leads the individual to initiate 
goal-directed activities and interactions and to anticipate positive affective states when exposed 
to cues of potential reward. On the other hand, a bias toward BIS leads to a tendency to inhibit 
movement toward goals, to experience negative affective states such as fear and anxiety in 
response to novel cues, and to withdraw from novel situations and social interactions. In the 
context of the UG, Scheres & Sanfey (2006) had university students playing as proposer and 
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responder for real with a $5 pot. The mode offer was 47% of the pot  ($2.37); offers of $2 and 
higher were accepted, whereas offers of £1.33 and under were rejected. After the UG, 
participants filled the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994) mean total scores  followed the 
result patterns of the original sample. Correlation analysis between BAS scores and UG- offers 
showed a positive association between BAS scores and the offer’s size,  and this was interpreted 
as a strategic move to increase the possibility of getting the offers accepted, i.e. the reward.  
More recently, Harjunen et al., (2018) invited university students to play an UG 
interacting  with a computerized agent. The authors examined how individual differences in 
motivational traits modulated proneness to the agent persuasive impact. Participants received 
offers from agents whose facial expressions portrayed emotions that vary to include neutral, 
happiness, anger, fear, disgust, surprise, sadness emotions. In addition, the agent was set to 
apply a touch effect in the responder’s hand (The Midas touch effect; Crusco & Wetzel, 1984). 
High BIS scores were associated with rejection rate of unfair offers presented by an angry face, 
interestingly the touch effect was not associated with responder behaviour for participants who 
scored high in BIS. The results suggest that BIS moderated the effect of facial expressions but 
not touch. Since the meaning of touch is more culturally dependant (Gazzola et al., 2012) than 
the meaning of facial expression, which have more universally agreed connotations (Elfenbein 
& Ambady, 2002), the authors concluded that high BIS individuals are more sensitive to cues 
that clearly convey a negative meaning.  
In the context of ASD, there continues to be relatively little systematic research 
concerning the functional balance between BIS and BAS systems. However, several of the 
characteristics of ASD can be conceptualised within a BIS/BAS framework.  For instance, the 
social motivation theory outlined in the introduction argues that autistic individuals find social 
interactions less rewarding (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012b), which 
would suggest an attenuation of BAS at least in terms of rewards derived from social 
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interaction. As Gaigg (2012) has argued, however, the evidence in favour of a social-
motivation theory may be a reflection of more domain general abnormalities in processing the 
emotional salience of stimuli (social or non-social), which could result from atypicalities in a 
domain general BAS system attenuation. In terms of the functions of BIS, it is well known that 
ASD is commonly associated with symptoms of anxiety and an insistence on sameness (i.e., 
avoidance of novelty), which implicates augmented activation of the BIS system.  South et al. 
(2011) has furthermore shown that the frequent anxiety symptoms in ASD are also correlated 
with increased motivation to avoid failure and punishment (BIS) rather than to seek out rewards 
(BAS), and Mundy et al., (2007) have argued that BIS and BAS function as modifier 
contributing to explain the variability in ASD social emotional development and reinforcement 
responsiveness. For instance, high BAS individuals are expected to maintain motivation and to 
have less difficulty to keep engaged in task and activities; whereas high BIS individuals 
required more frequent and varied reinforcement mechanisms. All in all, the literature on 
BIS/BAS suggests that on the UG, ASD participants would  accept the unfair split more 
frequently and as a proposer they will make fair splits as to avoid rejection. 
Ethics and moral judgement, in human societies moral and social codes have evolved 
to regulate social interaction but individuals differ in the extent to which they use moral 
absolutes as guides to action and judgment hence differences in responses to social dilemmas 
are observed. Forsyth's Ethics Position Theory (EPQ; Forsyth, 1980)  holds that although most 
people explicitly consider the relative importance of minimizing harmful, injurious 
consequences, individual moral values and beliefs vary from the idealistic, to the completely 
pragmatic. Idealistics tend to make use of universal moral principles, such as “Tell the truth to 
others” and “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,”. Such principles provide a 
clear yardstick for judging and guiding actions and idealistic individuals tend to be guided by 
such principles to make decisions that protect the welfare of others. They also tend to believe 
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that ethical behaviour will always lead to good outcomes. On the hand, relativists, prefer 
personal and situational analysis of behaviour over universal codes of morality, for instance, 
harming others can be seen as a good behaviour if the consequences turn out to be beneficial 
to the decision maker or society more generally. Despite of this conceptual ethical 
differentiation, an individual profile has a combination of both with a tendency to one or the 
other.  
Some of the characteristics of ASD, such as their tendency for repetitive and routinized 
patterns of behaviour, difficulty with cognitive flexibility and tendency for systemizing might 
make them more likely to adopt idealistic rather than relativistic moral rules, placing 
individuals in the category of absolutism in Forsyth’s (1980) taxonomy, in which an individual 
“assumes that the best possible outcome can be achieved by following universal moral rules” 
(p.176). Consequently, it might also be predicted that ASD participants’ representation of the 
UG might be more driven by relatively rigid conceptualisations of equity in distribution than 
more relativistic and flexible trade-offs between personal gain and fairness considerations. This 
tendency may result in UG decisions motivated by inequity aversion and higher rate rejection 
of unfair offers. 
As the literature reviewed above illustrates, ASD is characterised by a number of 
cognitive differences in aspects of theory of mind, systemizing-empathizing and the balance 
between behavioural inhibition and approach, that would lead to the prediction of overall more 
rational behaviour (in an economical sense) on an ultimatum game paradigm. One caveat to 
this prediction, however, is that a tendency toward systemizing may also lead to the typical 
pattern of fair behaviour due to an adherence to social norms. Building on earlier work by Sally 
and Hill (2003, 2006), the present study, therefore, aimed to shed light on the social-decision 
behaviour of autistic adults on a standard version of a one-shot UG, examining also those 
processes and individual difference factors that are thought to predict decisions on this 
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paradigm. Specifically, ToM abilities were tested using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ test, 
which has been developed specifically for examining ToM abilities in adults (RMIE; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). Other relevant individual difference factors were measured using relevant 
self-report questionnaires including the empathizing quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004) and the systemizing quotient (SQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003) the 
Behavioural Inhibition/Activation Scale (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994) and the ethics 
position questionnaire (EPQ; Forsyth, 1980), which measures people’s tendency to adhere to 
idealistic versus more relativistic social norms and rules.  
A one-shot paradigm was employed in this first study to avoid the contribution of 
reciprocal learning effects to the interactions. Before exploring UG- decision behaviour in 
adults with and without a diagnosis of ASD, a first experiment examined decision making on 
the UG in a large group of undergraduate students who completed the Autism Quotient (AQ: 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) as a continuous measure of sub-clinical autism related traits. The 
AQ is a self-report questionnaire that assesses the domains of social skill, attention switching, 
attention to detail, communication and imagination, which are all areas of significant difficulty 
for autistic individuals who typically score 26 or above on this questionnaire. Although non-
autistic individuals rarely score above this cut-off, scores nevertheless tend to be normally 
distributed and therefore the AQ is commonly used as a measure of the broad autism phenotype 
(Bailey et al., 1995). 
In addition to establishing whether sub-clinical autistic traits would be related to social-
decision making on the UG, this first study served to generate a sufficient number of unfair 
offers that could then serve for the experiment with adults with and without an autism diagnosis 
to ensure that this experiment could be carried out in a real and ecologically valid manner (i.e., 
the offers that participants would receive would be real and their decisions would have real 
consequences for those who had generated the offers). 
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2.1 Experiment 1a: One-Shot with students 
 
 Method 
Participants 
One hundred-seventy-five university students took part in the initial study (47 men, 128 
women, Mage (years) = 21.71, SD = 6.35; MAQ = 21.71, SD = 4.76). Participants were students 
attending Psychology and Law courses at City, University of London. They were recruited in 
classes where data collection could be organised in two short periods of around 5-10 minutes 
(see procedure below).  
Materials & Design 
The experiment was carried out on pen and paper. A pre-formatted response sheet 
designed by the experimenters was printed out on an A4 piece of paper (See Figure 2.1), and 
the following instructions were also provided: 
‘You will have the chance to make a small amount of money by playing a simple game. 
This is a game for two players. Player 1 is given £10 to split between themselves and 
Player 2. Player 1 can decide to split the money however he or she chooses. Player 2 
has two choices. Either he or she decides to accept the offer, in which case the £10 
will be split as suggested by Player 1, or he or she rejects it, in which case both players 
get nothing and the £10 returns to the bank.     
You will complete this task twice, once as Player 1, and once as Player 2. As it is 
difficult to get players together at the same time, we will ask you to play the game in 
two stages. In the first stage you will make an offer which will be passed on to another 
player in this group. In the second stage you will have the opportunity to either accept 
or reject an offer from another player. After both stages are complete, we will enter 
all accepted offers into a draw from which we will pick 10% and pay them out 
accordingly. Please write your e-mail address clearly in the relevant space (see next 
paragraph for details) on this form so that we can contact you if you are drawn for 
payment. If this sheet already has Player 1’s offer written in, you will take the role of 
Player 2. All you have to do is to decide whether to accept or reject the offer given. If 
you accept it, you will enter the draw for the opportunity to receive the payment you 
accept. The other player will also enter the draw to win what s/he has proposed to 
keep. If you reject the offer neither you nor the other player will enter the draw and 
both players will be informed that the offer has been rejected. Please let us know your 
response to the offer by marking accordingly. 
If this sheet does not have Player 1’s offer written in, you will take the role of Player 
1 and will need to make a split for the next player. The split should be a whole number 
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of pounds, between £10 for you and £0 for them and £0 for you and £10 for them. The 
amounts for you and the other player should of course add up to £10’ 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the A4 sheet included a decision section, where the 
participant could write down both decisions as proposer and as responder. The ID number from 
the top of the sheet was presented also here. In the sample presented here, the participant ID as 
proposer was 235a. For the proposer role, participants needed to write down their offer using 
the standard format where the first amount indicates how much the proposer keeps for 
themselves and the second amount indicating how much they offer to the responder. For the 
responder role, participants needed to circle one of two response options (accept vs. reject) to 
indicate their decision. The responder was identified by the experimenter by the ID assigned in 
the field for player 2. In the sample here ‘235b’. 
 
Figure 2.1 Response sheet for Student UG 
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To assess autism-related traits, The Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (AQ; Baron-Cohen  
et al, 2001) was administered in printed form. Autism-related traits are found not only at high 
levels in people with ASD, but also on a continuum at lower sub-clinical levels in the general 
population. The questionnaire comprises 50 items, 10 for each one of the following domains: 
Social Skills, Attention Switching, Attention to Detail, Communication and Imagination. The 
AQ has been shown to clearly separate individuals with and without an autism diagnosis in 
adults (TD Mean AQ = 16.94; sd 6.3 (95% CI 11.6, 20.0); ASD Mean AQ = 35.19, sd 6.5 (95% CI 
27.6, 41.1). Scores range from 0 – 50 and scores below 26 are generally thought to reflect few 
autism-related traits, whereas scores above 32 are typically considered a cut-off for clinically 
significant autistic traits (see Ruzich et al., 2015 for a recent review). In this university student 
population, no participant scored above the 32-point threshold and only five participants 2.9% 
scored in the range between the upper (32) and lower (26) thresholds 
Procedure 
Data was collected from three different groups of students during a few minutes at the 
beginning and half-way through regular lectures. Students were invited to take part in the 
experiment or withdraw from it after reading the UG instructions and the consent form, both 
projected onto the large screen in the lecture theatre. Individually signed consent forms were 
not requested but it was emphasized that a return of the response sheet was taken as a sign of 
consent. The UG was then briefly explained and participants were informed about payment 
implementation. Specifically, they were told that from all accepted offers 10% would be 
randomly selected and paid according to the UG’s rules. Participants were also made aware 
that some offers may be chosen for a subsequent lab experiment where these offers could be 
shown to a number of different participants. Here, 10% of the total accepted value across those 
participants would be paid. Thus, it was made clear to the participating students that their 
decisions on the UG could have real financial consequences. 
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In the classroom, students played both as proposer and responder with a £10 stake to 
be split with a randomly selected classmate. The first part of testing (playing as proposer) was 
done at the beginning of the lecture, and the second part (playing as responder) was done before 
the break. Each participant received the paper response form which contained the description 
of the UG with both proposer and responder roles fully explained (see above). First participants 
played the role of proposer. Once everyone had written their offer, they were asked to tear the 
top part of the response form, which contained their identification number and contact e-mail 
address. The response sheets containing the offers were collected and then returned to the class 
during a break period (about 1 hour later) in a pseudo-random order which avoided offers going 
back to the original proposers. Students were now asked to play as responders and to mark the 
accept/reject decision and write their email address and their previously assigned ID number. 
Along with the response sheet, participants also received the AQ to complete. Once everyone 
had completed the response form and AQ, the sheets were collected, and relevant proposers 
and responders were re-paired (using the ID numbers) for payment. All accepted offers were 
entered in a draw from which 10% were randomly picked and paid out accordingly. Winners 
of the draw were notified by e-mail after the testing session to arrange payment.  
 Results 
In line with expectations for general population samples, participants in the current 
study had an average AQ score of 14.04 (SD = 6.35), with males scoring somewhat higher than 
females though not significantly so t(173) = 1.67, p = 0.096 (see Figure 2.2). Noteworthy that 
73% of the sample population were females.  
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Figure 2.2 AQ Mean score by gender 
The results of the One-shot UG confirmed the well-established finding for 
industrialized societies that over half of the participants (62%) made fair fifty-fifty split offers. 
The distribution of the offers made by the proposer is set out in Figure 2.3 which shows that 
offers of 40% of the stake were the next most common, and less than 15% of the participants 
made offers less than that. Interestingly round 10% of offers benefited the responder with four 
people offering the total £10 available to the responder and one person offering £9. These types 
of offers commonly known as “hyper fair offers” have been found in societies were gift giving 
is part of the culture (Henrich et al., 2005). This finding may reflect the heterogeneity of student 
backgrounds at City, or alternatively, may represent a misunderstanding of the task. 
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
Female Male
M
ea
n
 s
co
re
s
87 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Percentage offered by the proposer from a £10 pot. Mode offer “5” 
 
Figure 2.4 sets out the results for the responder role and shows the percentage of 
participants who accepted or rejected the various offers. As expected, the majority of 50:50 
splits (97%), and all ‘hyper-fair’ offers that were beneficial to the responder were accepted. It 
is not entirely clear why around 3% of the egalitarian splits were rejected but it could be 
speculated that these rejections may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the study 
instructions. Acceptance rates declined as the value offered to the responder decreased with a 
considerable drop in acceptance rates for offers less than thirty percent of the total pot. Thus 
while £(6:4) splits were accepted by 80% of participants who received such offers, £(7:3) splits 
were accepted by only 33% of participants and offers less than that were nearly always rejected. 
It is worth remembering that this highly reliable behaviour is economically irrational  (except 
in the case where offers of £0 were proposed) since the rejection of offers means that 
participants forego the opportunity to win the amount they were offered. 
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Figure 2.4 Percentage of Acceptance and Rejection as a function of the offer values in the £10 
pot 
 
Regarding the relation between decision behaviour and autism-related traits, as 
measured by the AQ, there was no evidence to suggest that either proposer or responder 
behaviour were related to individual differences in such traits. In relation to the proposer role, 
there was no evidence for differences in AQ scores between participants offering fair £(5:5) 
splits (M = 13.62; SD = 6.35) vs. unfair splits different from £5 (M = 14.77; SD =6.34), [(t 
(173) = -1.14, p =0 .25); Cohen's d = 0.18]. Similarly, when considering the role of responders, 
there was no indication of differences in AQ scores between participants who accepted (n = 
55) vs. rejected (n = 9) unfair offers11 (Accepters: M = 15.04; SD = 6.26; Rejecters: M = 13.11; 
SD = 7.02; [(t (62) = 0.84, p =0 .40); Cohen's d = 0.29].  
                                                          
11 Most of the (5-5) splits were accepted (MAQ= 14:00; SD=6.70) vs. rejected (MAQ=16:33; SD=8.02)  
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Discussion 
Study 1a, was  designed to be implemented in a large group of undergraduate students 
(Non-clinical population) to gather the necessary unfair offers to set up the experimental study 
with the clinical population (ASD), and to provide some preliminary insights into the extent to 
which decision behaviour might be associated with autism traits as measured by the AQ 
(Baron-Cohen  et al, 2001). Behavioural results in the UG replicated previous findings in the 
general population in western societies showing that as proposers individuals made 50:50 
splits, and as responders these fair offers are generally accepted whereas offers of less than 
30% of the pot are usually rejected. Similarly, results from the measure for autistic traits were 
in line with expected general population samples.  
There was, however, no evidence to suggest that decision behaviour was related to individual 
differences in autism traits (social skill, attention switching, attention to detail,  communication 
and imagination). Noteworthy though, that the sample in this study is not diverse enough in 
gender, age and subject of study. Students were chosen from the Psychology and Law degrees 
for practical reasons in terms of easy access to the lectures and proximity location in the 
campus. The current experiment could have benefitted from a more heterogeneous sample to 
also include students from other degrees such engineering and computer sciences, whose 
cognitive style has been characterized by higher degrees of systemizing, which has in turn been 
associated with higher AQ scores (Billington, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2007). In a more 
heterogeneous sample, both the types of responses on the UG and the range of scores on the 
AQ would likely be characterised by greater variance, which would be more suitable for 
assessing associations between AQ and decision behaviour. Given the relatively low number 
of unfair offers that were generated, this result needs to be interpreted with some caution. 
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2.2 Experiment 1b: One - Shot UG with adults with and without a diagnosis of ASD 
 
All in all, the initial study described above demonstrated the well-established pattern of 
proposer and responder behaviour on the Ultimatum Game, where people clearly do not only 
base their decisions on an objective consideration of the outcomes and income maxi-
maximizing motives but on some other factors as well. Offers from proposers were 
predominantly fair but also included some unfair offers that will serve as materials for the next 
experiment described here, which will involve adults with and without a clinical diagnosis of 
ASD.  
Method 
Participants 
 
Eighty-four adults took part in this study: Forty- three individuals with a diagnosis of ASD (34 
male; 8 female) and 42 typically developed comparison individuals (31 male; 11 female). 
Participants were selected from an existing pool of individuals with whom the Autism Research 
Group at City, University of London is in regular contact. Groups were closely matched in 
terms of chronological age, verbal IQ, performance IQ and full- scale IQ as measured by the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IVuk; and WAIS-IIIuk). The descriptive statistics for 
these variables are summarised in Table 2.1. None of the TD participants reported having a 
personal or familiar history of a psychological or neurodevelopmental disorder. 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
 
Table 2.1. Characteristics for autistic individuals (ASD) and Typically Develop Individuals 
(TD) 
  ASD (34m,8f) TD (31m,11f)       
Measure M (SD) M(SD) t (84) P Cohen's d 
Age (years) 43.69 (12.89) 43.83 (14.13) 0.04 0.96 0.01 
aVIQ 112.29 (16.85) 114.70 (15.06) 0.70 0.48 0.15 
bPIQ 106.76 (16.85) 109.41 (14.33) 0.79 0.42 0.18 
cFIQ 111.05 (17.09) 113.30 (14.65) 0.61 0.54 0.14 
dAQ 34.36 (6.74) 15.47 (6.27) 12.82 < 0.001*** 2.89 
eADOS-C 2.94 (1.65)      
fADOS-RSI 5.81 (2.68)      
gADOS-Total 8.50 (3.50)      
 
a
Verbal IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK);
b
Performance IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK); 
c
Full Scale IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS 
IVUK); 
d
Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al.,2001); 
e
ADOS- Communication; 
f
ADOS- Reciprocal Social Interaction;  
g
ADOS Total Score- Communication + Reciprocal Social Interaction. 
 
ASD participants were diagnosed within the UK National Health Service by 
experienced clinicians according to the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Health Disorders (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) that was in 
force at the time that the participants were diagnosed. In addition, administration of the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-2, Lord et al., 2012) for 34 (out of 42) participants 
confirmed difficulties in reciprocal social and communicative behaviours that are the hallmark 
clinical feature of the disorder. The Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)  
provided further descriptive support for ASD diagnosis and confirmed that 40 (out of the 42) 
TD participants did not experience difficulties commensurate with ASD t(83)= 12.98, p = 
<0.001). The remaining two participants scored above the lower threshold (26) but since 
exclusion of these participants did not change the patterns of results reported below these 
participants were retained. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for both groups.  
All participants were English speakers. In line with the Declaration of Helsinki, 
individual written consent was obtained from all individuals upon reading the instructions of 
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the task. They all received a standard university fee of £8/hour for their time and transport costs 
were reimbursed in full. In addition, participants were also paid according to the decisions they 
made in the UG. All procedures received ethical approval from the Psychology Department’s 
ethics committee.   
Materials & Design 
 
The experiment was carried out as a pen and paper study. The form used by participants 
to make and respond to offers was the same as that used in the Student-UG experiment, with 
separate forms being used for the proposer and responder stages of the task. For the role of 
proposer, the forms required participants to enter an ID and to specify how to split the ten 
pounds (£10) with another person. They were told that they would not meet with the responder. 
In the role of responder participants needed to indicate whether they wanted to accept or reject 
an offer received from a previous proposer. For this part of the task, all participants received 
one of the unfair £7-£3 offers from the previous student-UG reported above. Finally, all 
participants also completed a third part of the task which we called “Hypothetical UGs”. All 
participants were given a form which presented all ten possible combinations of how a £10 pot 
could be split. Participants were required to indicate whether they would accept or reject each 
of these hypothetical offers by circling the relevant answers presented alongside the offers (i.e., 
reject / accept).  
In addition to completing the UG, participants also completed measures of The RMIE 
(Baron-Cohen et al, 2001); The Empathising (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004); The 
Systemizing Quotient (SQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003); The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; 
Baron-Cohen  et al, 2001); The BIS-BAS Scale (Carver & White, 1994)  and the Ethics Position 
Questionnaire (EPQ :Forsyth, 1980), which will be described briefly here (except for the AQ, 
which was described already earlier). 
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The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMIE: Baron-Cohen et al, 2001) is a 1st-order 
theory of mind task that measures the ability to infer beliefs, desires and intentions to others 
based on expressions portrayed in the eye-region of a face. The task consists of 36 items of 
grey-scale photographs of the eye region of male and female faces, each associated with 4 
mental state terms from which participants are asked to choose the on that best reflects what 
the person might be thinking or feeling (e.g. “worried”). Performance is assumed to rely on 
fairly unconscious, automatic and rapid matching of memories concerning similar expressions 
with a lexicon of mental state term, and therefore participants are instructed to choose the word 
that best describes the expression as soon as possible, without thinking too much about it. Half 
of the participants received the stimuli in ascending order (item 1 to item 36) and the other half 
in descending order (item 36 to item 1) to counteract possible order effects. Responses were 
coded as correct or incorrect, giving a maximum score of 36 points.  
The empathy quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) is a self-report 
measure to assess the people’s ability to identify another person’s mental and emotional states 
and to respond with an appropriated emotion to it. Given the mind reading difficulties 
associated with autism, the measure was developed to explore the notion that autism is also 
characterised by difficulties relating to and sharing the emotions of others (as indicated in the 
introduction, Baron-Cohen considers empathy and theory of mind to be dissociable). The EQ 
consists of 40 empathy-related questions (e.g., “I get upset if I see people suffering on news 
programmes”) and 20 filler questions. For each statement participants are asked to indicate 
whether they definitely agree or disagree or slightly agree or disagree and responses receive 
scores of either 0, 1 or 2 depending on whether empathy is not, mildly or strongly indicated. 
The maximum score for the empathy-related questions (filler questions are not scored) 
therefore ranges between 0 and 80, with higher scores indicating greater empathy. 
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The Systemizing Quotient (SQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003) is a self-report measure that 
was developed to detect an individual's drive to analyse a system in terms of its underlying 
rules and to construct systems using regularities. Paralleling the format of the EQ, the test 
consists of 40 systemizing items and 20 control items. An example of a systemizing item is “I 
prefer to read non-fiction than fiction”. Scores again vary from 0 to 80 and in addition to 
deriving a systemizing quotient, in combination with the EQ it is also possible to derive a 
Empathizing-Systemizing (E-S) difference score whereby positive values indicate a greater 
tendency toward empathizing than systemizing, whilst negative scores, which are commonly 
found in ASD, reflect a preference for systemizing over empathizing (Baron-Cohen, 2009; See 
Chapter one for further details). 
The Behavioural Inhibition – Activation Scale (BIS-BAS; Carver & White, 1994) is a 
self-report instrument designed to assess people’s disposition for behavioural inhibition (BIS) 
vs. behavioural activation (BAS). The questionnaire is made of 24 items of which four are 
fillers. Seven BIS items capture the extent to which participants avoid and regulate potentially 
aversive experiences (e.g., “I have very few fears compared to my friends”), whereas 13 BAS 
items capture distinct aspects of motivational approach tendencies including Drive (four items; 
e.g., I go out of my way to get things I want), Reward-Responsiveness (four items; e.g., “When 
I’m doing well at something I love to keep at it) and Fun Seeking (5 items; e.g.,  “I’m always 
willing to try something new if I think it will be fun”). Participants are asked to rate how true 
the items are for them on a four-point scale  ask for the likelihood of occurrence of the 
behaviour describe in the item. It uses a four-point Likert’s scale, going from “very true for 
me” to “very false for me”.  
The Ethics position questionnaire (EPQ; Forsyth, 1980) was administered to assess the degree 
of endorsement of universal moral values. The questionnaire comprises 20 attitude statements, 
10 concerning idealism (e.g., It is never ok to sacrifice the welfare of others”) and 10 
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concerning relativism (e.g., “Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the 
positive consequences of the act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral”). 
Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each item 
using a nine points Liker-type scale ranging from completely disagree to completely agree. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in the Autism Research Group’s laboratories at 
City, University of London. Administration of the UG and the associated measures described 
above took about an hour and was normally part of a longer testing session during which 
participants also completed unrelated cognitive assessments (e.g., experimental tasks of 
memory, perception of social-cognition). For the UG task, participants first played the role of 
responder for which the following instructions were provided:  
“Attached to this sheet is the offer from another participant. 
Remember if you accept this offer, then you will receive the amount 
you have been offered and we will send to the other person what they 
have proposed to keep for themselves. If you reject the offer neither 
you nor s/he will receive payment and we will inform the other 
person that the offer has been rejected. To give your answer, circle 
accordingly to your decision” 
 
To avoid possible observer effects, the experimenter left the testing room while the 
participant made their decision and only returned when the participant opened the door to signal 
that they had made their decision. Immediately afterwards, and keeping the interaction with the 
participant to a minimum, the experimenter handed over a “proposer” form which included the 
following reminder of the instructions for this part of the task: 
“Attached to this sheet is a blank form in which you can now decide 
how to split £10 with another person who will take part in this 
experiment. Remember, you can split the £10 however you wish but 
please use full pound values and make sure the total adds up to £10. 
If the other person accepts what you offer, s/he will receive what you 
have offered, and we will send you the money that you have proposed 
to keep for yourself. However, if the other person rejects your offer 
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then neither you nor the other person will receive payment and we 
will inform you that your offer has been rejected.” 
 
As in the first part of the task, participants made decisions in the absence of the 
experimenter. There was no time limit for participants to make their decisions and after 
participants made their offers, they were asked to respond to the 10 hypothetical offers for 
which it was made clear that no payments would be made. After the participant had responded 
to the hypothetical offers, the experimenter asked whether the participant had previous 
experience with similar tasks, but no one reported to have been involved in similar studies 
before. Participants were then asked to complete the RMIE and AQ unless data on these 
measures was already on file for participants (this was the case for most). Finally, the remaining 
self-report questionnaires were administered in a counterbalanced order (SQ, EQ, BIS-BAS, 
EPQ). 
Analysis 
Group differences were examined through independent samples t tests for continuous 
measures (e.g., self-report questionnaire scores; ToMRMIE) and chi-square tests for binary data 
(e.g., accept/reject decisions). Decision behaviour on the UG was further examined through 
logistic regressions to identify possible predictors of decision behaviour across and within both 
groups and to account for variance due to irrelevant demographic differences between 
participants. For all tests an alpha of <0.05 was considered to indicate significant effects but 
Cohen’s d effect sizes and Cramer's V for non-parametric tests are also reported to facilitate 
interpretation of the results.  
Results 
 The results are presented as follows: First, the group characteristics will be set out in 
terms of demographic variables and the various psychological trait measures that were 
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obtained, including the results for the theory of mind task (ToMRMIE). Then, the results for the 
UG are presented separately for the proposer, responder and hypothetical scenarios, and finally 
the logistic regression models are set out to examine, which variables might predict the decision 
behaviour on the UG. 
Individual differences and Psychological traits 
Table 2.2 presents the means and standard deviations of the scores for the RMIE theory 
of mind (ToMRMIE) test and the psychological trait measures including the AQ, SQ, EQ, (E-
S)12, BIS/BAS and EPQ questionnaires (EPQR and EPQI). As expected, ASDs and TDs 
significantly differed in their scores for the (ToMRMIE) with ASD participants scoring 
significantly lower than TD participants t(82) = 2.50,  p = 0.014). The ASD group also scored 
significantly higher than the TD group on the AQ (t (82) = 12.82, p < 0 .001) and significantly 
lower on the EQ (t (82) = 5.83,  p = <0.001), and although no differences were observed on 
the SQ (t (82)= 1.31, p =0 .19) the (E-S) difference score did. As expected, ASD participants 
had a significantly greater tendency for systemising rather than empathizing (i.e., negative E-
S difference scores) whereas the TD group showed the opposite pattern (t(82) = 5.68, p  
<0.001). No differences were found between the groups for the EPQ Relativism (t (82) = 0.34, 
p = 0.73), EPQ Idealism (t (82) = 0.91, p =0 .36) or the BAS (t (82) = 1.66, p = 0.99). Although 
the ASD group showed a significantly higher BIS score (t (82) = 2.34, p = 0.021), this 
difference was small and would not hold when controlling for multiple comparisons.  
 
                                                          
12 Regarding the EQ and the SQ, we are mostly interested in the relation between these two measures as 
described by (E-S) scores. The (E-S) score results by subtracting the Systemizing scores (SQ) from the 
Empathizing scores (EQ). Since both measures, (EQ and SQ) comprise the same number of items, and scores 
reported in this thesis are normally distributed, there was no need to standardise the scores (i.e., z-transform) in 
order to derive the difference score. 
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Table 2.2 Summary of Psychological traits for the ASD and TD Group 
 ASD (42) TD (42)    
Measure M (SD) M(SD) t (82) P Cohen's d 
        
aToMRMIE  24.19 (4.19) 26.39 (3.93) 2.50 .014 0.54 
bAQ 34.41 (6.80) 15.47 (6.27) 12.82 <.001 2.89 
cEQ 25.49 (11.82) 41.30 (12.56) 5.83 <.001 1.29 
dSQ 33.76 (13.05) 30.00 (12.63) 1.31 .19 0.29 
e(E-S) -8.82 (17.44) 11.30 (14.04) 5.68 <.001 1.27 
fBIS 20.61 (5.03) 17.88 (5.43) 2.34 .021 0.54 
gBAS 37.07 (8.08) 34.03 (8.05) 1.66 .099 0.37 
hEPQR 54.41 (15.09) 53.26 (15.02) 0.34 .73 0.07 
iEPQI 64.80 (17.26) 67.92 (12.86) 0.91 .36 0.20 
        
aReading the mind in the eyes test (RMIE: Baron-Cohen et al, 2001);bAutism Spectrum Questionnaire (Baron-
Cohen et al.,2001); e Empathising Questionnaire (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004); dSystemizing 
Questionnaire (SQ; Simon Baron-Cohen et al., 2003); eDifference between Empathising and Systemizing (E-S; 
Baron-Cohen, 2009);f Behavioural Inhibition (Carver & White, 1994); 
gBehavioural Approach (Carver & White, 1994);hEthics Position Questionnaire Relativism (EPQ; Forsyth, 
1980);IEthics Position Questionnaire Idealism (EPQ; Forsyth, 1980). 
 
Proposer behaviour. The number of participants who proposed certain offer values is 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. Looking at the graph, data suggest that there were no substantial 
differences between ASDs and TDs regarding the proportion of fair £ (5:5) offers made. A chi-
square test confirmed this impression showing that there was no difference between the groups 
in terms of the frequency of fair £(5:5) vs. unfair offers (offers other than £5) (X 2 (1, N = 84) = 
1.49, p = 0.20) and the effect size associated with this difference was small (ϕ= 0.133). Despite 
the statistical equivalence between groups, it should be noted that ASDs made numerically 
fewer fifty-fifty offers compared to TDs (ASD: 67%; TD: 79%). In addition, whereas all TD 
participants offered between £2 and £6, three ASD participants offered the minimum positive 
amount allowed (£1), and somewhat more ASD participants made offers beneficial to the 
responder (£6 and £7).  
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Figure 2.5 Distribution of offers by Group (TD vs ASD) 
  
In order to explore whether the psychological measures differed as a function of Group 
and offers made, we created a binary variable of offers made by classifying the offers as being 
either Fair13 £(5:5) or Unfair (offers other than £5). Table 2.3 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the TOMRMIE, AQ, EQ, (S-E), BIS, BAS, EPQR and EPQI measures as a function 
of Offer Type (Fair vs. Unfair) and Group (ASD vs. TD).   
Several 2 (Offer type: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (Group: TD vs. AS) univariate ANOVAs were 
carried out for each of the psychological measures. Analyses yielded significant main effects 
of Group for ToMRMIE, AQ, EQ and (E-S) showing the effects already described in the 
individual differences and Psychological traits section above. There were no differences in any 
of the variables between those who made fair vs. unfair offers, nor were there any interactions 
between these decision types and clinical group after correcting for multiple comparisons (see 
Table 2.3 for all ANOVA test statistics). However, for BIS there was a significant interaction 
between Group and Offer Type, F(1,77) = 4.42, p = 0.039, ηp2 = 0.54. Simple main effects 
                                                          
13 Fair on this variable is equated to egalitarian division of the money  
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were analysed by using independent sample t-tests. Results showed that ASD participants who 
made fair offers, scored significantly higher in the BIS measure (M: 21.56, SD = 4.69) 
compared to TD controls (M: 17.31, SD = 5.56) who made fair offers t (57) = 3.13, p = 0.03; 
Cohen's d = 0.83. However, for unfair offers no difference in BIS between ASDs and TDs was 
found. In fact, although results were not significant, the trend seemed to be reversed, ASD 
participants who made unfair offers score lower in the BIS measure (M: 18.79, SD = 5.35) 
compared to TD controls (M: 20.13, SD = 4.48) However, it should be noted that, in line with 
most UG studies, fair offers were more frequently made than unfair offers, limiting the 
suitability of the data for a comparative analysis. 
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Because the previous analyses indicated no differences between autistic and non-
autistic participants on UG decision behaviour, the two groups (ASD & TD) were collapsed 
for the final binary logistic regression analysis that sought to identify factors that might predict 
proposer offer Type (Fair vs. Unfair). To remind the reader, participants played first as 
responders and then as proposer. Therefore, along with psychological trait measures [ToMRMIE, 
(E-S), BIS, BAS, EPQRI, EPQR it was also of interest to examine whether decisions as 
responders (i.e., whether to accept or reject unfair offers) might predict whether participants 
made fair vs. unfair offers as proposers). The statistics for each predictor in a model that 
included all predictors simultaneously are presented in Table 2.4 
 
Table 2.4 Summary of Logistic Regression with factors as predictors of 50-50 proposal 
Predictor B Wald X p  Exp(B) 95% L 95% U 
(E-S) 0.04 5.66 0.02 1.05 1.01 1.08 
ToMRMIE -0.61 0.07 0.80 0.54 0.01 57.31 
EPQI -0.01 0.37 0.54 0.99 0.95 1.03 
EPQR -0.04 2.74 0.10 0.97 0.93 1.01 
BIS -0.03 0.26 0.61 0.97 0.86 1.10 
BAS 0.02 0.16 0.69 1.02 0.94 1.10 
Responder Beha. 2.17 8.90 0.00 8.77 2.11 36.56 
Constant 3.44 1.38 0.24 31.21     
a Responder Behaviour  
 
A test of the model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating 
that the combination of predictors distinguished reliably between participants who made fair 
vs unfair proposals (Chi square = 15.809, p = 0.027, df = 7).  A Nagelkerke’s R2 of .259 
indicated a medium to small relationship between predictors and responder decision behaviour. 
Prediction success overall was 77% (91% for 50:50 offers and 36% for offers different from 
50:50). The Wald criterion demonstrated that the E-S difference score and Responder 
Behaviour made a significant contribution to the model. An increase in the difference between 
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(E-S) was associated with an increased probability of a fair (50:50) split and participants who 
accepted an unfair offer in the role of responders, were more likely to offer a fair (50:50) split 
as proposers. 
Responder Behaviour Turning to the responder data, as shown in Figure 2.6, identical 
numbers of ASD and comparison participants accepted (55%) and rejected (45%) the unfair £ 
(7-3) split (X 2 (1, N = 84)
 = 0.00, p = 1; Cramer's V = 0.00).   
 
Figure  2.6 Response Behaviour towards the £7-£3 offer by Group 
To examine whether any of the psychological trait measures might be related to  
responder decisions (Accept vs Reject), as for the proposer behaviour, several 2 (Responder 
behaviour: accept vs. reject) x 2 (Group: TD vs. ASD) univariate ANOVAs were carried out 
for each measure. Analyses again yielded the significant main effects of Group for [ToMRMIE, 
BIS, EQ, (E-S), BIS already described but no significant effects of responder decisions were 
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observed (see Table 2.6 for all ANOVA test statistics). However, for the EPQI there was a 
significant interaction between Group and responder decision-behaviour, EPQI: F (1,75) = 
4.72, p = 0.03; ηp2 = 0.05). Follow-up comparisons indicated that TDs who accepted scored 
significantly higher on the EPQI measure (M: 70.05, SD= 9.82) compared to ASD (M: 60.18, 
SD= 17.32) who accept the unfair offers [t(40) = 2.28,  p = 0.028; Cohen’s d = 0.70)]. However, 
for rejecters no difference in EPQI between ASDs and TDs was found [(t (40) = 0.90,  p = 0.37; 
Cohen’s d = 0.29)]. In fact, although the difference was not statistically significant, the trend 
seemed to be reversed such as that rejecters in the TD group scored lower in the EPQI (M: 
65.44, SD =15.62) compared to rejecters in the ASD group (M: 70.16, SD = 15.97). We will 
revisit this analysis in the context of the study reported in Chapter 5.  
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Similar to the earlier analysis of proposer behaviour, due to the lack of group 
differences in responder behaviour, groups were collapsed for the final binary regression 
analysis to identify predictors of responder decisions, again entering all trait measures into a 
model simultaneously.  The statistics for each predictor are presented in Table 2.6. Unlike for 
the proposer behaviour, a test of the full model against a constant only model was not 
statistically significant, (Chi square = 10,004, p = 0.12, df = 6), suggesting that none of the trait 
measures, either individually, or in combination are reliably associated with people’s decision 
to accept or reject unfair offers. 
Table 2.6 Summary of Logistic Regression with factor as predictors of responder decision 
behaviour with groups collapsed 
Predictor B Wald X p  Exp(B) 95% L 95% U 
(E-S) 0.02 1.92 0.17 1.02 0.99 1.05 
ToMRMIE 1.88 0.76 0.38 6.52 0.10 436.83 
EPQI -0.01 0.40 0.53 0.99 0.96 1.02 
EPQR -0.02 1.96 0.16 0.98 0.94 1.01 
BIS -0.10 3.41 0.07 0.90 0.81 1.01 
BAS 0.04 1.31 0.25 1.04 0.97 1.12 
Constant 1.32 0.29 0.59 3.73     
 
Hypothetical Task: The final phase of this experiment required participants to respond 
to all possible whole-number hypothetical offers in a £10 pot. The results of hypothetical 
responses to these offers are set out in Figure 2.7, and again suggest very few differences 
between the ASD and comparison group. A series of Chi squares tests were run to compare 
(ASD vs TD) responder decision-behaviour for each hypothetical offer, which confirmed no 
significant differences for any of them (see Table 2.7).  
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Figure 2.7 Acceptance rate for each Hypothetical Offer in a £10 pot 
 
Table 2.7 Chi-square test comparing acceptance rate for each hypothetical game in TD and 
ASD 
*Game Chi square p  (Phi ϕ) 
Game0 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.55) p = 0.47 0.09 
Game 1  (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.49) p = 0.48 0.07 
Game 2 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.05) p = 0.81 0.02 
Game 3 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.04) p = 0.82 0.02 
Game 4 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.00) p = 1.00 0.00 
Game 5 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.34) p = 0.55 0.06 
Game 6 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.45) p = 0.50 0.07 
Game 7 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 1.81) p = 0.17 0.14 
Game 8 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.68) p = 0.79 0.02 
Game 9 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.74) p = 0.78 0.03 
Game10 (X
 2 
(1, N = 84) = 0.57) p = 0.45 0.08 
    
* Games are labelled with the amount going to responder 
Finally, a McNemar test was used to compare acceptance rates across the hypothetical 
scenarios, combining both groups for this analysis due to the lack of differences between ASD 
and TD participants. The interest here was to compare the acceptance rate between equivalent 
splits that benefit either the proposer £(10-0) or the responder £(0-10). Confirming the existing 
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literature, for all pairs, the test showed that responders are less tolerant to unfair splits when 
the unfairness favours the proposer rather than themselves (see Table 2.8 for a summary of the 
analyses).  
Table 2.8 Comparison of rejection rate between pairs of splits with the same distribution 
ratio one with the offer beneficial to the proposer (Left) and (Right)beneficial to the 
responder 
Pair McNemar test p 
 a (G0 - G10) nG0=76, nG10=8 < .01 
  (G1 - G9) nG1=57, nG9=17 < .01 
  (G2 - G8) nG2=57, nG8=19 < .01 
  (G3 - G7) nG3=37, nG7=10 < .01 
  (G4 – G6) nG4=18, nG6=10 0.03 
   
a 
Responder gets £0, proposer get £10 (Game 0) vs (Game 10) Responder gets £10, proposer gets £0
 
 
Discussion 
The present study set out to test the prediction that autistic individuals would 
demonstrate economically more rational decision behaviours on the UG due the combination 
of difficulties in theory of mind and empathizing, and the tendency for systemizing that 
characterises the disorder. Although these predictions find some support in the limited number 
of studies that have examined social-economic decision making to date, the predictions were 
somewhat tentative for two reasons. First, whilst a tendency for systemizing might lead to 
economically more rational decision behaviours on the UG under the kind of logical 
assumptions that have informed economic models of game-theoretical paradigms, systemizing 
might also lead individuals to adhere to social norms and rules dictating  that a desire to  achieve 
fair and mutually beneficial outcomes for all benefit should guide the social exchange. For this 
reason, people’s tendencies to adhere to either idealist or relativist social norms were also 
examined in the current study. Second, beyond social-cognitive processes such as empathy and 
theory of mind, personal motivational drives are also thought to play a role in social-decision 
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making. Specifically, a tendency for behavioural inhibition to protect against potential aversive 
consequences, has been linked to fairer decision behaviours in the UG, presumably because 
such a drive motivates behaviours that minimize potential aversive consequences (e.g., an offer 
being rejected). Thus, participant’s tendencies to engage behavioural inhibition versus 
behavioural activation processes was also assessed in the current study.  
The results of the current study generally replicated that now well-established finding 
that, participants in an UG do not behave according to rational theories of economic behaviour. 
Instead of offering the lowest positive amount of the total pot possible as proposers under the 
assumption that rational responders should accept any amount above zero (Rubinstein, 1982b; 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), proposers most frequently opt for fair offers and 
responders tend to reject unfair offers despite the fact that this entails giving up an opportunity 
for obtaining payment (Camerer, 2003). More importantly, in relation to the main predictions, 
the results showed no differences between ASD and TD groups in One-shot UG behaviour. As 
proposers the modal offer was £5 in both groups, and as responders the acceptance/rejection 
rate of the unfair £7:£3 split was identical in both groups with approximately half of the 
participants rejecting the unfair proposal. Group similarity was further corroborated by 
decisions on the hypothetical UG, where the results suggested that individuals in both groups 
were sensitive to unfair treatments towards the self. Finally, many of the individual difference 
variables that were expected to contribute to decision behaviour in the UG and to group 
differences in such behaviour, turned out not to play a substantial role, particularly in responder 
behaviour where none of the variables measured predicted acceptance/rejection rates of unfair 
offers across the whole sample of 84 participants. 
Given the previous studies by Sally and Hill (2003, 2006), which indicated that ToM 
difficulties contribute to atypical UG decision behaviour in autistic children, particularly on the 
initial trial of a multi-trial paradigm, perhaps the most surprising finding of the current study 
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was the lack of evidence for a role of ToM in guiding decision behaviour in either ASD or TD 
participants. There are a number of possible reasons for this negative finding and the more 
general absence of group differences between ASD and TD participants. First, in relation to 
the role of ToM, it is important to remember that a considerable number of the studies that have 
implicated ToM in UG decision behaviour, have been carried out with younger children at an 
age where ToM may not yet have fully matured (e.g., Takagishi et al., 2010, 2014; Sally & 
Hill, 2003, 2004). Although brain imaging studies have implicated ToM processes also in adult 
social-economic decision making (Chiu et al., 2008a; McCabe et al.,2001; Rilling et al., 2004), 
behavioural measures may not be sensitive enough to capture such ToM processes in adults, 
particularly in the context of a One-shot interaction. Similarly, the tasks used to measure ToM 
in adults (i.e., the RMIE), may not be as sensitive to the specific aspects of ToM that may be 
critical for UG behaviour and that may be more appropriately captured by the tasks used with 
children (i.e., Sally-Ann). Specifically, the nature of the RMIE places considerable demands 
on face processing, and the ability to attribute emotional states to facial expressions, rather than 
to attribute beliefs as a way to anticipate another’s behaviour as in the Sally-Ann task. 
It is, however, also important to take the results at face value and consider the possibility 
that ToM does not play a critical role in determining rejection but acceptance in the UG. In this 
context, it is important to note that the literature is not entirely consistent on this point. For 
instance, Takagishi et al., (2014, 2010) reported that 6 years old who passed a Sally-Anne ToM 
task were generally more likely to make fair (50:50) proposals compared to children who failed 
the ToM task, and Sally & Hill (2006) observed a higher proportion of unfair offers in ASD 
than TD children. However, the data presented by Sally & Hill (2006) also illustrated curious 
differences TD children of different ages whereby 6 and 10-year olds were more likely to make 
fair offers than 8-year olds, who did not appear to differ much from the autistic children. If 
ToM abilities are a critical factor in proposer behaviour, fair offers would increase linearly with 
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age as was observed by Takagishi et al. Such inconsistencies suggest that ToM may not 
consistently be a strong driving force in decision behaviour, or it may only play a significant 
role in certain circumstances, such as when an individual thinks that their character might be 
under scrutiny (Chiu et al., 2008;  Frith & Frith, 2008) or when interactions are more reciprocal, 
requiring an updating of beliefs about another person’s intentions (Sally & Hill, 2006).  
Whilst the current study did not indicate any involvement of ToM in decision 
behaviour, there was some evidence to suggest that a tendency to empathize rather than 
systemize, was associated with a greater likelihood that a person would offer a fair amount as 
proposer, suggesting that empathy might promote fairness. This is in line with evidence 
suggesting that empathy enhances behaviour that favour others and those who display more 
affective concern towards others are more likely to behave altruistically (Singer et al., 2006, 
2005).  
The other noteworthy observation in the current study was the finding that fair offers 
in ASD participants appeared to be more strongly motivated by the Behavioural Inhibition 
system (BIS) than in TD participants. Specifically, on the BIS measure autistic adults who 
offered fair amounts scored higher than TD adults who offered fair amounts whereas not such 
differences emerged for participants who offered unfair amounts. Because unfair offers were 
relatively scarce, this result needs to be interpreted with some caution, as it may simply be a 
reflection of more general group differences in BIS rather than more specific group differences 
in the role of BIS in decision behaviour. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this finding is in 
line with previous studies which suggest that fair proposer behaviour may, in part, be driven 
by the behavioural inhibition system, which would motivate behaviours that avoid aversive 
consequences (e.g., having an offer rejected or being perceived as unfair) and  confrontation 
(Mennin et al., 2002; Skatova & Ferguson, 2011). It is also interesting that whilst no overall 
group differences in BAS were observed in the current sample, the groups significantly differ 
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in the BIS scale. In line with previous studies, the results show increased BIS in ASD compared 
to TD groups (e.g., Larson et al., 2011) which are very likely to generally result in  higher 
levels of anxiety as further indicators of greater BIS activation in ASD. Since BIS is associated 
with a greater tendency to make fair offers as proposers, the drive to avoid the negative 
consequences that might result from making unfair offers may overshadow any tendency 
toward more self-serving and economically more rational proposer behaviour that might result 
from ToM impairments and/or a greater tendency to systemize rather than empathize in ASD. 
In other words, different trait factors might influence decision behaviour on the UG in opposite 
directions, which is difficult, if not impossible, to tease out from the single observations that 
are gained from participants in a One-shot UG. The remaining experiments presented in 
chapters 2-4, will therefore make use of multiple trial UG paradigms (though participants will 
interact only once with any given other partner), and employ experimental manipulations and 
measures that aim to shed more light on the specific role different factors play in guiding 
decision behaviour. Before turning to these studies, it is useful to highlight an important 
implication of the current findings. Specifically, although a One-shot task may be poorly 
powered to detect the kind of influences on social-decision behaviour that are of interest in the 
current thesis – influences of Theory of Mind, empathizing/systemizing, EPQ, BIS/BAS - an 
advantage of such tasks is that they have very high face validity. In this respect the absence of 
any group differences may have some positive implications for the day-to-day lives of autistic 
individuals. Specifically, the typical patterns of behaviour observed in the current study, would 
suggest that, at least in the context of single socio-economic transactions, such as those 
involved in bargaining about purchase prices of goods, autistic individuals appear no more 
susceptible to exploitation than TD participants, nor would they be at greater risk of being 
perceived as unfair. 
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3 EXPERIMENT TWO: PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSES AND DECISION 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
The results of experiment 1 reported in the previous chapter, in which autistic (ASD) 
and typically developing (TD) participants completed an ecologically valid One-shot 
ultimatum game, showed similarly fair offers and identical proportions of rejections of an 
unfair (£7 - £3) offer in both groups. Moreover, of all the measures that were examined as 
possible predictors of decision behaviour: ToM, Empathizing – Systemizing (E-S), 
Behavioural Approach and Inhibition (BIS/BAS) and Ethical positions (EPQ), only the E-S 
difference score and BIS drive predicted the probability of participants making fair offers, with 
BIS playing a role in this respect, only for ASD participants. No factor predicted acceptance or  
rejection rates of unfair offers as responders. The broad equivalence between groups in 
experiment 1 was surprising given the wider literature, although it is likely that the nature of a 
One-shot UG may not be sensitive to the differences that might be expected. 
 As will be explained in this chapter, following pioneering work by (Civai et al., 2010; 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003) a large body of research has emerged 
suggesting that responder behaviour in the UG, is the result of emotion processing activated 
when individuals are presented with offers that favour the proposer (i.e., unfair offers). 
Therefore, this next experiment was designed to examine the mechanisms involved in the 
decision-making process during the UG in more detail, focussing in particular on the role of 
ToM and emotion-related processes. Further scrutiny of these mechanisms is important given 
evidence that an absence of group differences in certain overt behaviours between ASD and 
comparison participants can often be observed in the context of differences in the mechanisms 
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involved in mediating the behaviour (Begeer et al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2008; South et al., 
2011)  
As will be described in this section, there is increasing evidence suggesting that the 
boundaries between emotion and cognition in decision making are less well-defined than 
previously thought (Camerer, 2003b; Lieberman, 2007a, 2007b; Loewenstein, 2000;  Sanfey 
et al., 2007; 2003). Emotional processes, such as the physiological arousal induced by the 
unfairness of an offer, have been shown to play a significant role in determining decision 
behaviour on the UG (Van’t Wout, et al., 2006) and, social-cognitive processes such as theory 
of mind (Blount, 1995; Rilling et al., 2004) are also thought to play a role. In light of this 
evidence, the difficulties that individuals with ASD demonstrate in various aspects of social 
cognition and in processing emotional information (Bölte, Feineis-Matthews, & Poustka, 2008; 
Chevallier et al., 2012; Mcdonald, 2013; Silani et al., 2008) would lead to the prediction that 
decisions on the UG should be less affected in ASD by the emotions generated by unfair offers 
and by the intentionality of proposers. The experiment set out in this chapter will test these 
predictions by recording physiological arousal levels to fair and unfair offers in a paradigm 
developed by Van’t Wout, et al., (2006) in which offers are either proposed by intentional 
agents (other humans) or are randomly generated by a non-intentional machine (a computer). 
Before setting out the details of this experiment, some of the relevant literature will first be 
summarised regarding the role of emotional and social-cognitive processes in human 
interaction. 
Awareness of emotional cues and sharing of emotional information have decisive 
influences on people’s social behaviour. Emotions affect cognitive processes and behaviour 
across multiple functional domains, including the regulation of attention and perception, 
modulation of learning and the processes involved in decision behaviour (e.g. Damasio, 1994). 
Together these wide influences serve to ensure the survival and wellbeing of the organism by 
115 
 
regulating behaviour to avoid danger whilst seeking out reward and appetitive stimuli (Barrett, 
2013; Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007). In decision making, emotion has been shown to play 
an important role in moral judgment (Greene et al. 2004) and more broadly, the relation 
between emotion and decision making has gained attention in economy (Loomes & Sugden, 
1982) and in psychology, with studies showing  that emotions function as the guiding compass 
when choosing between options that vary in terms of their value to the organism (Damasio, 
1994; Loewenstein, 1996; Zajonc, 1998).   
  
The way in which people integrate emotion-related information with ongoing cognitive 
processes plays an important role in determining socio economic behaviour. Standard models 
of economics, assume that the utility of an action depends only on the positive difference 
between the outcome versus expected outcome, and therefore the focus has been on post-
decision emotions, such as regret and disappointment (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). However, 
other models, which have shown that people are not always simply interested in outcomes, 
suggest that decision behaviour is also influenced by the emotion experienced during the 
decision-making process. Here, research has looked at a wider range of emotions (Forgas, 
1995), and considered the effects of both incidental emotions, that are unrelated to the task, 
and integral emotions that are directly elicited by the task (for a review see Rick & 
Loewenstein, 2008). Incidental emotions are generated by external and contextual factors, such 
as the weather, ambient noise or events that are unrelated to the task but that nevertheless affect 
decision making (Lieberman et al., 2011) and not always in a conscious way (Bonini et al., 
2011).  
Bonini et al., (2011) tested the effect of incidental emotions in the UG. Participants 
were asked whether to accept or reject an unfair offer of $2 out of $10. Participants were tested 
in one of two contexts; a room with an unpleasant smell or a room with no smell. There were 
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significantly more acceptances of the unfair offer in the smelly room compared to the neutral 
room, leading the authors to suggest that participants in the odour condition misattributed the 
disgust associated with the unfairness (integral emotions) to the disgusting smell in the room 
(incidental emotions), leading to a reduced tendency to direct a negative behaviour to the unfair 
offer. This interpretation implies that rejections of unfair offers are, at least in part, motivated 
by the aversive feelings that unfair offers would typically elicit – i.e., the integral emotions in 
the task.  
In the context of social decision-making tasks such as the UG, integral emotions are 
thought to derive not only from the fairness or equity of a proposed offer but also from the 
perceived causes of any unfairness or inequity. For instance, an unfair offer made intentionally 
by a rich person is more likely to cause anger and disgust than an unfair offer from a poor 
person or from a rich person made by accident. Manipulating the fairness and causes of unfair 
offers, have thus proven an effective way to explore the relation between integral emotion and 
decision making in the UG, as exemplified by Blount (1995). Participants in this experiment 
were assigned to one of three conditions which differed in the type of proposer: In the interested 
party condition, the proposer was another human who had a stake in the game; in the third-
party condition, a human partner was involved who would not get a payoff; and in the random 
condition the proposer was not human but a computer, which served to remove intentionality 
and self-interest. Rejection rate comparisons between the three conditions showed higher 
rejection in the interested party condition than when offers were randomly made by a computer 
device; whereas rejection rates in the third-party condition fell in between. The results were 
interpreted as evidence to show that the expectation people have of the offers is contingent to 
proposer type, this confirming that people have normative expectation about other people’s 
behaviours in the UG. 
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Similar results were found by Sanfey et al., (2003) who, presented  responders with 20 
offers (fair and unfair), 10 of which were generated by human proposers and 10 were generated 
by computers. fMRI scans taken during decision-making, examined activation in the insula, a 
brain region involved in the processing of disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) and pain experiences 
(Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). The data showed significantly greater activity in this region for 
unfair vs. fair offers from humans, and greater activation for unfair offers from human vs. 
computer proposers. What is more, insula activity reliably predicted rejection of unfair offers 
coming from human proposers, which agrees with the findings of Pillutla and Murnighan 
(1996), who found that responders in the UG who self-reported anger due to the unfairness of 
the offer, were more likely to reject unfair offers and accept losses of some money to punish 
unfair proposers. A number of other studies consistently show that integral emotions predict 
decision behaviour (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008; for an extensive view see De Houver & 
Hermans, 2013), and it is therefore generally accepted that emotional processes play a 
significant role in regulating decision behaviour (Damásio, 1995).  
But how do our emotions influence our decision making? According to the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis (Bechara et al., 2000), the emotional consequences of our experiences are 
recorded alongside sensory and motor representations in memory from where they can be 
reactivated when we encounter similar situations again in the future. The reactivated emotional 
information includes physiological markers such as changes in endocrine release, muscle tone, 
heart rate, and general arousal, which have intrinsic aversive or appetitive values due to the 
sensory information they are associated with in memory. As a result, somatic markers can 
prompt either avoidance or approach behaviours relative to the stimuli that elicit them and this 
is often independent of conscious awareness (Bechara & Damasio, 2005).  
Among the first demonstrations of the influence of somatic markers on decision 
behaviour was in the context of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), which requires participants to 
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choose cards from one of four decks with the aim to win as much money (or as many points) 
as possible (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Each choice leads, 
probabilistically, to certain amounts of winnings and losses and unbeknownst to the 
participants the decks are arranged so that 2 decks are overall advantageous (i.e. they yield on 
average greater wins than losses), whilst the other 2 decks are disadvantageous. Unsurprisingly, 
participants learn to choose more frequently from the advantageous decks over the course of 
100 decisions. Bechara and colleagues, however, were also able to show that even before 
participants shifted their decisions toward the advantageous decks, increases in arousal in the 
form of elevated Skin Conductance Responses (GSRs) could be observed, which were absent 
in patients with ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) lesions, who failed to show a shift in 
decision making toward the advantageous decks (Bechara et al., 1997). Moreover, Crone et al., 
(2004) showed that adults selected advantageous options faster than disadvantageous options 
and this was also preceded by skin conductance increases and greater heart rate deceleration. 
Together, these and other studies provide strong evidence to suggest that somatic markers play 
a significant role in decision behaviour by signalling the value of possible decision outcomes.  
Returning to the UG, when responders are confronted with unpleasant unfair offers, 
somatic markers associated with the negative emotions that are triggered, may lead to a 
defensive reaction that lead people to reject without considering, for instance, the financial 
benefit of accepting the offer14. Interestingly, in the studies outlined earlier by Sanfey et al., 
(2003), the fMRI data indicated that only unfair offers from a human proposer elicited 
activation in brain areas typically involved in the expression and experience of disgust and 
anger whereas unfair offers randomly generated by a computer did not. Van’t Wout et al. 
(2006) subsequently examined whether this pattern of results would extend to somatic markers 
                                                          
14 However as explained earlier in Chapter 1, decision behaviour in the UG can be explained by other motives 
than financial gains. 
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(Bechara & Damasio, 2005) by examining the relation between SCRs and the subsequent 
decision to accept or reject unfair offers from either a human or computer proposer. Thirty 
students (12 males; mean age 21.25 years) were invited to play 20 UGs with an endowment of 
5 euro each time. On half of the trials, offers were made by human proposers (a different one 
each time) whereas on the other half of the trials, offers were generated by a computer. In each 
condition (human – computer), half of the offers were fair (2.50 euro to each player), whereas 
the other half were unfair with the human/computer proposer offering only either 0.50, 1.00 or 
1.50 out of 5 Euros to the participant. As predicted, higher GSR was associated with higher 
rejection rate to unfair offers coming from human compared to computer-generated offers, thus 
supporting economic models that acknowledge a role of emotions on decision making 
(Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Damásio et al., 2013; De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 
2006; George Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).  
 As outlined in Chapter 1, among the defining social-cognitive characteristics of ASD 
are difficulties understanding, empathizing with and reciprocating emotional expressions of 
others. Specifically, there is now a wide consensus that people with autism have difficulties 
recognising and relating to the emotions of other people. Studies show that autistic individuals 
attend less to the emotions of others (Ben Shalom et al., 2006; Charman et al., 1997) have 
difficulties recognising and labelling other people’s emotions correctly (Gross, 2004; Hobson, 
1986) and there is some evidence suggesting that they also empathise with others’ emotions to 
a lesser extent although the evidence here is more contentious (Adolphs, 2002; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2000). Although these difficulties were once considered to be a fairly specific feature of 
the social impairments that characterise ASD, more recent studies have shown that the 
emotional salience of information and situations more generally does not modulate cognitive 
processes and the behaviour of autistic individuals in typical ways, although the evidence here 
is still fairly scarce (see Gaigg, 2012 for a review).  
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At the physiological level, autistic individuals generally seem to respond with similar 
physiological responses to emotional stimuli, except social ones like faces (Ashwin et al., 
2006). Physiological responses such as GSR and changes in heart rate, for instance  have been 
reported to function in a similar fashion in ASD as in TD participants (Corden, Chilvers, & 
Skuse, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, 2007, 2008), even if participants do not always seem to be 
aware of these physiological signals in terms of subjective feelings (i.e., Alexithymia; see 
Gaigg et al., 2018; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004). Albeit not from social decision-making tasks 
but from risk-based decision tasks, e.g. the IGT,  evidence by Johnson et al., (2006) and South 
et al., (2008) suggests that physiological responses do not modulate decision behaviour 
typically in ASD. For instance, Johnson et al., (2006) instructed a group of 29 young adults 
matched in IQ and age (14 clinically diagnosed ASDs) to win as much money as possible in a 
IGT over 150 trials. During the task, GSR was recorded as a measure of autonomic 
responsiveness. Participants started the game with $5 credit and were informed that they would 
receive their gains at the end of the session. Participants were shown images of four decks of 
cards labelled A, B, C, and D, which were displayed horizontal and “face down”. Participants 
were instructed to select a card by touching the screen. There was no time limit for card 
selection and participants were not informed about the total number of trials and the decks 
contingencies (A & B decks resulted in small reward and small punish, compared to C&D 
which resulted in large rewards and punishment). Participants were told that they could switch 
between decks whenever they liked. Once a card was selected, the participant was able to see 
the amounts won and lost and this feedback remained on the screen for 3s, in addition 
participants were always presented with the total earnings on the feedback screen.  
To enable GSR data collection a 6s inter-trial interval was implemented. Both groups, 
demonstrated similar proportions of overall advantageous selections. However, analysis of 
selection sequences within each group revealed highly distinct selection patterns in the ASD 
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group. ASD participants shifted more frequently among the cards and this was interpreted as 
limited responsiveness to the motivational significance of previous experienced gains (losses) 
during the task. Moreover, the groups (ASD vs TD) differed significantly on post-selection 
SCRs for advantageous decks, with the ASD group consistently producing lower SCRs. Whilst 
this finding was not associated with group differences in the proportion of advantageous vs. 
disadvantageous deck choices, it does suggest that emotion-related processes may play a 
different role in decision-making paradigms in ASD vs. TD participants.   
Given the literature set out above, the second experiment presented in this chapter 
builds on the paradigm developed by van ’t Wout et al., (2006) to examine whether 1) the 
typical responder behaviour in a one-shot UG by autistic adults observed in Experiment 1 
would replicate in a multi-trial UG paradigm, 2) whether rejection rates would be typically 
modulated by the intentionality of unfair offers (i.e., human vs. computer) in ASD and 3) 
whether the body’s bio-regulatory signals such as galvanic skin response (GSR) play a similar 
role in regulating decision behaviour in the UG in ASD and TD participants.  
Based on the results from experiment 1, we expected no differences in the overall 
acceptance/rejection rates between TD and ASD participants. Regarding the effects of the 
proposer manipulation (human vs. computer) on both physiological responses and decision 
behaviour, the tentative prediction was that this would have less of an effect on the ASD than 
the TD group on the assumption that ToM difficulties in ASD would make the intentionality 
of offers less salient to them. Specifically, whilst TD participants are expected to reject fewer 
unfair offers from computer vs. human proposers, and also demonstrate greater physiological 
arousal to human vs. computer unfair offers, these proposer effects would be attenuated in 
ASD. This prediction is tentative, because the results of Experiment 1 indicated that individual 
differences in ToM did not influence rejection rates in a One-shot game, and in the multi-trial 
studies of UG behaviour with children by Takagishi et al., (2014), differences in ToM between 
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children had significant influences on proposer but not on responder behaviour when the 
decision is to reject (Schug et al.,2016). Moreover, in one of the experiments presented by Sally 
& Hill (2006), a manipulation human vs. computer interactive partner in a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game (see Chapter 1 for details of this paradigm), has similar effects on both TD and ASD 
children. Despite these findings, however, the wider literature suggests that direct 
manipulations such as those implemented in the current study and by Sally & Hill (2006) do 
modulate decision behaviour in game theoretical paradigms, and if ToM plays a role, as is 
assumed, the difficulties in ToM associated with ASD should lead to differences in how such 
manipulations affect behaviour (this was also the prediction by Sally & Hill, 2006) and/or 
emotional responses.  
3.1 Method 
Participants 
In total, 72 adults (36 ASD) were recruited from an existing database to achieve groups 
that were closely matched on chronological age and intellectual functioning (Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IIIUK; The Psychological Corporation, 2000). ASD participants had 
all been diagnosed according to Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; 
DSM-IV) criteria by experienced clinicians within the UK National Health Service, and 
administration of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2000) and Autism 
Spectrum Questionnaire (AQ: Baron-Cohen et al.,2001) provided further support for the 
diagnosis. Although the ADOS could not be administered to two participants, and the AQ to 
one ASD participant, all ASD participants completed at least one of these assessments and all 
scored above relevant cut-off scores on one, or both of the instruments.  
Specifically, 33 out of 35 ASD participants scored 26 or higher on the AQ, which is the 
cut-off recommended by Woodbury-Smith et al., (2005) for clinically referred individuals, and 
25 out of 34 participants scored at or above the total algorithm cut-off score of 7 on the ADOS 
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(module 4) with the remaining participants scoring either 5 (n =6) or 6 (n = 3). All TD 
participants also completed the AQ and none scored at or above the higher cut-off scores of 32 
recommended by Woodbury-Smith et al., (2005) for screening of non-referred samples (3 TD 
participants scored 26, 27 and 28 respectively). Table 3.1 provides details of the group 
characteristics.  
This study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee of City, 
University of London and the procedures outlined below adhere to the ethical guidelines set 
out by the British Psychological Society. Participants Characteristics for ASD and TD 
Individuals. 
Table 3.1 Characteristics for ASD and TD Individuals 
 ASD (30m,6f) TD (25m,11f)       
Measure M (SD) M(SD) t (70) P Cohen's d 
Age (years) 46.92 (12.35) 49.64 (14.20) 0.86 0.38 0.20 
aVIQ 114.94 (15.08) 112.78 (12.45) 0.66 0.50 0.15 
bPIQ 110.92 (16.45) 106.25 (13.57) 1.31 0.19 0.30 
cFIQ 114.17 (16.13) 110.53 (12.17) 1.08 0.28 0.25 
dAQ 36.97 (6.70) 15.19 (7.00) 13.39 < 0.001 3.18 
eADOS-C 2.71 (1.55) *[0-6]      
fADOS-RSI 5.68 (2.50) *[1-13]      
gADOS-Total 8.38 (3.28) *[5-17]      
 
a
Verbal IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK);
b
Performance IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK); 
c
Full Scale IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS 
IVUK); 
d
Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al.,2001); 
e
ADOS- Communication; *[In brackets range of scores for ADOS] 
f
ADOS- Reciprocal Social Interaction; 
g
ADOS Total Score- Communication + Reciprocal Social Interaction. 
 
 
Materials & Design 
Twenty-four offers were generated for this experiment including twelve (£5:£5) fair 
and twelve unfair offers - four each of £9: £1, £8:£2 and £7:£3. Half of each type of offer was 
presented as a randomly generated computer offer whilst the other half was presented as human 
generated offers. For the computer condition, a short animation lasting 17 seconds was created, 
which first showed an image of a computer monitor that displayed the message ‘loading…’ for 
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10 seconds15, before showing ‘Computer offers £X…’ for 2 seconds and finally revealing the 
full message ‘Computer offers £X and keeps £Y’, which remained on the screen for another 5 
seconds. Immediately after the full description of the offer appeared participants were shown 
the message “Do you want to accept (A) or reject (R) the computer’s offer’, which remained 
on the screen until participants gave a corresponding keyboard response (a vs. r). For the human 
condition, videos were previously recorded, which showed proposers (one for each offer), 
typing offers into a computer. The framing of the videos was such that proposers were filmed 
over their shoulder from behind so that their faces could only be seen very partially out of 
focus, whilst the key board they were using, and the computer monitor they were looking at 
were clearly visible. The proposers were confederates who were instructed to type in offers 
that had previously been generated by other participants (i.e., those in Experiment 1 of the 
current thesis) and that would serve as the materials for the current study. The instructions to 
the confederates also specified that they should type in the offers at a certain pace so that the 
timing of the events on the video would correspond to the timing of the events set out above 
for the computer-generated offers (i.e., 10 second period of generating the offer followed by 
revealing first the offer value for 2 seconds and then the offer and retention values for another 
5 seconds). As the confederates typed in their offers, the values they typed appeared clearly on 
the screen in front of them. The videos that were generated in this manner were displayed to 
the participants of the current study with a fictitious first name shown below to individuate 
proposers. Following each video participants were again prompted for their response with the 
message “Do you want to accept (A) or reject (R) [e.g. Elizabeth’s] offer”. 
  For the recording of Skin conductance responses (SCRs), an ADInstruments 
PowerLab System (ML845) including a GSR (ML 116) and bioelectrical signal amplifier 
                                                          
15 Dots were added to this message one at a time at 250ms intervals until 4 dots were shown, at which point all 
dots disappeared and reappeared one at a time, thus giving the impression that some computer processing took 
place to generate the offer. 
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(ML408 with MLA2540 and MLA2505 5-lead shielded Bio Amp cables) were used, which 
was coupled with the stimulus presentation computer to allow event markers to be recorded on 
the physiological trace, to indicate the onset of stimuli. Physiological signals were recorded at 
a rate of 1kHz in LabChart 7 (ADInstruments, 1994-2011), which was used also for subsequent 
offline processing of the data. 
Procedure 
All testing was done in a quiet, dimly lit room at City, University of London, where 
participants were given the following instructions about the task:  
“The task we would like you to complete today is a decision-making task in which you will be 
presented with offers of a share of £10. Some of these offers will be randomly generated by a 
computer. Other offers are those of other people who have taken part in a previous stage of this 
experiment and who agreed for us to film them – their faces are blurred to protect their anonymity. 
Your task will be simply to decide whether you would like to accept or reject each offer. For every 
offer you accept, you will receive 10% of the value offered to you. If, the offer was made by another 
person, they too will receive 10% of the value they proposed to keep for themselves. For offers you 
reject there will be no payments to anyone. 
Example: Out of £10 a person offers you £5 and would like to keep £5 for themselves. If you accept 
this proposal both you and the other person will receive £0.50 (fifty pence). If you reject this 
proposal neither you nor the other person would receive any payment. 
In summary, you will be asked to respond to several offers and the amount of your earnings will 
be displayed at the end of the task. To indicate your decision, simply press the letter “a” to accept 
an offer or “r” to reject it.  
Throughout the task, we would like to monitor your heart rate and how much your fingertips sweat. 
This is because we are interested to find out how the decisions people make in this task are related 
to their physiological responses to the offers they receive. Therefore, at the beginning of the 
experiment, electrodes would be attached to the middle and index finger of your non-dominant 
hand and we would ask you to wear some electrodes on your chest to monitor your heart-rate “16 
 
Once participants confirmed that they understood the task, and after signing the consent 
form, equipment for recording the physiological measures was set up. The GSR electrodes, 
                                                          
16 Please note that whilst Heart Rate was monitored in this experiment, the results of this data are not presented 
in this thesis due to difficulties that arose during the analysis that could not be overcome within the time-frame 
available to submission. 
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were attached to the medial phalanges of the index and ring fingers of the participants’ non-
dominant hand using fitted Velcro tapes and the participant was asked to position two (positive 
and negative) self-adhesive snap connect ECG electrodes on the left and right sides of their 
chests with a reference electrode being attached to the elbow. Participants were encouraged to 
sit comfortably and to avoid unnecessary movements during the testing session to avoid 
movement artefacts. Before starting the UG task 2 minutes of baseline were recorded to ensure 
a correct attachment and conductance of the electrodes and to allow physiological signals to 
settle on a baseline.  
Following a brief reminder of the instructions for the UG task, computer and human 
offers were presented in random order using the stimulus presentation program E-Prime 
(version E-Studio, v.2.0.8.90; www.pstnet.com). Each trial began with a ‘please wait for the 
next offer’ screen that lasted 10 seconds to allow any physiological responses to previous trials 
to recover. After this wait slide, offers were presented as described in the materials section 
above. There was no time limit for participants to make their responses. Once responses were 
entered the next trial began, again with the 10 second “Please wait for the next offer” screen. 
At the end of the 24th trial the participant saw a screen showing the amount of money earned 
for all accepted offers (i.e., 10% of the accepted values) followed by a screen thanking them 
for their participation. Throughout the task, the experimenter stayed in the room behind a 
dividing screen next to the participant, to monitor the psychophysiological recordings.17  
                                                          
17 There is evidence by (Bolton & Zwick, 1995) suggesting that the presence of the experimenter has little to 
nothing influence on decision behaviour in this type of Lab based experiments however we do not know whether 
the presence of an experimenter might have effects on people with ASD and to the best of our knowledge there 
are not studies specifically addressing this topic. 
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3.2 Analysis  
Statistical analysis was performed in IBM SPSS v22. The level of significance was set 
at α=0.05. All data were tested for normality of distribution using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
The Levene’s statistic was used to test data for homogeneity of variances across groups. Data, 
which did not meet the criteria for homogeneity of variances and normality of distribution 
(GSR data) were log transformed.  
For the analysis of the GSR data, the peak response during the 7-second window during 
which the offer was presented to participants (see materials section) was subtracted from the 
GSR level during the last 2 seconds of the ‘wait for next offer’ screen, to provide an index of 
the participants’ trial-by-trial arousal response to the offers, prior to giving their decisions. 
Following the procedures of van ’t Wout et al., (2006) (see also Venables & Christie, 1980), 
increases in GSR levels from baseline of more than 0.02 µS were considered to indicate a 
reliable response and trials on which the amplitude was greater than 3 standard deviations 
above the mean of all other trials were considered artefacts and excluded from further analysis 
(9 trials were excluded on this basis in total). The mean amplitude of all remaining responses 
was calculated across the experimental factors of interest (e.g., GSRs related to fair vs. unfair 
offers or rejected vs. accepted offers) and a log transformation (log(GSR+1)) of the raw data 
was performed to normalize the distribution of the data (Venables & Christie, 1980). 
3.3 Results  
Behavioural data 
Figure 3.1 sets out the rejection rates of the different offers as a function of proposer 
(human vs. computer) and participant group (ASD vs. TD). To examine the extent to which 
rejection rates are moderated by the offer values, the type of proposer and the participant group, 
a 2 (Group: ASD vs TD) x 2 (Proposer: Human vs Computer) x 4 (Offer: £1, £2, £3, £5) 
repeated measures analysis of variance was performed.  
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Figure 3.1 Proportion of rejected offers as a function of, proposer type (human vs. computer) 
and participant group. Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
 
The analysis yielded significant main effects of offer, F(3,210) = 101.63, p <.001, η2 = 
0.59, Proposer F(1,70) = 9.93, p = .002, η2 = 0.124 but not group F(1,70) = 0.00, p = .994, η2 
= 0.000. The offer main effect confirms the well-established UG phenomenon whereby 
rejection rates increase as a function of the unfairness of offers. In the current experiment, 
offers of less than £5 (M = 0.61, SD = 0.35) were rejected significantly more often than fair 
offers (M = 0.06, SD = 0.19; t (71) = -12.947, p = < 0.001; Cohen’s d = 1.90). The main effect 
of proposer confirms the findings of van ’t Wout et al., (2006) that unfair computer-generated 
offers (M = 0.55, SD = 0.41) were rejected significantly less often than unfair human generated 
offers (M = 0.67, SD = 0.36; t(71) = 3.124, p = .003; Cohen’s d = 0.29).  
In addition to the main effects, the behavioural data were also characterised by a 
proposer x offer interaction F(3,210) = 3.62, p = 0.014, η2 = 0.05, which was further 
characterised by a marginally significant 3-way interaction between group, proposer and offer 
F(3,210) = 2.56, p = 0.056, η2 = 0.035. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, this interaction stemmed 
from group differences in the effects of the proposer manipulation, specifically on the £3 offer 
trials. Whilst TD participants rejected this offer significantly more often in the human (M = 
0.51; SD = 0.47) than the computer condition (M = 0.32; SD = 0.42; ; t(75) = 2.79, p = .009; 
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Cohen’s d = 0.43), ASD participants rejected this offer at an identical rate (M = 0.47; SD = 
0.47) in both conditions, suggesting that the value of the offer rather than the nature of the 
proposer motivated the decision in this group.  
Physiological data 
For the analysis of GSR responses, we first examined the extent to which GSRs varied 
as a function of the value of the offers and the nature of the proposers. Because of the relatively 
small number of trials for each type of unfair offer, responses to offers of £1, £2 and £3 out of 
the £10 were averaged under an ‘unfair’ category for this analysis. It is important to note that 
7 TD and 2 ASD participants needed to be excluded from this analysis because they had 
insufficient numbers of reliable GSRs above the 0.02μS threshold in all relevant conditions. 
The data for the remaining 29 TD and 34 ASD participants is set out in Figure 3.2 and did not 
replicate the observations of van ’t Wout et al., (2006) in that there were no main effects or 
interactions (all Fs < 1.7; ps > 0.2). 
 
Figure 3.2 Average GSR amplitude in response to fair and unfair offers as a function of 
proposer (human vs. computer) and participant group (ASD vs. TD). Error bars indicate +/- 1 
SE. 
  
130 
 
To examine whether GSR responses predicted whether offers would be accepted or 
rejected, the GSR data were also averaged across accepted and rejected offers in each of the 
two proposer conditions. Because not all participants accepted and rejected offers in each of 
the two proposer conditions relevant averages could not be calculated for 10 TD and 7 ASD 
participants in the human condition and for 16 TD and 15 ASD participants in the computer 
condition. Due to these unequal participant numbers, and to retain as many participants in the 
analysis as possible, two separate 2 (Group: ASD vs. TD) x 2 (Decision: Accept vs. Reject) 
ANOVAs were carried out for the two proposer conditions (Human vs. Computer) – the data 
are set out in Table 3.2. The only significant effect that emerged was a main effect of group in 
the human proposer condition F(1,53) = 4.48, p = 0.039, η2 = 0.078), where the ASD group 
demonstrated overall greater GSRs. The absence of any other significant effects or interactions 
again fails to replicate the observations of van ’t Wout et al., (2006) who had found that GSRs 
predicted rejection rates particularly for human offers. 
 
Figure 3.3 Average GSR amplitude for accepted and rejected offers as a function of proposer 
(human vs. computer) and participant group (ASD vs. TD). Error bars indicate +/- 1 SE. 
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3.4 Correlations / Predictors of Decisions 
Following the data analysis approach of Chapter 2, simple correlations were examined 
to identify individual difference factors that might correlate with participant’s decision. Table 
3.2 sets out the simple correlations (Pearson’s r coefficients) between rejection rates of unfair 
human and computer offers and each of a number of individual difference factors of interest, 
including age, VIQ, PI, FIQ, AQ, RMIE, BIS/BAS and EPQ idealism and realism. Correlations 
are shown for both groups combined as well as for each group separately and r-coefficients 
greater than 0.3 are highlighted in bold for ease of reference (all of the highlighted correlations 
were significant at the p<.05 level except that between VIQ and human rejection rates in the 
ASD group where p = .055).18 
                                                          
18 Since rejection rate are affected by fairness levels, we correlated measures in Table 3.2. with rejection rate for 
each offer type independently and by group. The result showed that rejection of the critical split £(3-7) in the 
ASD group significantly correlated when the offer is made by human with VIQ (-0.49) and EPQ_Idealism 
(0.45) and also when the offer is made by PC (-0.39) and (0.52) respectively. However, in the TD group the 
correlation is  with EPQ_Idealism (-0.37) and RMIE (-0.36) and only when offers are made by human 
proposers. While no correlations were observed in the TD group for offers coming from PC, in the ASD group 
rejection rate correlates when the offers are £2 (VIQ =-0.42; EPQ_Idealism = 0.45) and £1 (VIQ = -0.44; 
EPQ_Idealism =0.48). No correlations were observed in the ASD group when offers were made by human 
proposer. In the TD group, when offers were made by human there was a correlation between rejection rate and 
EPQ_Idealism (£2: -.039); (£1: -0.57) 
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Table 3.2 Bivariate Correlations between individual difference factors and rejection rates of 
unfair offers from Human and Computer proposers 
 
As Table 3.2 indicates, Verbal IQ and FIQ predicted rejection rates in both participant 
groups to a similar degree with higher VIQs predicting lower rates of rejection. Interestingly, 
the ethics position idealism scale also predicted rejection rates in the ASD group whereas no 
such relationship was apparent in the TD group. Fisher’s r to z transformations indicated that 
the differences in these correlations were significant for the human proposer condition (z = 
2.67, p <.01) but not the computer proposer condition (z = 1.51, p =.13), though it is worth 
noting that within each group the patterns of correlations did not differ between conditions19. 
3.5 Discussion 
This study had a threefold purpose. First, to establish whether the equivalent 
behavioural responses between ASD and TD participants observed in the one-shot UG of 
Chapter 2 would replicate in a multi-trial UG. Second, to further examine what role theory of 
mind processes play in UG decision making by manipulating whether offers are made by 
intentional agents (humans) or non-intentional machines (a computer). And finally, we 
                                                          
19 A correlation (r = 0.38, p =0.034) was found between (E-S) and EPQi measures; and between VIQ and EPQi 
(r = -0.40, p =0.002) 
Human Computer Human Computer Human Computer
Age -0.02 -0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.06 -0.05
VIQ -0.32 -0.44 -0.41 -0.24 -0.36 -0.36
PIQ -0.15 -0.28 -0.18 -0.13 -0.9 -0.21
FIQ -0.28 -0.44 -0.27 -0.24 -0.28 -0.35
AQ -0.15 -0.15 0.02 0.1 -0.08 0
RMIE 0.08 -0.06 -0.22 -0.17 -0.03 -0.1
E-S 0.3 0.27 -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.12
BIS -0.15 0.07 0.08 0.19 0 0.13
BAS -0.16 -0.1 0.18 0.31 -0.12 0.06
EPQ_ideal 0.41 0.51 -0.28 0.15 0.17 0.39
EPQ_real 0.23 0.25 -0.04 -0.33 0.11 0.02
ASD TD Combined groups
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investigated whether TD and ASD differ either in physiological response to unfair offers or 
more importantly in the way emotional responses to offers, as reflected in GSR, guides decision 
behaviour in the UG. 
In relation to the first two aims, the current study generally confirmed that ASD and 
TD adults are very similar in terms of rejecting unfair offers in the UG. As already explained 
in relation to the finding of chapter 2, this result is somewhat unexpected considering that 
certain characteristics of ASD, such as their tendency for systemizing rather than empathizing  
(Baron-Cohen, 2006; Baron-Cohen, 2009; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005) would lead to the 
prediction that autistic individuals would behave more ‘rationally’ in an economic sense, and 
accept offers on the basis of their face value rather than a consideration of a proposer’s motives, 
e.g. fairness considerations.   
Importantly, however, the data from the current study did suggest that there are 
differences between ASD and TD participants in terms of how decisions are made on the UG. 
Although both ASD and TD participants were sensitive in their decision behaviour to the 
proposer manipulation (i.e., both groups rejected unfair human offers significantly more often 
than unfair computer offers overall), this effect was only apparent for the most unfair offers of 
£1 and £2 out of 10 in the ASD group but not in the £3 unfair offer. ASD’s respond to offers 
of £3 may indicate that although they differentiate between proposers, they implemented the 
same strategy, e.g. logical strategy,  when deciding over the critical split. It is possible that in 
situations of borderline fairness, where there is a genuine dilemma between fairness and 
financial considerations, TDs are sensitive to contextual information which allows them to 
rationalise the offer and so accept it. No differences, in cooperation rate, were also reported by 
(Hill et al., 2004; Sally & Hill, 2006) in which participants were asked to interact with human 
and computer partners in a prisoner’s dilemma.  
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The effects of the proposer manipulation on participants’ emotional and behavioural 
responses is not only of interest in relation to the role that emotions play in guiding decision 
behaviour but also in relation to the role of ToM. Again, the evidence in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 
1995) would lead to the prediction that the proposer manipulation should have less effect on 
individuals with ASD compared to controls. The current data partially confirm this prediction.  
Participants from both groups, similarly rejected less unfair offers from computers compared 
to human proposers (Blount, 1995; Civai et al., 2010), however while TDs behaved this way 
across unfairness levels, ASD did not differentiate between proposers when the unfair offer 
represented about 60% of the pot. On the one hand, these results show that intentional (human 
proposer) and randomly generated (computer) offers differently impact UG decisions. This 
distinction is necessary not only for understanding the role of theory of mind mechanism in 
UG decision behaviour, but also it is useful if we are to identify the motives underlying UG 
decisions. Computer generated offers were significantly less frequently rejected than similar 
offers coming from humans, which can indicate that participants used rejection to convey a 
message, e.g. punishment.  In line with the claim by Pillutla & Murnighan (1996) that anger at 
being presented with an unfair offer is better predictor of rejection than inequality itself, and 
Rand & Nowak (2013), who suggest that retaliation, in the form of rejection, is the intuitive 
UG response when the individual expects fairness but is treated unfairly. On the other hand, 
since ASD differentiate between unfairness  levels, this suggests that their decisions were rather 
motivated by the value of the offer than by the nature of the proposer. 
One curious finding in this study, as well as the original paper by van’t Wout et al., 
(2006) is that both groups of participants rejected a substantial proportion of unfair offers from 
a computer. If rejections primarily serve to ‘punish’ unfair behaviours to uphold social norms 
or are in some other way related to social processes, one would expect virtually all offers from 
a computer to be accepted. The fact that unfair computer offers are also rejected at a 
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considerable rate might suggest that participants either engage social-cognitive processes 
automatically in situations that mimic what is normally a social interaction (e.g., because the 
values generated by computers are framed as ‘offers’), or decision behaviour is substantially 
influenced by the values (and in particular the inequity) of offers rather than what motivates 
them. These issues will be explored in further details in subsequent chapters. What is most 
important for the current chapter is that, broadly speaking, both ASD and TD participants 
rejected unfair offers from computers to a similar extent suggesting similar levels of 
‘irrationality’ in this context.   
In addition to the group differences concerning the proposer manipulation, correlation 
analyses also indicated that different psychological traits might be engaged by ASD vs. TD 
participants when making decisions. Specifically, in the ASD group the positive correlation 
between the ethics position measure and rejection rate, suggests that ASD participants might  
reject unfair offers primarily because they apply universal moral rules for judging the offer, 
further supported by the relation between the (E-S) and EPQ measures. On the other hand,  TD 
responders appear less governed by such universal rules as indicated by the null correlation in 
this group with the EPQ measure.   
Interestingly, although rejecters in both groups (ASDs and TDs) may be following a 
different heuristic, rejecters in both groups seem to be engaging their general cognitive 
resources to similar extents as suggested by the negative correlation between rejection rate and 
VIQ and FIQ in both groups. These associations suggest that acceptance of unfair offers is 
guided by a more deliberate, and resource intensive set of processes than rejections, which may 
be guided by more intuitive, processes, or other abilities not assessed in this experiment. What 
the nature of the processes might be that draw on general cognitive resources for acceptance is 
open to speculation. It may be that participants with greater ability are more able to inhibit an 
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automatically triggered rejection of unfair offers or they may be more likely to consider the 
decision they are faced with from a rational point of view. 
 Although the current study did not replicate the observations by van’t Wout et al., in 
terms of a role of somatic markers in guiding rejections, that original study along with others 
set out in the introduction involving the Iowa gambling task, would lend support to the notion 
that rejections are guided by more automatic than deliberative processes (see also Baron et al., 
2015; Knoch et al., 2006; Sutter, Kocher, & Strauß, 2003 for further discussions) and this 
distinction will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. First, however it is important 
to consider why the current observations may not have replicated those of Van’t Wout et al., 
(2006) in terms of the role of somatic markers in guiding decision behaviour.  
Van’t Wout et al., (2006) found significantly higher GSRs for unfair vs fair offers, 
particularly in a human proposer condition. These results had extended early findings which 
had demonstrated a relationship between emotional arousal and decision making (Bechara et 
al., 1997;  Loewenstein, 2000;  Loewenstein, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003), and thus broadly 
supported the ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis (e.g., Damasio, 1994), which argues that internal 
physiological signals, which represent the value of the potential consequences of our decisions, 
play a significant role in guiding behaviour. In the current experiment, the experimental 
manipulations appeared not to have any effects on participant’s physiological arousal in either 
group, at least as operationalised in terms of GSR responses.  
Unfair offers did not elicit greater physiological arousal than fair offers in either group 
of participants, irrespective of who the offers were made by (humans or computers). 
Interestingly, the current study is not the first not to replicate the observations of Van’t Wout 
et al., (2006). Null results were also found in a previous similar study by Osumi & Ohira, 
(2009) with a sample of Japanese university students (20, 10 females). Similar to the current 
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study, the authors had also used a fixed inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) between trials, which as 
Osumi & Ohira suggested, may have resulted in habituation and reduced anticipatory effects 
on autonomic responses to offers. Unfortunately, that study had not come to light by the time 
the current paradigm was implemented and therefore future studies should seek to implement 
variable ISIs in case this is the critical factor. It is also possible, however, that participant 
related, rather than task related factors played a role in the differences in findings across studies. 
For example, the current sample of participants may have found the experimental task generally 
less emotionally salient and engaging and therefore the different offer values were not 
differentially arousing. However, the average GSR responses elicited in the current study, 
which ranged from around 0.25 – 0.35 μS across the different conditions, are comparable to 
those reported in Van’t Wout et al., (2006), suggesting that this is an unlikely reason for the 
discrepant findings. Another possibility is that GSR responses may not be a ‘pure’ measure of 
a somatic marker given that GSR levels also index action preparation in cognitive and motor 
tasks  (Nagai et al., 2004; Patterson, Ungerleider, & Bandettini, 2002). Additionally, it is worth 
noting that because of the relatively small number of trials for each type of unfair offer, 
responses to offers of £1, £2 and £3 out of the £10 were averaged under an ‘unfair’ category 
for the GSR analysis and his may obscure subtler differences between responses to unfair and 
very unfair offers. Although our task design in this respect replicated that of van’t Wout et al., 
(2006), it may be the case that this design is not powered enough to reliably detect the effects 
observed in the original study and therefore future studies may benefit from the inclusion of a 
greater number of trials and participants. 
One finding of interest that did emerge from the GSR data is that responses tended to 
be generally higher in the ASD compared to the TD group, which parallels some earlier 
observations. For instance, De Martino et al., (2008) found that ASD participants showed 
higher GSRs than controls overall, in a decision-making paradigm in which choices the 
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participants made resulted in outcomes that were framed as either wins or losses.  Although the 
two groups did not differ in their decision behaviours and the net gains they achieved, higher 
levels of GSR were observed in ASDs, which the authors suggested could be an indication of 
heightened anxiety in the ASD group. Moreover, the results of this study showed that 
physiological responses in ASD did not differentiate between trials on which decision 
outcomes were framed as either gains or losses, unlike in the comparison group who showed 
greater GSRs to losses than gains.  De Martino et al., (2008) suggest that this may indicate that 
ASD participants take a more analytical approach during the gambling task, which aligns with 
the interpretation offered above concerning the relative insensitivity of ASD participants in the 
current study to the nature of the proposer, at least for the £3 offer condition. 
To summarize, in the current study although the ASD group showed higher GSRs 
compared to the TD group specifically when offers were made by human proposer, not 
differences were observed in the overall rejection rate between ASDs and TDs.  We observed 
however that different cognitive process seems to play a role in UG decisions and that levels 
of fairness triggered different responses and possible different processes. Since in both the 
current and first study, participants have had unlimited time to give their responses this may 
have potentially masked subtle group differences in what factors guide the kind of intuitive 
decision making that is common in day-to-day interactions. In the next study we use a time 
pressure manipulation to explore further the relation between intuition and UG-decision 
behaviour.  
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4 EXPERIMENT THREE: COGNITIVE MANIPULATION, CRT & TOM 
 
In Experiment 1 and 2 the rejection rate to an unfair offer in the UG did not differ 
between people with and without a diagnosis of ASD. Both groups rejected unfair offers at 
approximately the same rate, and there was no evidence to suggest that they arrived at the 
rejection decisions through different decision-making processes. However, differences may 
have gone undetected because of the paradigms used so far. In the previous two studies there 
were few constraints on what processes participants could engage to arrive at their decisions. 
In particular, there were no time constraints on the decisions participants needed to reach 
leaving open the possibility that groups differ in the extent to which they may rely on fairly 
automatic and intuitive vs. more controlled and deliberative processes to reach decisions.  
The present study sets out to addresses this issue by implementing a time pressure 
manipulation. Across many areas of psychological research, time pressure manipulations have 
been used to try to tease apart the relative contributions of automatic and intuitive vs. more 
deliberate and controlled processes to different domains of functioning. Imposing time limits 
on behavioural responses essentially limits the amount of information processing participants 
can engage in, which is thought to force them to rely on simple heuristics and habits to guide 
their behaviour, rather than more deliberative consideration of the possible pros and cons of 
different behavioural options. Time-pressure manipulations have been used to reveal many 
biases and stereotypes that often inform people’s judgements and behaviours, ranging from 
implementation of simple strategies such as acceleration and information filtering to cope and 
adapt to time constrains (Ariely & Zakay, 2001, for a review) trading-off between quantity 
over quality of information (Kocher & Sutter 2006) to anchoring at an initial perceived 
information without making further updates in their judgments often leading to sub-optimal 
outcomes and systematic cognitive errors (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Of most 
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interest to the current thesis are studies that have examined the issue of time in the context of 
the UG. 
One way in which research has examined the potential contribution of relatively quick 
and automatic, vs more controlled and deliberative processes to decision making in the UG has 
been through the examination of participant’s response times. For instance, in an online 
experiment in which about five thousand students responded to a series of very unfair UG 
offers, Rubinstein (2007) compared the response times of participants who accepted vs rejected 
the offers with the prediction that shorter RTs would be associated with reject decisions. This 
prediction was based on the literature outlined earlier in Chapter 1 which suggests that reject 
decisions may be motivated, at least in part, by aversive emotions that are assumed to be 
triggered relatively automatically and subconsciously responses (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; 
Sanfey et al., 2003; van ’t Wout et al., 2006). Contrary to predictions, however, Rubenstein 
(2007) observed no differences in the median RTs between acceptances and rejections of the 
unfair offers.  
Interestingly, Knoch et al., (2006), around the same time, examined the timing of 
decision processes involved in reject and accept decisions in the UG by using Trans Magnetic 
Stimulation (rTMS). In this experiment, participants were presented with 20 offers generated 
either by a computer (10) or an anonymous partner (10) in a random order, whilst receiving 
rTMS stimulation over pre-frontal cortical regions that are known to be involved in deliberative 
executively controlled reasoning. The results showed that rTMS stimulation over a right pre-
frontal cortical region led to significant increases in acceptances of unfair offers compared to 
control conditions. Moreover, these acceptances occurred at the same speed as participants 
typically accepted fair offers (around 4 seconds) compared to the 6-7 seconds that participants 
typically took to reject, suggesting that participants might intuitively be motivated to accept 
offers to maximise personal gains but that they often override this automatic tendency through 
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executive control processes that motivate rejection. On the basis of these observations, it would 
be expected that requiring participants to respond quickly in an UG scenario, might increase 
their acceptance of unfair offers.  
Somewhat surprisingly, only one study to date appears to have employed a time-
pressure manipulation to examine this issue. Sutter, Kocher & Strauß (2003) asked participants 
to respond to unfair offers either within a10 second time-limit or within a relatively unlimited 
time window of up to 100 seconds over a number of trials. Contrary to what might be expected 
on the basis of the study by Knoch et al., (2006), Sutter et al., (2003) reported significantly 
more rejections under the time pressure condition, although this effect was observed only on 
the initial trials, after which no differences between acceptance and rejection rates were 
observed. It was concluded by the authors that once repetition comes into play the effects of 
time pressure disappear, presumably because responders have now had time to work out that it 
is more profitable to accept. Contrary to the conclusions by Knoch et al., (2006) therefore, this 
study by Stutter et al., (2003) suggests that rejections of unfair offers may be the more 
automatic response although it is important to note that a 10 second time-limit is unlikely to 
limit information processing to such an extent that deliberative reasoning is ruled out or even 
minimised. 
The results from the above-mentioned studies does not provide very consistent clues to 
the possible influences of automatic vs more deliberative decision processes in guiding 
ultimatum game decisions, possibly because the time-pressure manipulation employed by 
Sutter et al., (2003) may not have been as effective in reducing the influences of deliberative 
decision processes as the rTMS method by Knoch et al., (2006), and possibly because neither 
of the two studies considered the possible influences of individual differences in information 
processing and cognitive styles. Specifically, certain self-report measures such as the Thinking 
Inventory and the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996), suggest that 
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people differ in the extent to which they engage in automatic, intuitive thinking (experiential 
thought) and effortful, analytic thinking (rational thought).   
Evidence from a web-based UG by Mussel et al., (2013) suggest that individuals who 
score high on a need for cognition index (18-item assessment of NFC: Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984) are more likely to naturally seek, acquire, think about, and reflect back on information 
to make sense of stimuli, relationships, and events in their world. Whereas individuals who 
score low in this measure are more likely to search for information in others, rely on cognitive 
heuristics, or social comparison processes. Participants were required to make UG-decisions 
within 3 seconds, which falls within the time-frame that the rTMS study by Knoch et al., (2006) 
had suggested as the period of relatively intuitive and automatic decision processes. The results 
indicate that longer reaction time and high scores in the NFC test were associated with higher 
rejection of unfair offer.  
According to dual processing theories, (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) individuals, by 
default, rely on processing mechanisms of low computational expenses and come up with 
solutions to problems that at first seem to be optimal even if they are not. These initial response 
tendencies can thus be overridden to improve accuracy and more stable and self-beneficial 
choices. Evidence from the Cognitive Reflection Task (3i-CRT;Frederick, 2005; 7i-CRT; 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014)  suggest that the tendency to follow a deliberative approach 
after over-riding the tendency to accept an intuitive and fast solution, varies in the population, 
and different time demands are observed between individuals who follow one or the other 
approach.  
All in all, the evidence outlined above suggests that intuitive vs. more deliberative 
processes do contribute uniquely to driving decisions that are either self-serving or fairness 
preserving, depending on certain individual trait characteristics. On balance, the evidence 
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outlined above, appears to favour the notion that people might intuitively lean toward accepting 
unfair offers due to a relatively automatic drive toward maximizing personal gain (e.g., Koch 
et al., 2006). On the other hand, some of the evidence outlined in the previous chapter also 
lends support to the idea that rejections may be motivated by relatively automatic and emotion-
related processes in terms of aversive responses to unfairness (e.g., Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; 
Sanfey et al., 2003; van ’t Wout et al., 2006). Cutting across these possibilities there is also 
evidence suggesting that individual difference characteristics may have strong influences over 
the biases that individuals display in decision-making contexts. Some of these individual 
difference factors (e.g., BIS vs. BAS tendencies) were examined in the previous chapters and 
the current chapter will extend this by taking into consideration cognitive styles.  
Evidence on reasoning styles in ASD is relatively scarce but, as outlined in the literature 
review in chapter 1, a number of recent studies by Brosnan and colleagues suggest that autistic 
individuals may demonstrate a greater tendency for deliberative vs. more intuitive reasoning 
than comparison participants. For instance, Brosnan, Chapman, & Ashwin, (2014) examined 
decision making in ASD and comparison groups in the ‘Jumping-to-Conclusions Beads Task’. 
The task involves two jars filled up with different sized beads. One jar is filled up with 60 black 
beads and 40 white beads, and a second jar contains 40 black beads and 60 white beads. One 
jar is chosen, and beads are then drawn and shown to participants one at a time. After each 
bead participants had to make a decision about which jar they thought the beads from (i.e., the 
one with more black or white beads), or else ask for another bead to be drawn until they make 
a decision. It was found that compared to the control group, ASD adolescents requested more 
data before making decisions. This information style, labelled by the authors as “circumspect 
reasoning” (Brosnan et al., 2014, page 517) has parallels with a systemizing profile as described 
by the E-S theory outlined in Chapter 1 (Baron-Cohen, 2009), whereby ASD is characterised 
by a drive to discover the rules governing a certain situation or system, which would be a fairly 
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resource intense and deliberative process. In a subsequent study, Brosnan et al., (2016a) further 
extended this evidence through data collected on the CRT (Frederick, 2005) and REI (Epstein 
et al., 1996) described above. Higher accuracy in the CRT and low self- reported intuition in 
the REI in the ASD group, supported the notion that ASD is characterised by a bias toward 
deliberative reasoning (Brosnan et al., 2014).  
Together, the evidence outlined above leads to the prediction that autistic individuals  
would be more reliant on deliberative processes to arrive at their decisions in the UG than 
comparison groups. What the precise consequences of this would be on the decision behaviours 
is not entirely clear due to the uncertainty that remains over whether acceptance or rejection is 
the more intuitive and automatic response. As noted above, whilst the evidence might lean 
toward suggesting that acceptance due to self-serving biases might be the default and automatic 
response, this likely depends on certain characteristics of the individual, making it difficult to 
make predictions at a group level. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that a combination of 
intuitive and more deliberative processes is at work in the UG and that time pressure would 
generally disrupt deliberative processes. Thus, whatever the automatic response, if autistic 
individuals rely more on deliberative processes, a time-manipulation should have greater 
influences on their behaviour than in comparison participants, whether at a group level or an 
individual level. The current study will examine this prediction by implementing a time-
pressure manipulation whilst measuring individual differences in cognitive style through the 
Cognitive Reflection Task, hereafter 7i-CRT (Toplak et al., 2014), along with some other 
individual difference characteristics as in the previous studies (e.g., RMIE, E-S,BIS/BAS, 
EPQ_Relativism and EPQ_Idealism). Compared to previous studies examining the effects of 
time-pressure on the UG, the current study will also make use of certain control tasks that will 
serve to illustrate that the time-pressure manipulation is effective in disrupting certain 
deliberative processes that may play a role in informing UG decisions. 
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4.1 Method 
Participants 
Sixty adults took part in this study: Thirty individuals with a diagnosis of ASD (24 male; 6 
female) and 30 typically developed comparison individuals (17 male; 13 female). Participants 
were recruited form an existing database at City, University of London. They were paid a 
standard University fee of £8 per hour for their participation plus the earnings from the 
Ultimatum Game, as described below. ASD participants had been diagnosed with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder by clinicians through the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) according 
to DSM-IV criteria. Assessment in the lab with the Autism Diagnostic Observation schedule 
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2012) by a researcher trained to research reliability standards on the 
instrument, provided further corroboration of their diagnosis. Typical individuals were selected 
to match ASD participants on chronological age, verbal IQ, performance IQ, and full-Scale IQ 
as measured by the Wechsler Adult intelligence scale (WAIS-IVuk; and WAIS-IIIuk). All 
participants completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) which provided further evidence for 
the diagnosis of ASD in the clinical group and ruled out that the TD group included participants 
who may be experiencing the kind of social communicative and cognitive difficulties that are 
commensurate with autism. The descriptive statistics for these variables are summarised in 
Table 4.1. None of the TD participants reported having a personal or family history of a 
psychological or neurodevelopmental disorder. 
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Table 4.1 Characteristics for autistic individuals (ASD) and Typically Development 
Individuals (TD) 
  ASD (24m,6f) TD (17m,13f)       
Measure M (SD) M(SD) t (59) P Cohen's d 
Age (years) 47.23 (12.91) 52.27 (15.17) 1.38 0.17 0.35 
aVIQ 111.76 (19.12) 113.37 (12.79) 0.37 0.70 0.09 
bPIQ 106.43 (19.97) 111.32 (15.42) 1.03 0.30 0.27 
cFIQ 110.86 (20.37) 113.18 (13.40) 0.50 0.61 0.13 
dAQ 34.06 (7.58) 14.39 (6.05) 10.80 < 0.001*** 2.28 
eADOS-C 2.96 (1.62)      
fADOS-RSI 5.66 (2.63)      
gADOS-Total 8.62 (3.78)      
 
a Verbal IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK); b Performance IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK); c Full Scale IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or 
WAIS IVUK); d Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al.,2001); eADOS- Communication; *[In brackets range of 
scores for ADOS]; fADOS- Reciprocal Social Interaction; gADOS Total Score- Communication + Reciprocal Social 
Interaction. 
 
 
Materials & Design 
The stimuli for the current experiment included 24 monetary offers that varied in terms 
of the overall pot sizes to which they related and, also in terms of the level of fairness, as shown 
in Table 4.2. Diverse offers were chosen to increase the number of trials per participant and to 
encourage them to consider each split independently rather than habituating to the same offers 
over the experimental session. Pot sizes ranged from £5 to £30 and the fairness of the offers 
varied across four categories [Category 1: (50% - 50%); Category 2: (40 - 60%); Category 3: 
(25 - 75%); Category 4: (20 - 80%)], with the first value indicating the percentage of the pot 
that was to go to the person receiving the offer (e.g. 40%), and the second value indicating the 
percentage of the pot that the person making the offer was to retain for himself (e.g. 60%). 
Thus, the fairness decreases across the four levels. In the forthcoming pages for brevity and to 
remind the reader about the distribution of the money, the games were labelled in this format: 
C50, C40, C25, C20, where C stands for fairness category, and the number represents the 
percentage of money going to the responder, with C20 representing the least fair split. To 
maintain a high degree of ecological validity within the task, three of the twenty-four offers 
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were ‘real’ offers that had been made in the first study of this research project. Participants 
were informed about this (see procedure section), but they could not distinguish these real 
offers from fictitious ones that were purposefully generated for the task. Participants were told 
that 10% of the value of the real offers would be paid out according to the rules of the ultimatum 
game to both, proposers and responders.  
Table 4.2 Splits by Fairness category 
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Participants played the role of responder throughout the experiment and were therefore 
asked to decide whether to accept or reject each offer in a mixed subjects design: 2 (Group: 
ASD vs. TD) x 2 (Fair vs. Unfair offers) x 2 (Time pressure vs. No time pressure). The time 
pressure factor was manipulated within subjects and therefore all participants were presented 
with the same offers twice, once under the time-pressure condition and once under the no-time 
pressure condition (hereafter untimed). The order of the conditions (time pressure vs. untimed) 
was counterbalanced such that an equal number of participants in both groups completed either 
the time pressure or the untimed condition first. Offers were presented in a random order on a 
computer screen in the format “Luke offers £2 and keeps £8”. Names were randomly paired 
with offers.  
During the untimed trials, participants were given an unlimited amount of time to 
respond to the offer. Thus, the offer remained on the screen until the participant either pressed 
the ‘a’ key on the keyboard to accept or the ‘r’ key to reject.  During the time pressure trials, 
on the other hand, participants needed to respond within 2000 milliseconds. A timer on the top 
of the screen provided a visual countdown of the remaining time. If participants failed to 
respond within the 2000ms time-limit a red frame appeared around the screen that indicated to 
participants that the time had elapsed and that this trial would not be paid out – their response, 
however, was still required to progress to the next trial. This set up ensured that we could obtain 
response data from all trials. The 2000ms duration was primarily informed by pilot testing, 
which suggested that, in the current paradigm, participants typically responded within 2-3 
seconds when no time pressure was imposed (see also the results presented in Table 4.5 below). 
After participants gave their response, a 1000ms screen with a central fixation cross was 
presented before the next offer appeared.  
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Mathematical task 
In addition to the UG task, an equivalent mathematical task was also designed as a 
control condition to confirm that the time-pressure manipulation does, indeed, influence 
deliberative cognitive processes of the kind that are likely to be relevant to decision making in 
the UG. Participants always completed the arithmetic task after the UG task because it included 
the same stimuli and it was important not to contaminate responses on the UG with possible 
practice or other carry-over effects from the arithmetic task. The arithmetic task was identical 
to the UG task except that participants now needed to decide whether the amount of money 
offered to them was less than 30% of the total pot. As with the UG, these decisions needed to 
be made in both conditions; under and without time pressure. The order of these conditions 
was again counterbalanced across participants. Accuracy on this task was financially rewarded 
with £0.50 per response within the time limit to incentivise this task in a similar fashion to the 
main UG task.  
The CRT,  Theory of Mind (RMIE), E-S, BIS/BAS, EPQ_Relativism, EPQ_Idealism 
A computerized version of the 7i-CRT was implemented (Toplak et al., 2014), which 
is an extension of the original three item test developed by Frederick (2005). An example of 
the questions included in the task is: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar 
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? The intuitive response is 0.10 cents, but the 
right response is 0.05 cents. A response could be scored as 1 (for the correct response) or 
otherwise zero. Higher scores, therefore, are indicative of a more ‘reflective’ person. Although 
the measure is widely known, all seven questions and responses can be found in Appendix A. 
Responses distinguish between intuitive and wrong answers to aid the reader when looking at 
the results and the analysis. The RMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and the other measures were 
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administered to each participant, unless results on this task were already available on file for a 
participant.  
All in all, the testing session lasted about one hour and a half, including time for 
instructions and breaks between the UG and the CRT. Apart from performance in the ToM 
task, performance was rewarded in all other tasks to keep the incentives relatively constant 
across all measures. Payment was arranged at the end of the session. For the UG a responder 
who accepted all the real splits received £4.40; accuracy in the mathematical task gave a 
maximum of £2.40; accuracy of the CRT represented additional £2.10 in total (£0.30 per 
correct response). Participants received a standard £8 per hour and the cost of transport to come 
to the Lab was also reimbursed. 
Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in one of the dedicated laboratory rooms of the 
Autism Research Group at City, University of London. They were told that they would be 
taking part in a decision-making task that would require them to make financial decisions about 
certain monetary offers under several conditions.  
An information sheet explained the rules of the UG game although the name of the 
game was not mentioned.  Participants were informed that the task was to be completed several 
times, interacting anonymously with a different a proposer in each occasion, who also had the 
same information about the rules for the interaction. Participants were informed that the role 
of proposer and responder were assigned by the experimenter, decision had already been made 
by proposers, and they have been assigned the role of responders. They were also told that not 
all but some of the offers were real and taken from a previous study in the Lab, yet real offers 
were not distinguishable. They were informed that out of the total of accepted real offers, both, 
responders and proposers would be paid 10% of the total of the values in the distribution. The 
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number of trials was not specified. Once participants confirmed that they understood the task 
and gave their written consent to proceed, they first completed the two conditions of the UG, 
followed by the two conditions of the arithmetic task and finally they completed the CRT and, 
if not already available, the reading the minds the eyes task. 
At the beginning of each of the four experimental tasks (i.e., the timed and untimed UG 
and timed and untimed arithmetic tasks), participants first saw a number of screens with the 
specific instructions for the condition they were about to complete. For the UG participants 
saw the following: 
Before presenting you with the offers, there will be a few practice trials. Some of these 
trials will be with a time limit, and some without. For trials with a time limit a clock will be 
shown on the top of the screen. In these practice trials, you will simply see either a word or a 
non-word on the screen and you should press 'w' for a word or 'n' for a non-word. Press SPACE 
for the practice trial. 
Eight practice trials were presented to familiarize participants with the general structure 
of the task and, also with the duration of the time limit that would be imposed for some trials 
during the UG. After the practice trials, the instructions continued as follows: 
Now you will be presented with the offers for you to decide. Some of these decisions 
need to be made within a limited amount of time and some without. For trials with a time limit 
a clock will be shown on the top of the screen. When you accept an offer, you will receive 20% 
of the value offered to you and the other person will receive 20% of the value they have chosen 
to keep for themselves. Remember to press "A" for acceptance and "R" for rejection. You are 
now ready to begin the task.  
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If the block corresponded to a time pressure condition, participants received a prompt 
to say that “For the next set of offers you will only have a limited amount of time to make your 
decision”, and otherwise the start of block instructions read “Consider the next offers as long 
as you wish before responding” 
For each UG trial, participants then saw the name of the proposer on the top middle 
part of the screen. Right below, in one line, the proposed amounts were displayed in the format 
“offers £3 keeps £7”. Below, in a third line the words “Accept or Reject?” were presented. The 
keyboard was covered so only the needed letters for this task were available to participants. 
Under the time pressure condition, the countdown timer was also presented above the name of 
the proposer.  
Between the UG and arithmetic tasks participants took a brief break to allow the experimenter 
to prepare the next block of trials. The following instructions were presented for the arithmetic 
task: You will be presented with the same offers you received in the previous session. This time 
we would like you to say for each trial, whether the amount offered to you is less or more than 
30% of the total pot. Type "L" if the amount offered to you is less than 30%. Type "M" if the 
amount offered to you is more than 30%. Some of these calculations need to be made within a 
limited amount of time and some without. For trials with a time limit a clock will be shown on 
the top of the screen. You will be paid £0.05 for each accurate calculation. For each of the 
trials, “Is the offer less than 30% of the total pot?” was presented on the response sheets with 
“Less or More” replacing the Accept/Reject decision prompts. The rest of the procedure 
remained the same as in the UG. 
The computer program was set up to guide participants through the experiment in the 
absence of the experimenter. At the end of each task, the screen showed “Thank you for taking 
part in our experiment. Please let the experimenter know you have finished by pressing the 
153 
 
ENTER key. Please open the door to let the experimenter in”. The program was set up to show 
the earning only at the end of the testing session, “You have won £[money]” 
For the 7iTask, the program presented one question at the time. All participants received 
the questions in the same order and there was not time pressure at any time. On the first screen, 
they saw “Welcome. You are about to start the task.  Please press the SPACEBAR to continue”; 
the second screen “You will be presented with some questions for you to respond. Type your 
answer and use the enter key to move on to the next item. You will have received £0.30 for each 
correct response. Please press the SPACEBAR to continue” and this was the same for all seven 
questions.  
4.2 Results 
Ultimatum Game   
Under time pressure participants violated the time limits an average of 1.6 out of 24 
trials, indicating that approximately 99% of the decisions were made within the time limits. 
Since exclusion of the trial on which participants responded outside the time-limit did not alter 
the pattern of results reported below, all trials were retained in the analyses.  Collapsing offers 
across groups and time condition, as expected fair offers were mostly accepted, with an 11% 
resulting in rejections.  On the other hand, 66% of the unfair offers were rejected. The average 
rejection rates for ASDs and TDs as a function of Time and Fairness Category can be found in 
Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 Average Rejection Rate by Group, Fairness category and Time condition 
  ASD TD Both groups 
Timed M SD M SD M SD 
C50 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.15 
C40 0.23 0.35 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.31 
C25 0.58 0.41 0.58 0.37 0.58 0.39 
C20 0.68 0.39 0.72 0.27 0.70 0.33 
Overall 0.38 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 
Untimed       
C50 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.10 
C40 0.19 0.32 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.27 
C25 0.60 0.43 0.61 0.38 0.61 0.40 
C20 0.72 0.39 0.79 0.27 0.76 0.34 
Overall 0.38 0.44 0.39 0.44 0.38 0.43 
 
A 2 (Group: ASD vs TD) x 2 (Time: time pressure vs untimed time) x 4 (Fairness 
category: C50 vs C40 vs C25 vs C20) mixed factor ANOVA with repeated measures in the last 
two factors was carried out to examine whether rejection rates differed across groups, 
unfairness of the offers, and time pressure. There was no main effect of Time, F(1,58) = 0.007, 
p = 0.93, η2 = 0.00 but the analysis yielded the expected main effect of Fairness category20 
F(2.08,120.72) = 123.33, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.68 with rejection rates increasing as the fairness of 
offers decreased. Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that participants rejected offers 
more often in category C20 (M = 0 .73, SD = 0.33) than in category C25(M = 0.59, SD = 0.39), 
more often in category C25 compared to category C40 (M = 0.18, SD = 0.29) and more often 
in category C40 compared to category C50 (M = 0.04, SD = .12; all ps <.001). 
The analysis also yielded an interesting significant interaction between Time and 
Fairness Category F(2.64,153.08) = 5.56, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.09, which is illustrated in Figure 
                                                          
20 Homogeneity not assumed, Levene’s task <0.050. In C50 & C40 (Timed) and in C40 for the untimed 
condition, then F (1,120) = 123, p < .001, η2 = .68. Greenhouse Geisser correction were used.  
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4.1. To resolve this interaction, simple main effects were analysed by looking at the effect of 
Time at each level of Fairness Category across both participant groups. 
  
 
Figure 4.1. Rejection rates as a function of Time and Fairness Category. 
 
Paired sample t-tests with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0125 (.05/4) showed 
marginally higher rejection rates under time pressure (M = 0.06, SD = 0.15) than in the untimed 
condition (M = 0.02, SD = 0.100) for the fairest offers of C50, ( t(59) = 2.31, p = 0.024, Cohen’s 
d = 2.74), and also significantly higher rejection rates under time pressure (M = 0.20, SD = 
0.31) than when untimed (M = 0.15, SD = 0.27) for the next fairest offers of C40, (t(59) = 2.82, 
p = 0.006, Cohen’s d = 0.17. However, for the unfair offers of C25, (t(59) = 0.83, p = 0.41) and 
C20 ( t(59) = -1.83, p = 0.072) there was no effect of Time.  
The absence of a main effect of Group (F(1,58) = 0.01; p = 0 .92; η2 = 0.00) or any 
interactions including the group factor (Fs < 0.82, ps > 0.40; η2s < 0.02) suggested that there 
were no overall group differences in rejection rates and that the experimental manipulations 
had similar effects for ASD and TD participants. 
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It is important to note that accuracy in the mathematical task, which will be explained 
in the next section, was correlated with ultimatum game rejection rate. Specifically, 
mathematical performance in the untimed condition correlates with overall rejection rate (r = -
0.33, p = 0.011), with rejection rate in the time pressure (r = - 0.33, p = 0.009), and in the 
untimed condition (r = -0.29, p = 0.025). Therefore, to control for mathematical abilities, in the 
above analysis, mathematical accuracy in the untimed condition was included as a covariate.  
There was an effect of mathematical accuracy  F(1,57) = 6.959, p = 0.011, η2 = 0.10. 
As in the previous analysis, there was no effect of time  F(1,57)= 0.664, p = 0.42, η2 = 0.012. 
Similarly, there was an effect of fairness category, F(2.06, 117.54) = 13.191, p < 0.001, η2 = 
0.18. However, the interaction between Time and Fairness disappeared when controlling for 
mathematical accuracy F(2.64, 150.62) = 0.043, p= 0.99, η2 = 0.00. There was no effect of 
group or any interaction including  the group factor ( Fs < 1, ps > 0.50, η2 <0.014). 
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Mathematical task (Control condition) 
 
Accuracy on calculating the percentage of the total pot offered as a function of Time 
and Fairness Category for ASDs and TDs can be seen in Table 4.4 
Table 4.4 Accuracy on calculating the offered percentage as a function of Time and Fairness 
Category for ASDs and TDs 
  ASD TD Both groups 
Timed M SD M SD M SD 
C50 0.77 0.28 0.84 0.26 0.80 0.37 
C40 0.67 0.32 0.71 0.33 0.69 0.33 
C25 0.62 0.37 0.47 0.26 0.54 0.33 
C20 0.68 0.34 0.72 0.32 0.70 0.32 
Overall 0.68 0.33 0.68 0.29 0.68 0.31 
Untimed       
C50 0.87 0.28 0.92 0.20 0.89 0.24 
C40 0.82 0.32 0.96 0.16 0.89 0.26 
C25 0.64 0.37 0.56 0.38 0.60 0.37 
C20 0.90 0.27 0.96 0.13 0.92 0.21 
Overall 0.80 0.31 0.85 0.22 0.83 0.27 
 
A 2 (Group: ASD vs TD) x 2 (Time: time pressure vs untimed) x 4 (Fairness category: 
C50 vs C40 vs C25 vs C20) mixed factor ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two 
factors was run to see whether participants’ accuracy on the mathematical task would differ 
depending on Group membership, Fairness category, and whether participants did the 
calculations under time pressure or not. The analysis yielded no main effect of Group, F(1,58) 
= 23, p = 0.63, η2 =0.00. However, unlike in the UG task, the analysis revealed a robust effect 
of Time F(1,58) = 23.67, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.29, with more accurate performance during the 
untimed (M = 0.83, SD = 0.27) than the time pressure condition (M = 0.68, SD = 0.31). There 
was also a main effect of Fairness category F(1.98,114.69) = 21.13, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.27, with 
significantly poorer performance on C25 fairness trials (M = 0.57, SD = 0.27) compared to C50 
(M = 0.85, SD = 0.25; p <.001), C40 (M = 0.79, SD = 0.29; p < 0.05) and C20 (M = 0.81, SD 
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= 0.27; p < 0.001), which is expected given that in C25 trials the offers were closest to the 30% 
that participants needed to calculate for their response. Finally, there was also a Fairness 
category x Group interaction F(1.98,114.69) = 3.15, p = 0.047, η2 = 0.0521, which is illustrated 
in Figure 4.2. Separate 2 (Time: time pressure vs. untimed) x 4 (Fairness category: C50 vs. C40 
vs. C25 vs. C20) mixed factor ANOVAs showed significant main effects of Fairness category 
for TDs, F(1.93, 56.04) = 24.41, p < .001, η2 = .46, as well as ASDs F(1.84,53.54) = 3.75, p = 
.03, η2 = .11. However, Bonferroni pairwise comparisons showed that whereas TDs were 
significantly more accurate in C50 (M = 0.88, SD = 0.21), C40 (M = 0.83, SD = 0.18), and C20 
(M = 0.83, SD = 0.18) compared to C25(M = 0.51, SD = 0.26; all ps < .001), ASDs were more 
accurate in C50 (M = 0.81 SD = 0.24) and C20 (M = 0.78, SD = 0.27) compared to C25 (M = 
0.63, SD = 0.31, both ps = 0.007) with no differences between the C40 and any of the other 
categories. In other words, as illustrated in Figure 4.2, the performance of ASD participants 
was relatively more even across the four fairness categories, compared to the TD group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Not homogeneity assumed for C25 (Under time pressure) and for Categories C40 and C20 under Not Time 
pressure.  
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Figure 4.2 Fairness by Group interaction in the mathematical task 
 
The ANOVA on the performance data from the mathematical task also yielded a 
significant Time x Fairness category interaction, F(3,174) = 6.00, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.094. Simple 
main effects were analysed by looking at the effect of Time at each level of Fairness Category 
using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .0125 (.05/4). This analysis showed no significant 
main effect of Time on accuracy for C25 (p =0.23), where performance was overall poorest 
and relatively close to chance, see Figure 4.3. However, for categories C20, C40 and C50 the 
analysis yielded a significant difference in accuracy when participants respond under time 
pressure or not. 
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Figure 4.3 Accuracy in the Mathematical Task as a function of Time and Fairness Category.  
 
Reaction Time 
Reaction time for responder behaviour in the UG 
The average reaction time for rejection rate for ASDs and TDs as a function of Fairness 
Category and Time condition can be found in Table 4.5. The inspection of the data revealed 
one missing data point representing a participant who accepted all offers, which meant that no 
reaction time data was available for rejections. 
We ran the same ANOVA analyses as described above but using participants’ response 
time to make rejections as a dependent variable to see whether reaction times differed 
depending on Group, fairness of the offers, and whether decisions were made under time 
pressure or not.  A 2 (Group: ASD vs TD) x 2 (Time: time pressure vs untimed) x 4 (Fairness 
category: C50 vs C40 vs C25 vs C20) mixed factor ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last two factors yielded no main effect of Group, F(1,58) = 0.81, p = 0.37, η2 = 0.014. 
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Table 4.5  Average Reaction Time for UG response by Group, Fairness category and Time 
condition  
  ASD TD Both groups 
Timed M SD M SD M SD 
C50 956.85 256.65 1108.09 232.84 1032.47 254.64 
C40 125.94 333.89 1268.83 230.53 1197.39 293.45 
C25 1153.59 315.95 1319.68 265.60 1236.64 301.26 
C20 1108.83 304.98 1322.55 263.52 1215.69 302.43 
Overall 1086.30 302.87 1254.79 248.12 1170.55 287.95 
Untimed       
C50 1974.57 1134.85 2290.22 1676.70 2132.39 1428.36 
C40 2906.26 2101.78 2820.97 1415.15 2863.00 1776.94 
C25 3226.29 2649.79 3465.43 2083.30 3345.86 2366.23 
C20 2823.36 1654.55 3159.83 1814.21 2991.59 1729.78 
Overall 2732.62 1885.24 2934.11 1747.34 2833.21 1825.33 
 
However, there was a significant main effect of Time, F (1,58) = 82.37, p < 0.001, η2 
= .58, confirming that – unsurprisingly – participants responded faster under time pressure (M 
= 1170.55, SD = 287) than in the untimed condition (M = 2883.37, SD = 1825). Also, there 
was a main effect of Fairness category, F (2.21,128.18) = 12.39, p < 0.001, η2 = .18. Bonferroni 
pairwise comparison showed no significant differences in reaction time between C40 and C25, 
C25 and C20, and between C20 and C40. However, participants were faster in C50 (M = 
1582.43, SD = 841) compared to all other categories (C25: M = 2291, SD =1333; p < 0.001; 
C20: M = 2103, SD =1016; p < 0.001; and C40: M = 2030, SD =1035; p = .003), suggesting 
that participants required very little time to judge and decide over egalitarian offers. 
 In addition, the analysis yielded a significant Time x Fairness category interaction, F 
(3,174) = 6.26, p < 0.001 η2 =0.097. To resolve this interaction, two repeated measure 
ANOVAs were carried out to examine the effects of Fairness category at each level of Time. 
These analyses yielded significant main effects of Fairness category under the time pressure, 
F(3,177) = 35.27, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37, and no time pressure condition,  F(3,177) = 9.26,  p < 
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0.001, η2 = 0.136, however with a visibly less pronounced effect of fairness category in the 
time pressure condition (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4 Mean Reaction time to respond to UG offers as function of Fairness category and 
Group for Timed and Untimed trials. *Error bars in the Timed condition are smaller than the 
width of the data-point markers on that line 
 
Reaction time for Mathematical task 
The average response times for the mathematical calculations for ASDs and TDs as a 
function of Fairness Category and Time condition can be found in Table 4.6. A similar 2 
(Group: ASD vs TD) x 2 (Time: time pressure vs untimed) x 4 (Fairness category: C50 vs C40 
vs C25 vs C20) mixed factor ANOVA as described above for the UG was carried out for trials 
on which participants provided the correct response. There was no main effect of Group, 
F(1,58) = 3.25, p = 0.076, η2 = 0.05, but a significant main effect of Time, F(1,58) = 97.35, p 
< 0.001, η2 = 0.62, again confirming that participants responded faster under time pressure (M 
= 1280.16, SD = 300.42) than under no time pressure (M = 4773.21, SD =3616.55). In addition, 
there was a main effect of Fairness category, F(3,174) = 13.29, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.18. Bonferroni 
pairwise comparison showed no significant differences in reaction time between C50 and C20, 
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C40 and C25 and between C20 and C40. However, participants were faster in C50 (M = 
2225.89, SD = 1523.03) compared to C25 (M = 3588.52 SD =1999.82; p < 0.001) and C40 (M 
= 3468,91 SD =2411,17; p < 0.001) and they were faster in C20 (M = 2823.44 SD =1899.93; p 
< 0.001) compared to category C25, which is the expected pattern considering that the C25 
condition is the more difficult of the four conditions. 
Table 4.6 Reaction time for the mathematical calculations for ASDs and TDs as a function of 
Fairness Category and Time condition 
  ASD TD Both groups 
Timed M SD M SD M SD 
C50 1151.26 233.49 1150.62 358.98 1150.94 300.23 
C40 1300.41 249.40 1391.22 461.54 1345.81 370.64 
C25 1288.82 238.95 1390.10 275.46 1339.46 260.71 
C20 1239.84 253.06 1329.07 283.36 1284.46 270.13 
Overall 1245.08 243.72 1315.25 344.84 1280.17 300.43 
Untimed       
C50 2893.57 1742.49 3708.12 3458.30 3300.84 1428.36 
C40 5169.04 4095.38 6014.97 4814.19 5592.01 2745.84 
C25 4913.13 2450.29 6762.04 4546.37 5837.59 4451.70 
C20 3523.07 2096.11 5201.77 4415.48 4362.42 3738.95 
Overall 4124.70 2596.07 5421.73 4308.59 4773.22 3529.74 
 
In addition to the main effects, the analysis also yielded a significant Time x Fairness 
category interaction, F (3,174) = 10.56, p < .001 η2 = .15. As Figure 4.5 suggests, the interaction 
was due to much more pronounced response time differences across conditions in the untimed 
compared to the time condition, which is not surprising.    
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Figure 4.5 Mean Reaction time for responding to the mathematical task and Fairness 
category. *Error bars in the Timed condition are smaller than the width of the data-point markers on that line 
 
All in all, the response time data from the mathematical decision task yielded the 
expected findings that participants generally respond quicker under time-pressure than under 
no time-pressure and that they generally take longer to respond to the more difficult C25 and 
C40 conditions than the easier C20 and C50 conditions. More interesting is a comparison of 
the response data set out in Figure’s 4.4 and 4.5, which suggests that it takes participants 
considerably longer to give accurate responses to the mathematical questions than to decide 
whether to accept or reject offers, which may indicate that deliberate calculations of the kind 
participants were asked to perform here, are unlikely to play a significant role in deriving UG 
decisions.  
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4.3 Correlations / Predictors of Decisions  
Cognitive Reflection Task, Theory of Mind, E-S, BIS/BAS, EPQ  
Initial inspection of the data revealed no outliers for either the CRT or the Reading the 
mind in the eyes task and the histograms, normal Q- Q plots and box plots suggested that the 
measures were normally distributed. However, of the total sample five participants did not 
completed the ToM test (Two from the ASD group). Table 4.7 shows, for each group (ASD 
and TD), the mean accuracy score and reaction time for the cognitive reflection task (CRT) as 
well as the mean score for the theory of mind (RMIE), the E-S difference, BIS/BAS scale and 
the Ethics position questionnaire. Among all participants 12% of the total sample correctly 
responded to all answers, whereas 25% of the sample failed to respond to at least one problem 
correctly. The two groups performed similarly on the CRT task and comparison of the 
proportion of intuitive answers,  wrong answers or CRT-Reaction time (CRT-RT), between the 
groups showed not significant statistical differences. 
Comparison of the RMIE scores  between ASD and TD groups showed a significant 
difference in this theory of mind measure. In accordance with the wider literature TD 
participants scored significantly higher than ASD participants on this task. There was also a 
significance difference in the E-S and BIS measures so that means for the ASD group showed 
a larger difference between empathizing and systemizing (E-S) and higher BIS compared to 
controls. 
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Table 4.7 Mean scores for ASDs and TDs in CRT, CRT-RT,RMIE,E-S,BIS/BAS, EPQ 
aCognitive reflection task, accuracy; bCognitive reflection task, intuitive; cCognitive reflection task, wrong 
answer; dCognitive reflection task, reaction time; eRMIE: Reading the mind in the eyes, ToM task; f Difference 
between Empathising-Systematizing; gBehavioural Inhibition BIS/BAS Scale; hBehavioural Activation BIS/BAS 
Scale; iRelativism scale of the ethics position questionnaire; jIdealism scale of the ethics position questionnaire. 
 
Correlations between overall UG-rejection rates (i.e., the average rejection rates across 
all fairness levels and across timed and untimed conditions) and the independent variables are 
shown in Table 4.8. Values highlighted indicate the correlation is significant. The results 
showed that UG-rejection rates were associated with higher CRT accuracy as well as higher 
ToM abilities and increasing VIQ scores when both groups data is combined. In other words, 
reflective thinking styles, greater theory of mind abilities and high VIQ were associated with 
greater acceptance rates across all conditions. Interestingly, these correlations were distinct for 
fair vs. unfair trials across conditions (Timed vs Untimed) Specifically, whereas ToM abilities 
and VIQ correlated with decision behaviour across all fairness categories, CRT only correlated 
with decision behaviour for unfair trials with more robust correlation under time pressure.  
 In a second step the same analysis was done for each group separately, rejection rate 
in the TD group was uncorrelated with ToM, VIQ, in all conditions; and for this group the CRT 
measure correlated only with rejection of unfair trials under time pressure. Interestingly, in the 
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ASD group ToM and VIQ significantly correlated with rejection behaviour of fair and unfair 
offers, under time pressure and not time pressure conditions, all r > 0.30. In addition, CRT 
correlated with rejection of unfair offers in the time pressure and no time pressure conditions.  
Table 4.8 Correlations for CRT-RT,RMIE,E-S,BIS/BAS, EPQ and rejection behaviour by 
fairness and time manipulation  
 
Given the observed correlations, two separate regression analyses were carried out to 
establish to what extent these factors contributed independently to decision behaviour in the 
timed and untimed conditions, using CRT and RMIE, the ToM measure, as predictors. It is 
worth noting that significant correlations were found  between RMIE and the VIQ scores for 
both groups combined (all r > 0.30, p <0.050). Further analysis, by group (ASD and TD 
separately) showed that these factors significantly correlate in the ASD (all r > 0.40, p <0.050) 
but not in TD group (all p > 0.050) therefore in the regression analysis VIQ factors were 
excluded.   
In the first analyses we regressed CRT and ToM scores on rejection rates for unfair 
offers (the average across C20 and C25 conditions) under time pressure. This regression 
yielded an overall significant model (Adjusted R2 = .229; F = 9.032; p = <0.001) in which CRT 
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(β = -.34, t = -2.90, p = 0.005) and ToM (β = -.87, t = -2.46, p = 0.017) significantly and 
independently predicted reduced UG rejection rates. The second regression for the untimed 
condition also yielded an overall significant model (Adjusted R2 = .19; F = 6.437; p = .003) but 
here only CRT (β = -.36, t = -2.85, p = 0.006) but not ToM (β = -.19, t = -1.56, p = 0.12) 
significantly predicted reduced UG rejection rates. 
4.4 Discussion 
The results presented in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis indicated contrary to predictions, 
that autistic individuals make very similar decision on the UG than typical individuals. 
Considering the cognitive characteristics of ASD and some limited literature on social-decision 
making in this disorder, these findings were somewhat surprising as several arguments lead to 
the prediction that autistic individuals should perhaps behave more according to rational 
economic principles than typically developing participants. The earlier experiments, however, 
did not consider the possibility that autistic individuals might arrive at the same decisions 
through more controlled and deliberative thought processes than comparison participants who 
may base their decisions more commonly on relatively automatic and instinctual processes that 
may be driven by emotion. Experiment 2 began to address this possibility to some extent by 
measuring emotion related somatic markers, but that study failed to replicate earlier findings 
by van t’Wout et al (2006) and it was therefore not possible to draw firm conclusions about the 
role of emotion-related processes in guiding decision behaviour. The study presented in the 
current chapter sought to further explore this issue by implementing a time-pressure 
manipulation that aimed to reveal the role of more intuitive vs. more deliberative reasoning 
processes in UG decisions by limiting the extent to which deliberative processes could be 
engaged (at least under one condition – time-pressure). To the best of our knowledge this is the 
first study to use a time-pressure manipulation as way to explore and compare the cognitive 
processing underlying social decision making in ASD and TD individuals.  
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Before discussing the main results on the UG task, it is important to highlight briefly 
that the time-pressure manipulation employed in this study was generally effective. First, 
results of a mathematical control task, confirmed a significant effect of the time-pressure 
manipulation on participant’s accuracy in judging whether a certain amount of money offered 
was more or less than 30% of a given pot. Second, in the main UG task, response times under 
the untimed condition were on average longer than the response time limit implemented under 
the time-pressure condition, suggesting that this condition did restrict the amount of 
information processing that participants might otherwise engage in. The fact that the time-
pressure manipulation generally had the desired effect of hampering deliberate reasoning is 
important because, as noted in the introduction, it remains still unclear whether or not quick 
and automatic processes that are relatively free of deliberation would generally lead to 
rejections or acceptances of unfair offers. One line of evidence suggests that participants would 
naturally be inclined to reject unfair decisions based on a fairly automatic emotional aversion 
to inequity or unfairness, which motivates decisions that seek to punish undesirable social 
behaviour (i.e,. unfairness) for the greater good of social norms (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; 
Sanfey et al., 2003; van ’t Wout et al., 2006; Stutter et al., 2003). By contrast, other evidence 
has suggested that acceptance might be the default decision due to self-serving biases that aim 
to maximise self-benefits (e.g., Knoch et al., 2006).  
The current study tends to support the first of the above possibilities. Specifically, 
across both ASD and TD participants, increased rejection rates were observed for fair and 
particularly marginally unfair (C40) offers with little effect on rejection rates of very unfair 
offers that would typically be rejected under most conditions. The increased rejection rate of 
marginally unfair offers is particularly interesting considering that such offers are likely to 
cause the most cognitive conflict between the potential personal benefits of accepting vs. the 
wider societal detriments of encouraging unfair behaviour. It is worth remembering that in 
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Chapter 3, marginally unfair offers were also the most sensitive to the manipulation of 
computer vs. human proposers. The increased rejection rates of this offer in the current study 
suggests that under conditions that limit the engagement of deliberative reasoning, participants 
are inclined to default to rejection, most likely because of the aversive feelings or connotations 
that are associated with unfairness or inequity. Formulated in relation to acceptances, the 
findings therefore also suggest that acceptance of unfair offers is likely to result from more 
deliberative and controlled reasoning. Analysis of decision behaviour without controlling for 
mathematical performance suggests higher rejection for fair and marginally unfair offers under 
time pressure compare to no time pressure. However, when controlling for performance in the 
mathematical task, rejection rate is unaffected by time pressure. This suggest that people’s 
mathematical skills influence the extent to which their decision behaviour is affected by time 
pressure. 
 Furthermore, the association between acceptance of unfair offers and controlled 
reasoning showed that increased performance on the 7i-CRT, which is indicative of more 
reflective reasoning styles, was associated with decreased rejection/increased acceptances 
across all offers. Our result in this respect are in accordance previous results reported by 
Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz (2008) who found that higher UG rejection was associated with 
poor performance in the 3-items CRT. Similarly Calvillo & Burgeno, (2015) and De Neys et 
al., (2011) also found an association between the extended version of the CRT used in the 
current study and UG decision behaviour, whereby a higher tendency to be reflective was 
associated with greater acceptance rates. Interesting in relation to these correlations is that the 
current study furthermore indicated that ToM ability as measured through the RMIE was also 
associated with reduced rejection rates, which may indicate that mentalizing plays a role in the 
deliberations that lead participants to accept.   
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Although the results of the current study are generally in line with one of the few (if not 
the only) studies to examine the effect of time-pressure on UG decision behaviour by Sutter, 
Kocher & Strauß (2003), it is worth noting some differences in findings and the paradigms 
used. Specifically, similar to the conclusions drawn here, the authors reported that rejection 
appears to be the default automatic response in the first of 9 rounds of a €10-UG. Unlike in the 
current study, however, a bias to reject was not observed across the entire experiment; from 
the 2nd trial onwards in that study the time pressure effect vanished, and acceptance became the 
default response.22 
Two factors are likely responsible for the difference in findings between the current 
study and Sutter et al.,(2003). First, in relation to offers and payments, in the current design 
participants played under both treatments (Time pressure vs Not time pressure), and although 
participants received offers from different pot sizes, the incentive was kept constant throughout 
the 48 trials (10 %  of each accepted offers). Instead,  Stutter et al., (2003) assigned  participants 
to one of two conditions (Time pressure vs Not time pressure), used a fixed (€10) pot and  made 
participants aware of the number of trials. From the second trial onwards, once the repetition 
became apparent, there would therefore be a reduction in the need for any cognitive 
deliberation (i.e., it counteracted the time-pressure manipulation) given that there are no new 
processing demands on successive trials. Second, the current study implemented a much 
shorter time window during the time-pressure condition (2 secs), than Stutter et al., (2003; 10 
sec), which may further limit the effectiveness of the manipulation across multiple trials.    
Issues related to the response time limits during the current time-pressure condition, 
may also help explain why the current findings differ from the evidence reported by  Knoch et 
                                                          
22 It is worth noting that it was not possible in the current experiment to analyse responses only from the first 
trial for comparison because the order or trials (i.e., of different pot sizes and fairness levels) was randomised 
and therefore each participant would have received different offers on the first trial.  
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al., (2006) who showed that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) that disrupts deliberative 
processes, decreases rejection of unfair offers, suggesting that acceptance is the automatic and 
intuitive response. However, the response time data reported by Knoch et al., (2006) indicated 
that participants took on average around 4 seconds to provide their responses even under the 
conditions in which Knoch et al., (2006) argue primarily automatic processes are engaged. The 
current study suggests that participants engage in deliberative processes already by around 3 
seconds [RTs (Timed: M =1170, SD 0.287); (Untimed: M =2882, SD 1825)], and therefore the 
TMS stimulation in Knoch et al., (2006) may not have disrupted all of the deliberative process 
that may be involved in acceptances. In particular, it may be the case that participants in the 
Knoch et al., (2006) study were encouraged to engage ToM processes that the current study 
implicates as a contributor to acceptances. This is likely, because the design employed by 
Knoch et al (2006) involved a proposer manipulation similar to that described in the previous 
chapter (i.e., human vs. computer proposers). The uncertainty about whose offer was coming 
next, may have boosted theory of mind and acceptances, which would be in line with the results 
of the previous experiment where acceptances of computer offers were higher than those of 
human proposers.  
Turning now to the comparison between decision behaviour in ASD vs. TD 
participants, the results of the current study concur with those of the previous two in suggesting 
that there are few if any differences in how autistic and non-autistic participants reach decisions 
in UG scenarios. Rejection and acceptance rates of the different offer categories were 
indistinguishable between the groups and both groups responded very similarly to the time 
pressure manipulation. Some subtle differences emerged in the pattern of correlations between 
CRT, ToM and rejection rates across fair and unfair offers. Specifically, for ASD participants, 
ToM and CRT correlates with rejection rates in the same way across all experimental 
conditions whereas for TD participants the pattern differs somewhat for timed vs. untimed 
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conditions. These different patterns across both groups might indicate that TD participants 
adapt more flexibly to the demands of the timed and untimed conditions than ASD participants. 
Specifically, whilst TD participants engage cognitive reflection and ToM differentially 
depending on the circumstances, ASD participants may deploy these processes irrespective of 
the situational demands. This difference, therefore, could reflect an aspect of the executive 
function difficulties that are commonly associated with ASD (particularly in the domain of 
cognitive flexibility).  
It is important to note that the results in the current study did not demonstrate 
differences between TD and ASD groups on the 7i-CRT scores unlike the results by Brosnan, 
et al., (2014) and De Martino et al., (2008), who suggest that  ASD individuals reason more 
logically and reflectively, and are  thus less inclined to follow heuristics. Possible reasons for 
the discrepancy include sample characteristics such as clinical characteristics or participant 
age. If differences in sample characteristics are among the reasons for the discrepant findings 
in relation to the CRT, this raises the possibility that the current sample of adults participants 
is more heterogenous than the group of students in Brosnan, et al, hence it is possible to suggest 
that the findings apply only to a subset of individuals in the spectrum or that our sample is not 
representative of the wider autism spectrum. I will return to this possibility in more detail in 
the final discussion chapter.  
 However, the results may not be associated with the sample itself but with the 
characteristics of the measure. For instance, it is known that some forms of intuition are 
associated with highly overlearned tasks, however it does not mean that the person has or not 
an intuitive cognitive style (Lieberman., 2000; Kahneman & Klein., 2009). Performance in the 
CRT interacts with knowledge, available heuristics, environmental characteristics and open-
minded thinking (Campitelli & Labollita., 2010) and has been found to positively correlate 
with measures of utilitarian moral judgement, scientific understanding & creativity,  reasoning 
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and decision-making tasks, see (Pennycook et al., 2016). In fact, the current study extends this 
evidence. A positive correlation between CRT performance and UG responder, i.e. acceptances 
was observed, which indicates that different systems are involved in acceptances vs rejection 
behaviour therefore the UG is also a good test for testing dual theories.    
Interestingly, it could be that the incentive of a £0.30 payment for correct responses in 
the current study somehow changed the nature of the task so that it was no longer sensitive to 
group differences. This seems unlikely, however, given that the levels of accurate vs. intuitive 
and inaccurate answers seem ideally distributed to detect group differences.  
For now, it is important to note that one of the implications of this possibility would be 
that a more representative sample of autistic individuals, might be more likely to accept unfair 
offers in the UG given that the increased tendency for reflection in such a group would be 
expected to lead to higher acceptances as indicated by the correlations observed in the current 
study and previous studies mentioned earlier. 
Unlike the results for the CRT, data from the RMIE task did replicate earlier findings 
in showing that autistic individuals experience difficulties in ToM. Despite the fact that ToM 
was correlated with increased rejection rates, however, the group differences in ToM were not 
associated with accompanying decreased acceptance rates of unfair offers. Our regression 
model suggests that the RMIE, our ToM measure, significantly predict acceptances in the UG. 
Interestingly though, ToM abilities do not predict decision behaviour in cases of extreme 
unfairness and when there is no time pressure. Only in such a case the CRT is significant in the 
model, suggesting that the certainty of a social rule, such as equating fairness to egalitarian 
splits, prevail over perspective taking considerations. Thus, the lack of group differences 
between ASD and TD participants, despite differences in ToM, might be the consequence of 
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the fact that multiple factors interact in guiding decision behaviours and the specific role of 
ToM may not be easy to isolate.  
In summary, the study presented in this chapter once again suggested that autistic 
individuals behave very similarly in the UG scenario as compared to typically developing 
participants. Unlike in the previous chapter, where a manipulation of the proposer (human vs. 
computer) appeared to affect decision behaviour differentially in ASD and TD participants, the 
time pressure manipulation in the current study had fairly similar effects on both groups. 
Although correlations between ToM ability, reflective thinking and UG decisions in the current 
study were also broadly similar between groups in the current study, subtle differences in the 
patterning of these correlations across experimental conditions suggests that autistic 
individuals might engage ToM less flexibly to different situational demands. In order to 
examine this issue further, the last experiment examined decision behaviour in a variant of the 
UG – the so-called Mini UG – that offers some experimental control over the role of 
mentalising by contrasting decisions to unfair offers that proposers have either made 
intentionally or not. 
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5 EXPERIMENT FOUR: MiniUG 
 
In the four studies using the ultimatum game presented in the previous chapters, 
participants responded to unfair and fair offers made by others without knowing the underlying 
motivations and the circumstances in which these offers were made. Did the proposer 
intentionally offer an unfair amount or maybe accidentally? Could they have been under some 
financial strain that motivated their unfair offer? Or maybe they were encouraged to offer an 
unfair amount by someone else? Any number of speculations like these might inform people’s 
decisions on whether to accept or reject an unfair offer but it is equally possible that their 
decisions are simply guided by the inequity of the proposed amounts and/or by the absolute 
amount of money on offer. This last experiment sought to discriminate between outcome 
unfairness and intentional unfairness, by using options that are unfair but are the fairest 
available to the proposer and making this information available to the responder.  
This variant of the ultimatum game, known as the mini-ultimatum game (hereafter 
MiniUG; Falk et al., 2003) can reveal the extent to which participants either engage an outcome 
based decision approach that is relatively insensitive to the options available to the proposer 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 
1989) or instead an approach that takes into consideration the motivations and intentions of the 
proposer given the contextual constraints under which they are formulating unfair offers 
(Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1993), thus 
involving a certain degree of theory of mind reasoning.  
The MiniUG is made up of four ultimatum game scenarios with the same pot size but 
different payoffs. Whereas, in the standard Ultimatum the proposer has no restrictions on how 
to split the pot (Total Pot -X), in the MiniUG, the proposer is given two options of how to split 
the money, an unfair option that is constant across four games labelled here the fixed-split (e.g. 
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£8 ; £2), and an alternative-split that is either fair (£5; £5) or even less fair than the constant 
(£9 ; £1). Thus, across all four games responder behaviour can be compared to offers with a 
fixed absolute ‘unfairness’, but a variable relative unfairness given the constraints imposed on 
the proposer. To illustrate, Table 5.1. shows the structure of the MiniUG with a £10 pot, as 
used by Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher (2003) along with the decision behaviour of proposers and 
responders. The fixed-split (8:2) is presented with a different alternative-split each time, either 
with (5:5); or (8:2); or (2:8); or (10:0) and it is clearly evident that responders are sensitive to 
this manipulation, rejecting the unfair offer significantly less often when the proposer has no 
fairer alternative to choose.  
Table 5.1 MiniUG Full trial and results patterns as in Falk et al., (2003) 
 
*Game 2 is not calculated in proposer behaviour as both options available to the proposer are the same. 
 
The pattern of decision behaviour observed by Falk et al., (2003) has been replicated 
consistently, reliably showing that individuals are overall less likely to reject unfair offers when 
they see that the proposer has no fairer option available to them (Falk et al., 2003; Güroǧlu  et 
al., 2009; 2010; Pelligra et al., 2015; Sutter, 2007). However, there is also evidence showing 
that rejections are observed when the fixed-split is presented with an alternative distribution 
which is exactly the same i.e. Game 2 in Table 5.1, suggesting that fairness perceptions guide 
individuals’ decisions in the MiniUG differently. Further support for this conclusion stems 
from studies that examine decision behaviour from a developmental perspective. Specifically, 
whereas adults’ appreciation of fairness is modulated by contextual factors, for instance by 
For me For you For me For you
Game 5 £5 £5 31 44.4
Game 2 £8 £2 NA* 18.0
Game 8 £2 £8 74 26.7
Game 0 £10 £0 100 8.9
% of times Offered % of times Rejected 
Fixed-split 
£8 £2
Alternative-split 
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making distinction between intentional or accidental behaviours (Blount, 1995; Castelli et 
al.,2014; Van’t Wout et al., 2006) children under 5 years of age, hold a concept of fairness 
which is closely associated with the fairness of the outcome (Wittig, Jensen, & Tomasello, 
2013). In the context of the Mini UG, for example, developmental effects in fairness 
perceptions have been looked at by comparing decision behaviour in different age groups 
(Sutter, 2007), 5-year olds children (Wittig et al., 2013), university students (Brandts, 2001) 
and  adolescents at different stages of age  in both roles as proposers and responders (Güroǧlu, 
van den Bos, & Crone, 2009). Together the evidence suggests differentiated fairness sensitivity 
that varies with age, where younger participants were relatively more often driven by outcome-
fairness than older participants. Hence assigning importance to intentions over outcomes in 
fairness judgments seems to increase gradually with age.    
Considering the processes that guide decision behaviour in the MiniUG, studies point 
to a critical role of mentalizing in the moderation of rejection rates based on the manipulation 
of the alternative offers. For instance, in a study by Güroǧlu et al., (2010) 25 university students 
(15 females) were invited to play a MiniUG in the role of responders while undergoing 
functional brain imaging. Participants received 192 offers, of which 24 served as practice trials 
and 42 trials on which participants received fair and hyper-fair offers instead of the unfair fixed-
split. Decisison time was set up to 5000 ms, which, based on the results of the study described 
in the previous chapter, should be sufficient for particiapnts to engage ToM related processes 
in a deliberative fashion. The behavioural results of this study showed the expected pattern of 
results, with significantly fewer rejections of the fixed offer when the alternative offer was even 
less favourable to the responder. More importantly, activation in the insula, a brain area 
associated with social norms violations (Spitzer et al., 2007) or inconsitence response with 
expectations, was observed during rejection of the fixed-  split in game 20%  when the proposer 
had not alternative, acceptance of the fixed-split in game 50% and game 80 % where the 
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alterantive split was fair and hyperfair, respectively. This was used as evidence to demostrate 
that the intentionality of the offers, i.e the four games, is associatd with moral judgement and 
decision behaviour.  
In a different way, the respective importance of mentalizing vs. outcome oriented 
decision processes were examined by Güney and Newell (2013) in a two-parts study. In the 
first part, a group of university students were asked  to play a series of mini-ultimatum games 
as responders under conditions where offers were said to be coming from either computers or 
humans, even though the offers were set up by the experimenters to follow the offer distribution 
of Falk et al., (2003). Testing took place in groups of five students and each participant was 
told that only one participant in each group would be assigned to the role of responder, thus 
leading participants to believe that a real and different proposer made the different offers across 
the human trials. Participants played for real money and were informed about the overall 
outcomes after responding to all of the four possible game scenarios. Participants demonstrated 
the expected pattern of response behaviour in this part of the experiment.  
However, in the second part results were slightly different.  In this part the experimental 
designed was modified to test whether reputation building, and the foreseeing of future 
interactions would have an impact on MiniUG decision behaviour and an alternative 
explanation to the involvement of theory of mind abilities in these decisions. To achieve this 
anonymity was removed from the interaction and participants were asked to play face to face 
with a different partner in each game. Rejection increased in overall, however, compared to the 
results in Part-1, the rejection rate was higher for the (8:2) game when both options available 
to the proposers were equally unfair. Results were used as evidence to suggest that other factors 
such as reputation building, and the foreseeing of future interactions play a role in decision 
behaviour  only for interactions lacking intentionality clues.  
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Given the evidence just outlined, and the results of the previous experiments, which 
suggest that autistic individuals may rely on ToM abilities to guide their decision behaviour in 
the UG, but not adapt their metalizing flexibly to the specific context of the UG scenario, we 
might expect that rejection rates across the four scenarios of a MiniUG might vary less in ASD 
than TD participants. To our knowledge only one study to date has used the MiniUG to examine 
decision behaviours in the context of ASD. Pelligra et al., (2015) invited 20 autistic children 
and 60 TD children, all male and matched on IQ, to play the MiniUG over four trials using the 
strategy method23. ASD children played only as responders and so did 20 of the TD 
participants, with the remaining 40 TD participants playing only as proposers. Children played 
for Pokémon’ cards and were asked to choose between them before starting the MiniUG to 
ensure they had high motivational value. In addition, and before playing the MiniUG, second 
order ToM abilities were also assessed using the Ice cream test (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; see 
Chapter 1 for details). Proposer’s decisions by the 40 TD  showed that they chose the fixed 
split more often (100%) when the alternative option was (10:0) but it was only chosen 30% of 
the times when the alternative offers was (5:5). More importantly turning to the responder 
behaviour, TD children in 75% of the cases, rejected the fixed split when the alternative was 
(5:5) whereas in the (10:0) game the fixed split was only rejected in 5% of the cases, clearly 
demonstrating the expected sensitivity to the proposer’s options. The ASD group, however, 
was far less sensitive to the manipulation rejecting the fixed split 60% of the time when the 
alternative was the fair offer, but also 45% of the time when the alternative was even more 
unfair. Moreover, when examining decision behaviour as a function of whether children had 
passed the ToM test, the authors found that this had an effect only in the TD but not the ASD 
group. Specifically, TD children who passed the ToM test were more sensitive to the alternative 
                                                          
23 In the Strategy method, participants are asked to respond to all the possible options available to the proposer, 
in total eight responses for the standard MiniUG. 
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offer manipulation than children who failed with no such difference being evident in the ASD 
group. The authors concluded, on this basis, that whilst ToM seems to play an important role 
in informing the decisions that TD children made on the MiniUG, other factors seem to play a 
role for ASD children, although it is also possible that ASD children did engage ToM as well 
but simply did not adapt how they did so to the different scenarios, i.e., ASD children may 
have thought about the possible motives of the proposer without adjusting their reasoning 
depending on the alternative options they had available. 
Given this pattern of results observed by Pelligra et al., (2015), together with the results 
reported in the previous chapters and the wider literature concerning ASD, this final experiment 
tested the prediction that decision behaviour in autistic adults would be less sensitive to the 
MiniUG manipulation than comparison participants but that rejection rates might nevertheless 
be correlated with ToM abilities as in the previous chapter, where greater ToM was associated 
with overall lower rejection rates of unfair offers. 
5.1 Method 
Participants 
Fifty-five adults, twenty-seven with autism and 28 individuals without a diagnosis of 
ASD were involved in this experiment. Participants were recruited from an existing database 
to include autistic and typically developing adults. They were paid standard University fees of 
£8/hour for their participation plus the earnings from two randomly selected trials of the mini-
UG (see below for details).  ASD participants provided documentation to confirm that they had 
been diagnosed by suitably qualified clinicians through the National Health Service according 
to DSM-IV-TR criteria and additional assessment with the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
schedule, ADOS (Lord et al., 2012) further corroborated impairments in reciprocal social and 
communication behaviours that are the defining feature of the disorder. Twenty-one 
participants met the relevant cut -off criteria for ADOS. Although the remaining twelve scored 
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below the threshold, they were retained in all analyses since the records they provided 
confirmed their clinical diagnosis and it is well known that the ADOS module 4 is susceptible 
to false negatives. Typical individuals were selected to match ASD participants on Full-Scale 
IQ as measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III or IV (Wechsler, 2000, 2008) and 
chronological age. All participants also completed the Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (Baron-
Cohen, et al., 2001) which provided further corroboration of the diagnosis in ASD participants 
and confirmed that none of the TD participants reported above-threshold autism-related traits. 
None of the participants in either group reported a family history of neurodevelopmental or 
psychiatric illness, drug or alcohol abuse which would have led to exclusion. Table 5.2 
summarises the characteristics of both groups. 
Table 5.2 Characteristics for autistic individuals (ASD) and Typically Development 
Individuals (TD) 
 
a Verbal IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK); b Performance IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or WAIS IVUK). c Full Scale IQ (WAIS-IIIUK or 
WAIS IVUK); d Autism Spectrum Questionnaire (Baron-Cohen et al.,2001); e Reading the Mind in the Eyes, ToM task;  
fADOS- Communication; gADOS- Reciprocal Social Interaction; hADOS Total Score- Communication + Reciprocal Social 
Interaction 
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Materials & Design 
As in Falk et al., (2003) the current study uses the pot’s distribution presented in Table 
5.1. However, in addition, six pots of money were used instead of one, and participants were 
asked to play both roles, as responders and proposers. The implementation of different pot sizes 
was made to increase the number of trials participants could be asked to respond to without 
relying on very simple response strategies or biases. To preserve the ecological validity of the 
study and to make the experiment affordable, participants were informed that the experimental 
program would randomly select one of the trials on which participants served as proposers, to 
serve as a ‘real’ offer for the next participant in the responder role (thus one of the responder 
trials was also ‘real’). This trial was fully paid out according to the rules of the UG and this 
was all made clear to participants. Since the ‘real’ trial would be indistinguishable from all the 
other trials, participants were encouraged to treat all trials as real. 
The current design had six MiniUG games, for the pot sizes (£10, £20, £30, £40, £50, 
£60). For each MiniUG, the standard four sets of trials were generated that required participants 
in the responder role to decide which of two options to pass on to responders; a fixed unfair 
split (80% vs. 20%) and an alternative split that varied in fairness (50%-50%; 80%-20% and 
100%:0%), which will be described as the 50%, game 20%, game 80% and game 0% 
respectively. These values indicate the proportion of the pot going to the responder if the 
alternative split is chosen. Table 5.3. provides an overview of all trials included in the design 
for ease of reference. 
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Table 5.3 Splits by money pot in £s and percentage of the total amount offered in the 
alternative split by game 
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In addition to the 24 experimental trials, when participants acted as responders, 6 
control trials were also included for which participants would receive the fair rather than the 
fixed offer (i.e., £5:5; 10:10; 15:15; 20:20; 25:25; 30:30). Trials were presented in random 
order with the fixed 20%: 80% offer appearing on the left or right side of the screen on half of 
the trials. Participants completed three conditions of the experiment in a fixed order. First, they 
acted as responder and needed to decide whether to accept or reject offers from a proposer. 
Second, in what was called the Forecasting condition, they were asked how many of 100 people 
they think would be likely to accept or reject certain offers. And finally, they acted as proposer 
and choose between the two available splits, the one to be passed on to a responder. As in the 
previous experiments, the Reading the mind in eyes task (ToMRMIE; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
as a measure of ToM and administered at the end of the Mini UG conditions unless the data 
was already available.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in the Autism Research Group laboratories of City, 
University of London. Participants received on paper a full description of the experiment and 
provided written consent. There were no practice trials, but reminders of the instructions were 
provided before each of the experimental conditions. 
Participants completed the experimental tasks in one testing session. They first played 
as responders, then in the forecasting condition, participants predicted the decisions of others, 
and finally played the role of proposers. The number of trials was not disclosed to participants 
at any stage in the experiment. Between each condition, participants completed unrelated 
online tasks for a few minutes to provide breaks between the main experimental conditions and 
to reduce potential carry-over effects between them. The order of the three experimental 
conditions was kept constant across all participants whereas the order of the trials was 
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randomized for each participant and each condition. Time during each condition was measured 
but not limited and feedback was given only at the end of experiment. The experimenter was 
in the room only at the beginning of each task to set up the session. 
In the role of responders, participants were informed that their task was to decide 
whether to accept or reject offers made by a number of proposers. Participants also learned that 
they were to make this decision on several trials, and that one of those trials presented an offer 
that a previous participant chose in their role as proposer, therefore their decision would affect 
whether that person would get paid. Immediately after, participants were presented with the 
task, with a brief reminder of the instructions at the start. Participants were required to input 
their response by key press, using “A” to accept and “R” to reject offers.  
Each trial then started with a fixation cross on the screen for 500 milliseconds, followed 
by a screen with the two splits the proposer had available to choose from with the name of a 
proposer appearing centrally above the two alternatives in the form “These options were 
available to Thomas” The two choices remained on the screen for 2000 milliseconds, and then 
one of the choices was highlighted with a green frame to indicate it was the offer chosen by the 
proposer. At the bottom of the same screen a prompt appeared for the participant to give their 
response. Participants needed to decide whether to accept or reject the split highlighted in 
green, for which they had an unlimited time. After entering the response, a fixation cross stayed 
on the screen for 500 milliseconds before the next pair of offers appeared on the screen. The 
same procedure was repeated over thirty trials, of which six were control trials as noted above.  
For each pot, the responder decided over the Fixed-split. The Fixed - split was always 80%: 
20% which was presented four times, each time along with one of the alternative splits that 
varied in fairness as explained above (Games 50%; 20%; 80%; 0%).  The program was set to 
always highlight in green the Fixed, with the exception of the control trials where the fair split 
was highlighted. Figure 5.1 shows the sequence of events for a responder trial.  
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Figure 5.1 Sequence of events in a trial for a responder 
 
After a ten-minute break, in the same room but using a different monitor, participants 
did one of the unrelated online tasks. Once that was finished, they were invited to do the second 
main condition (the Forecasting condition). Here participants were told that they would see 
offers again as in the previous task, but that this time they would need to indicate how many of 
100 people they think are likely to accept the offer option that would be highlighted in green 
for them. During this task participants typed a number between zero and one hundred at the 
response screen stage to indicate the number of people they thought would accept the 
highlighted offer. Figure 5.2 shows the sequence of events for a trial in this condition. 
Importantly, to incentivise careful responding also on this task, participants were informed that 
their accuracy on this part of the experiment would be rewarded. Specifically, participants who 
came closest in their estimates to the actual response distribution in the responder part of the 
session, would receive a £5 payment.  
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Figure 5.2 Sequence of events for the forecasting condition 
 
Finally, following another short unrelated task, participants played the role of the 
proposer, this time deciding which of the different offer options they would like to pass on to 
other responders. Offers were again presented in a similar format to the previous parts of the 
session (see figure 5.3), but rather than having an option highlighted, participants needed to 
select an option by pressing the left or right arrow keys, which then highlighted that option for 
200ms with a green frame before the next offer options appeared (a 500ms fixation cross) 
separated the trials). After all trials in this proposer part, the programme ended by displaying a 
randomly chosen trial that would be passed on to the next participant (customized script 
ensured that this was actually reflected in the pay-outs that would be implemented in the 
responder condition such that there was no deception involved. 
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Figure 5.3 Sequence of events for a proposer trial 
At the end of the session, participants completed the RMIE task if necessary, and were 
then paid for their time and for any additional payments that were due as a result of the UG 
decisions. The whole testing session lasted approximately an hour and half.  
5.2 Results 
Ultimatum Game 
Results are presented separately for each condition (proposer and responder). Although 
participants played first as responder and then as proposer, we commit to what is customary in 
the field and report proposer behaviour first followed by responder. For each of these 
conditions the results showing the relation between decision behaviour and theory of mind 
abilities is presented immediately after the analysis of decision behaviours. 
Proposer behaviour 
For each individual, data was first averaged across pot sizes and then across participants 
to derive the average percentage of times that participants opted for the fixed split offer as 
proposers. Figure 5.4 sets out these data as a function of group and of the alternative offer 
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available. The condition in which both offers were of the fixed amount type were excluded 
from this analysis as these trials did not present any real option. These trials were included so 
that the Responder and Proposer conditions were equivalent in all respects.  
 
Figure 5.4 Percentage of times the (80:20) fixed split was chosen as offer instead of the 
alternative-split, by group 
 
A 2 (Group: TDs vs ASDs) x3 (Fairness: game 50% vs. game 80% vs. game 0%) 
factorial ANOVA yielded a main effect of fairness, F(2,106) = 113.58, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.68. 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that participants were significantly more 
likely to offer the fixed-split (80%:20 %) in game 0% (M = 0.91, SD =0.24) compared to game 
80% (M = 0.69, SD = 0.34; p = 0.001) or game 50% (M = 0.11, SD = 0.21; p = 0.001). There 
was no main effect of Group F (1,53) = .058, p = 0.81, η2 = 0.001, and no significant game X 
group interaction F(2,106) = 0.606, p = 0.54, η2 = 0.011 suggesting very similar performance 
across both groups. 
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Responder behaviour  
The average rejection rates of the fixed-split (80% : 20%) across games and groups is 
presented in Figure 5.5 Rejection rate follow the same patterns as reported by (Falk et al., 
2003). 
 
Figure 5.5 Rejection rate of the fixed-split across games and by group 
 
A 2 (Group: TDs vs ASDs) x 4 (Fairness: Game 50% vs. Game 20% vs. Game 80% vs. 
Game 0%) mixed ANOVA yielded a main effect of Fairness F(3,159) = 9.21, p < 0.001, η2 = 
0.148. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that there was no significant 
difference in participants’ rejection of the fixed split between Game 50% and Game 80%, and 
between Game 20% and Game 0% (p =1.000). However, rejections between these pairs of 
conditions were significantly different with higher rejections in Game 50 (M = 0.60, SD = 0.35) 
and Game 80 (M = 0.57, SD = .41) compared to Game 20% (M = 0.44, SD = .41) and Game 
0% (M = 0.43, SD =0 .41) – all ps < 0.005. There was no main effect of group F (1,53) = 0.58, 
p < 0.81, η2 = 0.001 or significant fairness x group interaction F(3,159) = 0.64, p < .58, η2 = 
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0.012, suggesting very similar patterns of responder behaviour in the two groups, unlike the 
results reported by Pelligra et al., (2011). 
Response time data for the responder condition similarly revealed no evidence of group 
differences. The data are set out in Figure 5.6. and a 2 (Group: TDs vs. ASDs) x 4 (Fairness: 
game50% vs. game 20% vs. game 80% vs. game 0%) mixed ANOVA indicated no main effect 
of group F(1,53) = 0.73, p = 0.78, η2 = 0.001 or interaction between fairness x group F(3,159) 
= 0.092, p = 0.96, η2 = 0.002 although the main effect of fairness was again significant, 
suggesting that responses on conditions where the fixed split is typically rejected participants 
required somewhat more time to respond F(3,159) = 2.89, p = 0.037, η2 = .052.  
 
Figure 5.6 Decision time for acceptances and rejections combined across games and by group. 
All in all, the pattern of results from the analysis between decision behaviour, fairness 
and decision -time shows that ASD and TD have similar reaction time when responding to the 
unfair offer in all four scenarios in the MiniUG.   
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The role of Theory of Mind 
In this section the result of three measures are discussed. First, the results for the relation 
between ToMRMIE and decision behaviour are presented in relation to proposer and responder 
behaviour.  Then, we present the results for the Forecasting task, the measure we created to 
assess participants beliefs about responder’s behaviour. These results are discussed in relation 
to the observed behaviour as proposers. And finally, following the analysis in previous 
chapters, results for the relation between decision behaviour and participants’ ethics positions 
are presented.  
ToM abilities and decision behaviour as proposer and responder 
Simple correlations were examined to identify whether ToMREMIE (RMIE: Baron-
Cohen et al, 2001) our measure of theory of mind might correlate with participant’s decisions 
as proposer and responder. As proposer, we tested for each game the relation between ToM 
abilities and the decision to offer the more egalitarian split in games 50% and 0%. Game 80% 
is particularly interesting since offering the less self-beneficial option may result in higher 
acceptance, therefore a relation with ToMREMIE abilities was expected. Game 20% was 
excluded as in this game the two options are the same. As responder the relation between ToM 
abilities and the proportion of rejection of the fixed split in each game was tested.  
No significant correlations were observed between ToM and decision behaviour as 
proposer or responder, for all pairs ps > 0.050., this suggesting that other factors might have 
guided proposer’s  and responder’s decisions in this MiniUG. Results for proposer and 
responder behaviour are reported in Table 5.4 which sets out the simple correlations (Pearson’s 
r coefficients) between decision behaviour  in each of the four games (game 50%; game 20%; 
game 80%; game 0%) as proposer and responder. Correlations are shown for both groups 
combined as well as for each group separately.   
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Table 5.4 Correlations for ToM, decision behaviour by group and game 
 
Proposer decision, Forecasting 
The above analyses suggest that, contrary to predictions, there were no associations 
between ToM as measured by the RMIE and acceptance/rejection rates in the mini UG. The 
forecasting condition provides a further opportunity to assess participant’s beliefs about what 
might motivate responders.  Although the question was “How many people will accept this 
offer”, results are presented in terms of rejections to keep consistency with the description of 
the results across conditions. Figure 5.7 presents the average of forecasted rejection rates of the 
fixed-split (80%: 20%) across games by group. 
 
Figure 5.7 Forecasted rejection rate of the fixed-split across games by group 
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A two-way analysis of variance (Mixed ANOVA) was used to examine the effect of 
the fairness of the alternative - split (game 50% vs. game 20% vs. game 80% vs. game 0%) and 
group (TDs vs. ASDs), which yielded a main effect of fairness, F (3,159) = 26.30, p = <0.001, 
η2 = 0.33, which paralleled the pattern observed across levels of fairness in the responder 
condition above, with higher predicted rejections game 50% (M = 0.67, SD = .23) and game 
80% (M = 0.62, SD = 0.27), compared to game 20% (M = 0.45, SD =0 .35) and game 0% (M 
= 0.46, SD = 0.33) – all relevant ps < 0.005. Of more interest, there was again no main effect 
of group F (1,53) = 2.56, p = 0.11, η2 = 0.046 and no significant fairness x group interaction F 
(3,159) = 0.16, p = 0.92, η2 = 0.003.  
In addition, to the above analysis, it was also of interest to knowing the extent to which 
the predictions people make about other’s behaviour were related to the decisions they made 
themselves as proposers. Simple correlations were examined to identify whether the 
proportions of times the fixed split was chosen in the proposer condition correlated with the 
forecasted rejection rates in the equivalent game in the forecasting condition. See all correlation 
in Table 5.5. Somewhat surprisingly, predicted rejection of the (80%: 20%) split was not 
correlated with the amount of times proposers choose this offer split, for  Games 50% and 
Game 0%  ps > 0.050. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, the absence of correlations indicates 
that, in the role of proposers, participants did not take into consideration the information they 
hold about responder’s behaviour, which suggests that ToM may not play as much of a role in 
the MiniUG as the earlier study by Pelligra et al.,(2011) suggested. However, in Game 80%, 
predicted rejection correlated with the number of times proposer choose to offer the fixed split.  
As seen in Table 5.5.although the result is significant for both groups together (p = 
.018). this was driven by the significance in the ASD group only (p = .020). Interestingly, the 
direction of the correlation indicates that the higher the predicted rejection rate of the fixed split 
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the more it is offered. In this game offering the alternative split (20%: 80%) would increase the 
possibilities of having the offer accepted since it will be beneficial to the responder.  
Game 20% was again excluded as here the two splits represent the same pot 
distribution, instead a correlation was examined to identify whether actual rejection rate 
correlates with the forecasted rejection rate in this game, interestingly in none of the groups the 
correlations were significant, thus the lack of accuracy in the  assumptions people made about 
others’ rejection rate could lead to suggest that participants may not have taken into account 
other’s beliefs.  
Table 5.5  Bivariate Correlations between forecasted rejection rate and proposer decisions by 
game and group 
 
 
5.3 Correlations / Predictors of Decisions MiniUG decisions 
VIQ, E-S, BIS/BAS, EPQ: idealism /realism  
Last, results for the relation between decision behaviour and participants’ scores in 
VIQ, Difference between Empathising and Systemizing (E-S: Baron-Cohen, 2009);   
Behavioural Inhibition and approach scales (BIS/BAS: Carver & White, 1994); Ethics position 
questionnaire (EPQ idealism /realism: Forsyth, 1980) is presented. Table 5.6 shows, for each 
group (ASD and TD), the mean score for each of these measures. Statistical differences were 
found in the E-S measure, showing that in accordance with the original paper, ASDs have in 
overall higher systemizing scores than empathizing, hence the negative sign.    
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Table 5.6 Characteristics for autistic individuals (ASD) and Typically Development 
Individuals (TD) in VIQ, EPQ, E-S, BIS/BAS 
 
 Following the data analysis approach of previous chapters, simple correlations were 
examined to identify whether these measures might correlate with participant’s decisions as 
proposer and responder. Results for both proposer and responder behaviour are reported in 
Table 5.6. As noted earlier G 20% is excluded from the analysis in proper behaviour since the 
two options available to the proposer are exactly the same. No significant correlations were 
observed in the role of proposer which suggest that other factors, not measured in our design, 
might have guided proposer’s decisions.   
Results for responder behaviour are reported in Table 5.7 which sets out the simple 
correlations (Pearson’s r coefficients) between rejection rates of the unfair split in each of the 
four games (game 50%; game 20%; game 80%; game 0%), Verbal IQ, E-S-, BIS/BAS,EPQ 
idealism (EPQIdeal) and realism (EPQRel). Correlations are shown for both groups combined as 
well as for each group separately and r-coefficients greater than 0.3 are highlighted in bold for 
ease of reference (See table footnote for significance level). To adjust for the multiple 
comparisons an alpha value of <0.001 (0.05/48 correlations per group) would need to be 
adopted as an appropriate significance level, hence none of the correlations is significant after 
applying Bonferroni corrections.   
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Table 5.7 Bivariate Correlations between individual differences in VIQ, EPQ, E-S, BIS/BAS 
and decision behaviour of the unfair split in each game.  
 
 
Correlations observed here replicate the pattern of results for ASD in experiment 3, 
where VIQ and decision behaviour as responder showed a significant correlation, and also 
replicate the results in experiment 1b where responder behaviour was associated with the 
EPQIdeal scale of the Ethics Position questionnaire (Forsyth, 1980). Similarly, the significant 
correlation observed for TDs in the role of responder in game 20% replicates the relation 
observed in experiment 1b (ARG) whereby rejection of the £(7:3) split was associated with the 
E-S scores. Noteworthy that Game 20% and the £(7:3) split represent a similar distribution of 
the pot, and since in Game 20% both choices available to the proposer were the same, this 
game is comparable to a standard UG. 
5.4 Discussion  
In the current study we address the question whether the relative importance of 
outcomes versus intentions differ between ASD and TD individuals during the decision making 
in the UG.  We implemented a MiniUG, a version of the UG in which the options available to 
the proposer are restricted to only two choices on how to split the pot, and this information is 
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given to the responder. Responders were always present with the same unfair offer, along with 
the alternative split the proposer could have chosen. The alternative split varies in levels of 
fairness. In the current design, the fairness ratio was implemented as in (Falk et al., 2003; 
Sutter, 2007) but whereas they used the strategy method to increase the number of responses 
per participants, in the current study six MiniUG were implemented for the same purpose.   
The experimental session was made of three tasks, with some other unrelated task in 
between, that are not reported here. First, participants acted as responders, next they did a 
forecasting test, and finally played in the role of proposers. When ToM data was not available, 
participants did the ToMREMIE (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)  at the end of the session.   
No major differences were found in decision behaviour between ASD and TD regarding 
their choices as proposer or responders. Against our prediction, that ASD would have 
responded with the same strategy across the four scenarios, we have found that both groups 
(ASD and TD) showed sensitivity to the alternative option when deciding whether to accept or 
reject an unfair (80:20) split. As proposers ASDs do not always choose the maximizing option.  
As noted in the introduction, one reason for predicting differences between ASD and 
TD participants in this MiniUG relates to the notion that UG decisions are affected by ToM 
abilities therefore given the well-known ToM impairment in ASD would result in different 
decisions. Although the two populations significantly differ in their levels of ToM abilities as 
measured by ToMREMIE, not association was observed between decision behaviour on the 
MiniUG and ToM abilities. Furthermore, the results of our forecasting measure showed that 
our participants accurately predicted other’s rejection rate, however a null correlation between 
the results from the forecasting measure and proposer behaviour indicates that participants 
were not using this information when choosing an offer.  
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With our design we confirm previous finding in that people respond  differently to level 
of unfairness in MiniUG with adults (Falk et al., 2003; Güney & Newell, 2013; Güroǧlu et al., 
2010) and with children (ASDs: Pelligra et al., 2015; TDs:Sutter, 2007), furthermore the 
rejection rate of the fixed split (44%) when the alternative offer was exactly the same, replicated 
the rejection rate for the standard UG (Camerer, 2003) suggesting that participants value 
fairness even if at the cost of their own benefit (Falk et al., 2003; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). As 
proposers, participants choose fair games over the unfair options, yet this may not necessarily 
be the result of anticipating other’s behaviour as it has usually been suggested.  
From our design we cannot conclude whether the observed behaviour was the result of 
pure inequality aversion, or because proposers were trying to maximize and therefore 
strategically choose an offer unlikely to be rejected by the responder (Hardy-Vallée & Thagard, 
2008). Anonymity has been suggested to promote unfairness (Camerer, 2003b) and given the 
structure of our design participants could have made less fair offers but this was not the case in 
the current study where 90% of  the participants chose to offer the fair split in game 50%, and 
the most fair split in game 0%. In game 80%, participants choose to offer the split that favour 
the responders, yet this can be a strategic decision. Participants may anticipate that an unfair 
that favours the responder will be more readily accepted than an offer favouring the proposer.  
In addition, the observed behaviour can be added as evidence that our participants were aware 
of the realistic nature of the economical exchange.  
On the other hand, the lack of involvement of ToM abilities, as measured by our ToM 
task, in MiniUG decision behaviour, but different rejection rate of the fixed split across the 
four fairness scenarios, indicates that these rejections were shaped by how fair the outcome 
was perceived in comparison with the outcome in the alternative split, and by ethical 
considerations in regard to norms, such as fairness considerations. The rejection rate was not 
significantly different between game 50%, in which the unfairness was against the responder, 
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and in game 80%, when the unfairness was against the proposer, suggesting that self-interested 
motives might drive the judgement of fairness when the alternative option heavily 
disadvantages the responder over the proposer. The rejection in game 20% suggests that pure 
inequality aversion plays a role in this game  and supports previously reported findings of Falk 
et al., (2003) whilst questioning pure intention-based models (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 
2004;  Rabin, 1993). On the other hand, the rise in the rejection rate in game 80% compared to 
game 20% and the reduced rejection rate in game 0% suggest that levels of intentionality are 
involved in decision behaviour, or at least to some extend decisions are made with reference to 
the alternatives the proposer had available. 
Turning to the results of the correlation analysis, the association between moral 
judgment and UG decisions is in line with the observations of Güroǧlu et al., (2010) who 
reported that rejection of offers in game 20% and when participants accepted offers in game 
50% and game 80% were associated with insula activation, a brain area involved in fairness 
judgments (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008) error signal associated with norm 
violation (Montague & Lohrenz, 2007) and norm compliance (Spitzer et al., 2007). In our 
study, and only for ASD group, there was an association between responder behaviour and 
EPQ_Idealism, which suggest that for these participants following social norms may be the 
guiding compass when judging fairness as responders in the MiniUG. The RT data showed that 
the ASD nominally took longer to reject than TDs. Although this no resulted in differences in 
rejection rate, it could be suggested that ASD participants were making comparison using an 
egalitarian fairness rule. However, in day to day social life where not all interactions are rule 
defined, this parsimonious judgement may not be possible and decisions become difficult 
(Luke et al.,2012). As for TD group we can only speculate that responders were taking an 
outcome-based approach and use a self-reference fairness heuristic as rule of thumb for making 
decisions. In the MiniUG the nature of the fixed-split and the possible outcome with the 
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alternative-split was fully known to decision makers, thus this information may have been 
sufficient to implement a fairness heuristic and not higher order mentalizing processing 
necessary.  
The current study demonstrated that the presence of an alternative option modulates 
fairness judgments and enhanced tolerance towards unfair offers, thus suggesting that unfair 
proposals are more likely to be forbidden when alternatives are presented, even if not available 
to the responder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
203 
 
 
6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The starting point for this thesis was the observation that there is currently insufficient 
evidence to characterize social decision making in the autistic population. Although other 
relevant evidence consistently shows that multiple facets of social functioning are 
compromised in autism, scientists continue to debate whether these difficulties are present in 
all the domains of social cognition necessary to thrive in day to day life. This project focused 
on social decision making since this domain provides a window into the social world of ASD 
individuals because of the multiple intertwined processes involved, some of which represent 
strengths for autistic individuals (e.g. systemizing), while other processes represent difficulties 
(e.g., ToM, emotion processing). 
The UG (Güth et al., 1982) was chosen to investigate social decision making in ASD 
in the current thesis to test the hypothesis that the strengths and weakness associated with the 
disorder would result in distinctive patterns of decision behaviour on this paradigm. The UG 
was considered to be an ideal paradigm for carefully examining social decision-making in ASD 
because it consistently elicits a pattern of economically irrational behaviour in the general 
population that is thought to be motivated by the interaction of a number of processes that are 
implicated in ASD, including theory of mind, emotion-related processes such as empathy and 
the tendency for ‘systemizing’. The UG allows for the exploration of the role of such factors 
both in terms of individual differences across participants as well as through experimental 
manipulations designed to moderate the influence of one or more of these factors on decision 
behaviour. To date, only a handful of studies have examined decision making on such game-
theoretical decision tasks (See Table 1.1), with the evidence tentatively supporting differences 
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in behaviour in ASD that are related to factors such as ToM. However, the evidence remains 
scarce and this thesis represents a novel attempt to systematically explore UG behaviour across 
different experimental conditions in ASD.   
On the whole the results across the four major experiments set out in this thesis suggest 
no substantial behavioural differences between ASD and control participants in UG behaviour, 
although experiments 2 and 3, suggested differences between the groups in relation to the 
cognitive processes each group recruited during decision making. As proposers in Experiment 
1 (Chapter 2) and Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) ASD and TD participants similarly made fair offers 
whenever possible. It is noteworthy, that whereas in Experiment 1 there were no restrictions in 
the amount of money that the proposer could choose to offer, in Experiment 4 the proposer had 
limited choices given by the experimental design, yet both groups of participants, in both 
experiments made offers unlikely to be rejected and this was associated with a balanced profile 
of (E-S) and their behaviour as responders.   
As  responders,  participants from both groups similarly accepted/rejected unfair offers. 
However, the decision-making process relied on different mechanisms with the ASD group 
mostly relying on VIQ and levels of moral and ethical principles  as measured by the EPQ in 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 2), Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) and  Experiment 4 (Chapter 5). On the 
other hand, decision behaviour in the TD group was associated with VIQ in Experiment 3 
(Chapter 4) and  (E-S) in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) . In Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) while TD 
participants differentiated intended (i.e., human)  from not intended (i.e., computer generated)  
unfair offers, ASD did not make such a differentiation specifically on trials that represent the 
biggest conflict between fairness vs. self-interest considerations (£7:£3). In Experiment 3 
(Chapter 4) although ToM mechanisms appeared to be recruited by ASD when making decision 
under time pressure, no relation between ToM and decision behaviour was observed in the TD 
group. Statistically, trends in the whole sample were driven by ASD since ToM only seem to 
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play a role in the decision behaviour of this group. In Experiment 3, in addition to ToM, 
cognitive reflection as measure by the CRT task predicted acceptances of unfair offers in both 
groups. Finally, in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) the pattern of results in the no-alternative choice 
game, replicated that observed in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2). 
In the discussion that follows, the results across the four experiments will be discussed 
in relation to some of the most common explanations that have been given for the consistent 
pattern of behaviour on the UG, which reliably contradicts the notion that decisions should be 
guided by an economically plausible maximizing principle (i.e., proposer should offer the 
minimum positive amount, and responders should accept any offer).  
The evidence reported in this thesis suggests two potential accounts for participants’ 
willingness to reject/accept an offer: (1) Participants are motivated to comply with reciprocal 
fairness, which implies that players hold certain beliefs  about how other players should  behave  
during the interaction. (2) Decisions are based on inequity aversion, whereby aversion to the 
unequal distribution of resources in its own right guides decision behaviour, with little 
influence of the context in which decisions are made. 
In relation to the first option, a considerable amount of evidence suggests that 
reciprocity is fundamental to the maintenance of human society (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; 
Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Gintis, 2000) and is encouraged in different ways in 
human culture (Gachter & Herrmann, 2009). Individuals can engage in reciprocity by 
responding to kindness with kindness (positive reciprocity) or responding to a negative action 
with a negative action (negative reciprocity). Either type of reciprocity implies that a decision 
maker infers (implicitly or explicitly) certain intentions to those they interact with and therefore 
it has been suggested that theory of mind abilities may be involved in guiding 
acceptances/rejections in the UG. To examine the role of theory of mind and the closely related 
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construct of empathising vis-à-vis systemising, relevant trait [ToM; EQ,SQ; E-S] measures 
were included across the experiments in this thesis. In addition, a second group of measures 
was included that assess traits that are more concerned with certain cognitive dispositions of 
an individual rather than their interpersonal skills [7i-CRT-;BIS/BAS;EPQ]. In the first group 
only, the E-S difference score was related to decision behaviour suggesting that rejection rate 
is closely related to a person tendency to think about the rules that govern systems. Associations 
between the 7i-CRT and EPQ in the second set of measures further corroborates this impression 
by suggesting that that participants were rather judging offers based in their views about social 
norms, i.e. inequity aversion and their own pre-disposition towards rewards, rather than 
showing empathy (EQ) or assigning intentions to the proposer [ToM]. These findings will be 
now discussed in more detail in relation to people’s roles, both, as proposer and responder.  
Proposer behaviour 
In the role of proposer (Experiment 1, one-shot UG; Experiment 4, Mini-UG) no 
differences were observed between ASD and TDs. In line with most one-shot UG studies, the 
mode offer was (50:50) and in the Mini-UG participants chose the egalitarian split when it was 
an option, or they chose a split that was the least unfair out of two unfair options, confirming 
previous findings from laboratory experiments which suggest that egalitarian offers are the 
result of strategic thinking to get ultimatums accepted. In this respect, our results showed that 
egalitarian splits were more likely to be made by proposers who accepted an unfair split as 
responders, and by individuals who demonstrated greater differences in levels of empathizing 
and systemizing as measured by the (E-S;Baron-Cohen, 2009) in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2).  
Higher scores on empathy, in relation to scores in systemizing, may have allowed 
participants to switch perspectives to anticipate the feelings of responders when facing an 
unfair offer, thus offering an egalitarian split as a strategy to avoid having an offer rejected 
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(Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; 
Ohmura & Yamagishi, 2005;  Rabin, 1993; Thaler, 1988). Additionally, and interestingly, 
results from proposer behaviour in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5), showed that although a check for 
expected-acceptance rate indicates that participants accurately predicted acceptance rate for 
each offer, there was no correlation between this information and offers chosen, e.g. predicted 
acceptances of the unfair fixed split in game 80% where the alternative offer favours the 
responder, resulted in lower proposal rate, and instead the alternative offer was chosen. This 
suggesting that in the role of proposer individuals opt for strategic proposals.    
Given that ASD and TD participants differed consistently across experiments in terms 
of their Empathizing-Systemising balance, it was surprising to find that offers did not differ 
between the groups. Specifically, the lower empathizing and greater systemizing pattern 
typically observed in the ASD groups, would – on the basis of the above argument – lead to 
the prediction of reduced fair offers in ASD vis-à-vis the comparison group. One possible 
reason for why this prediction was consistently not confirmed across experiments is that ASD 
participants may have engaged their systemizing not to derive an economically logical decision 
but to implement a social rule, which dictates egalitarian fairness. Such an interpretation would 
be in line with the observation that in some of the experiments reported in this thesis, decision 
behaviour in the ASD group tended to be more strongly related to scores on the EPQ (Forsyth, 
1980) than in the comparison group. Thus, whilst TD participants may be making fair offers 
on the basis of emotion related processes related to empathy, ASD participants may be making 
egalitarian offers more on the basis of an adherence to social norms and rules (Greene et al. 
2004) 
Another possibility for the equivalent proposer behaviour between ASD and TD 
groups, despite consistent differences in empathizing/systemizing, is that any tendency that 
might exist for ASD participants to make fewer fair offers (as a result of differences in E-S) 
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are counteracted by a greater desire to avoid the negative consequences that might result from 
making an unfair offer. In Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) levels of BIS scores (Carver & White, 
1994) were more strongly related to decision behaviour in the ASD than the TD group, with 
those who scored high on this measure more likely to make fair offers. Since high BIS scores 
are associated with avoidance of negative consequences (Berkman, Lieberman, & Gable, 
2009), offering an egalitarian split may serve to maintain control over the interaction and avoid 
unpleasant rejections or to avoid the negative consequences and feelings that may be associated 
with the prospect of breaking a social rule or norm.  
Responder Behaviour 
Turning to the role of responder, across the four experiments rejection rates confirmed 
the standard finding that around 40% of adult players in western societies reject offers that are 
below 30% of the total pot; Experiment 1 (45%), experiment 2 (44%), experiment 3 (39%) 
experiment 4 (44%). In addition, patterns of rejection in games where the unfairness favours 
the proposer (an offer of £3 out of £10) were different to patterns of rejection when the 
unfairness favours the responder (Experiment 1, hypothetical UG and Experiment 4 Mini-UG) 
replicated finding suggesting that egalitarian fairness considerations are present in UG 
decisions (Brañas-Garza et al.,2014). Surprisingly, and contrary to our prediction, ASD and 
TD participants were very similar in terms of the overall levels of rejection of unfair offers, 
although the results suggest that there may be some differences with respect to the cognitive 
and psychological mechanisms underlying decision making between groups. 
 In the one-shot UG of Experiment 1 identical numbers of ASD and TD participants 
rejected the unfair (£7:£3) offer and responses to the hypothetical scenarios were also nearly 
identical. Moreover, accepters and rejecters within each group did not differ very substantially 
with respect to any of the individual difference’s variables measured, with exception of the 
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EPQ idealism scale, which was significantly higher in TD accepters than ASD accepters, with 
no difference between groups in those who rejected.  
However, within-group analysis showed that in the ASD group, EPQ idealism scores 
were higher in those who rejected compared to those who accepted unfair offers, whereas no 
differences in the scores were observed between accepters and rejecters in the TD group. The 
EPQ (Forsyth, 1980) measures how likely a person is to embrace the universality of moral and 
ethical principles. Individuals who score high in EPQ Idealism consider ethical behaviour is 
only ethical if the consequences are exclusively good and they believe ethical behaviour can 
always be achieved by strictly following universal moral rules, for example, people who hold 
a strong belief about egalitarian fairness will reject an unfair offer regardless of the motives 
held by the proposer. On the other hand, high EPQ Relativism suggests individuals have a 
tendency to reject the notion of universal moral principles thus preferring personal and 
situational analysis of behaviour. These individuals usually assume that ethical decisions are 
made by weighing good consequences against bad consequences. Group differences in the 
scores for those who accept the unfair split, with higher scores in the TD vs. ASD,  but not 
group differences between those who reject, may indicate that UG acceptances involve some 
aspects of moral judgment whereas rejection may be more automatic.   
Interestingly, within-group analysis showed differences between accepters and 
rejecters in the ASD group only, with higher EPQ idealism scores for those who reject 
compared to those who accept. No such differences were observed in the TD group which may 
suggest that ASD go through similar judgments processing, i.e. moral, before deciding whether 
to accept or reject. Although it is important to interpret this result with caution due to the 
multiple comparisons that were carried out in this first experiment, group differences in the 
role of EPQ idealism were further supported by the results in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), where 
rejection rates of unfair offers correlated with VIQ and EPQ Idealism in ASD but not the TD 
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group; and in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5) where rejection of the unfair split correlated negatively 
with VIQ and positively with EPQ idealism only in the ASD group.  
These correlations may indicate that ASD engaged in some type of moral reasoning 
when making decisions over unfair offers, whereas TD may be guided by empathy 
considerations which is supported by the results in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3) where rejection 
of the unfair offers was associated with scores in the (E-S) measure, and in Experiment 4 
(Chapter 5) where (E-S) was positively correlated with rejection of the fixed split in Game 20% 
which represent a similar decision scenario as in the standard One Shot UG implemented in 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 2). 
In addition to differences between groups with respect to the role of idealistic moral 
rules, the results across several of the experiments also indicated that theory of mind processes 
may be drawn upon differently in UG decision scenarios between ASD and TD participants. 
In Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), the role of ToM was probed by implementing a proposer 
manipulation whereby UG offers were either presented as coming from a human or a computer 
proposer. Previous studies (e.g., van t’Wout et al., 2006) had shown that participants generally 
are more willing to accept unfair offers from computers rather than humans, presumably 
because unfair intentions would be attributed only to human proposers. The results of 
Experiment 2 replicated this effect but also showed that ASD participants were, as expected, 
less sensitive to the proposer manipulation than TD participants for offers that were marginally 
unfair. That is, whilst TD participants accepted £3-£7 offers significantly more often when 
coming from a computer than a human proposer, ASD participants accepted these offers 
equally often from both types of proposers. Although rejection rates did not correlate with ToM 
abilities as measured by the RMIE task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) in this study, this pattern of 
results is generally in line with the suggestion that individuals with ASD may not be sensitive 
to social intentionality carried by the offers, in this case unfair offers (Chiu et al., 2008b).  
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Differences in the role of ToM between groups were further supported by the results of 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 4), in which participants needed to make decisions either under time 
limits or without time constraints, thus manipulating the extent to which deliberate vs. more 
intuitive processes could be engaged to support the decision-making process. ToM predicted 
rejection behaviour in the ASD group in both time and no time pressure conditions whereas no 
such a relation was seen in the TD group. This trend is particularly interesting for two reasons. 
On the one hand it adds evidence to previous but not consistent suggestion that theory of mind 
plays a role on UG decision making (Schug et al., 2016), we will come back to this in the next 
paragraphs. On the other hand, the fact that ToM abilities turned out to be activated under time 
pressure condition, and in the untimed condition contribute evidence for understanding  
developmental aspects and use of  ToM.  
In Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) although there was not an obvious reason for participants 
to expect unfair offers, the certainty of having to make decisions under time pressure may have 
increased alternativeness in the ASD group, and this may have been a strong enough  contextual 
factor to trigger ToM mechanisms. This argument is in line with existing evidence suggesting 
that at least some aspects of the mentalizing network may be intact in autistic adults (Roeyers 
& Demurie, 2010) Furthermore, as suggested by Bowler, (1992) and Frith, (2004) “ displaying 
an explicit theory of mind does not necessarily imply an intuitive mentalizing ability” (p. 678) 
and this explicit theory of mind may be affected by factors such motivation, sensitivity or the 
nature of the task, hence the lack of such a relation in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) and Experiment 
2 (Chapter 3) and Experiment 4 (Chapter 4), where rejection behaviour was correlated with 
both VIQ and EPQ Idealism scale in the ASD group only. Furthermore, since performance in 
VIQ is influenced by background, education, cultural experiences and knowledge learnt from 
the environment, it is not surprising that this measure and decision behaviour are associated in 
the ASD group only, thus stressing the view that ASD decision behaviour depends more in 
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information processing, e.g. Social Norms than in reciprocal motivations. In addition, the 
positive  correlation between VIQ and ToM in the ASD group but not in the TD group, confirm 
previous evidence suggesting that the interaction between ToM and other cognitive functions 
in ASDs continues to develop with learning (Verbrugge & Mol, 2008), experience  
(Dumontheil et al., 2010) and is shaped by culture (Heyes & Frith, 2014). 
Whether ToM mechanisms are thought to be fundamental to UG decisions in the 
standard population is still an unsettled debate. Most of the evidence for ToM comes from 
studies manipulating the type of proposer and asking individuals to respond to offers made by 
human vs. offers randomly generated by coin toss or computer proposers, as in our Experiment 
2 (Chapter 3); or manipulating the offer options available to the proposer and making these 
options clear to the responder in efforts to aid responders to judge the intentions of the proposer, 
as in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5). Other evidence also stems from brain imaging research which 
indicates that ToM regions are activated during UG and other similar decision making 
paradigms, although this evidence is less directly relevant to the work presented in this thesis 
(for a review; Gabay et al., 2014).  
In addition to implementing such manipulations, the current study also examined the 
role of ToM in decision behaviour by correlating performance on an adult ToM task with 
decision behaviour on the UG, similar to how previous studies have compared decision 
behaviours on the UG between children who either passed or failed ToM tests (e.g., Takagishi 
et al.,2010) and our result add to the evidence that although ToM may play a role in some social 
scenarios, it is not always the case (Castelli, Massaro, Bicchieri, et al., 2014; Schug et al., 
2016). The fact that the different manipulations and measures employed in this thesis to probe 
the role of Theory of Mind did not yield a consistent picture, has several implications. First, it 
may suggest that the different experimental manipulations are not all equally effective in 
manipulating the role of ToM. For instance, different experimental manipulations (proposer 
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manipulation, time pressure, MiniUG), may not all manipulate ToM involvement in the same 
way. Different paradigms might differ with respect to whether people might think explicitly 
(e.g., MiniUG) vs. more implicitly (e.g., One Shot UG) about the intentions and motives of the 
proposer. When the stimuli are so obvious and salient as a social rule, individuals do not need 
to engage ToM abilities to respond to the interaction, and instead rely in that social rule.  When 
these rules are so imbedded in the beliefs system individuals use them almost in automatic, and 
this may have led researchers to interpret an automatic ToM usage. 
Fairness judgments require the assessment of the responder’s internal norm of fairness 
and also require that the responder creates a model of the proposer, therefore it is expected that 
some aspect of theory of mind gets involved. However, it may be that those very specific 
aspects were not fully captured by our ToM measure, for one of  two reasons:  either because 
these aspects have become automatized with experience and a more fine-grained ToM measure 
is required e.g. (Faux Pas; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), a test which measures vicarious 
embarrassment as a result of bypassing a social rule; or because mentalizing abilities may get 
overridden by other higher cognitive processes, hence the relation between ToM and rejection 
behaviour of fair and unfair offer under time pressure and untimed conditions in the ASD group 
in Study 3 (time pressure manipulation). Taken together, the results across the experiments 
suggest that ToM play a role in UG decisions but that this role is highly dependent on the 
specific circumstances under which decisions are to be taken. 
In addition, our prediction that a diminished ToM in the ASD group would lead to 
higher acceptances of unfair offers was not confirmed by our results. Correlations and 
regression analysis in Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) showed that low level of ToM predicted 
rejection rate  when decisions are made with no time pressure. These finding challenge the 
restricted view that about rationality have been used in UG research in that acceptances are for 
the most the outcome of self-regarding motives. Instead our data brings about the idea that 
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rationality would be better associated with intelligence in a wider sense and interpreted as 
having the ability to go beyond the given information (Bruner, 1973) and to be able to switch 
perspectives and strategies when responding to social stimuli, for instance when choosing 
between competing options as is the case of the responder in the UG.  
The result from our studies suggest that processes other than ToM (e.g., cognitive 
control and inhibition) may play more or less of a role in the different paradigms thus 
potentially overshadowing an involvement of ToM. The logistic regression model in 
Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) gives a subtle indication that BIS, our measure of behavioural 
inhibition bias, predicts rejection of unfair offer in One-shot UG. Future studies should 
continue exploring the role of  ToM in social-decision making by using a combination of ToM 
measures and manipulations in iterated UG with the same proposer to try and tease apart some 
of these alternative possibilities. 
In addition to the role of ToM, the evidence presented in this thesis also sheds some 
light on the role of intuitive vs. more deliberative processes on decision behaviour in the UG 
and of potential group differences in this respect between ASD vs. TD participants. Negative 
reciprocity theories suggest that in the presence of unfair offers, negative feelings lead 
individuals to reject (Halali et al.,2014; Koenigs & Tranel, 2007) and dual theories suggest that 
such emotional processes operate at a relatively automatic and subconscious level and that they 
may be overcome by deliberative processes that would lead to acceptance (Sanfey & Chang, 
2008). The consistent correlation between VIQ and decision behaviour in the ASD group lends 
some additional support to the notion that certain decisions are deliberate, i.e., autistic 
individuals rely more heavily on their cognitive resources (Brosnan et al., 2016), in particular 
verbal reasoning skills, to deliberate about the choices they make, thus the  current results add 
evidence to the ongoing debate within dual process theories.  
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Whereas some argue that UG decisions result from exerting control over an automatic 
desire to punish unfair behaviour, the alternative view suggests that UG decisions are the result 
of exerting control (Calvillo et al., 2015; Sanfey & Chang, 2008) over the desire to accept an 
unfair offer out of greediness and without taking into consideration other’s preferences. The 
debate between these two views has been widely explored by dual theories of cognition 
suggesting that whereas the former results in acceptances once the individual overcome the 
impulse to act out of reciprocal fairness, i.e. punish (Knoch et al., 2010; Knoch et al., 2006), 
the latter suggest that overcoming the impulse to judge the split by its face value, leads the 
responder to take into consideration the context and intentionality of others ending in rejection 
(Sanfey et l., 2003; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008b). Our results are more consistent 
with the view that exerting control over the impulse to reject leads individuals to accept unfair 
offers in one-shot UG. For example, the results of Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) show  that, under 
time pressure, individuals appear to be intuitively biased to reject, whilst acceptances are more 
likely to increase when there are no constraints on decision behaviour. Moreover, scores on the 
CRT in this experiment indicated that participants who have a greater tendency to engage in 
deliberative vs. more impulsive reasoning to solve problems, were more likely to accept than 
reject unfair offers, further suggesting that the rejection of unfair offers is a more intuitive and 
automatic response.  
Interestingly, when examining the associations between the CRT and rejection rates 
separately in ASD and TD participants, the results indicated that low performance in the CRT 
predicted rejection of unfair offers in both time conditions (time pressure & untimed) in the 
ASD group, whereas in the TD group this relation was only significant in the TP condition. 
Since in the UG there are no right or wrongs answers per se, the CRT  correlation may indicate 
that participants who have a greater tendency for deliberative thinking may be more sensitive 
to cues that indicate that different perspectives/alternatives can be considered as an explanation 
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for a certain situation. In the context of the UG, for instance, this may lead to a deeper 
consideration of the intentions and motives behind an unfair offer, and how that compares to 
social norms and expectations, rather than to jump to decisions based on the value on an offer.  
In this context it is interesting to note that ToM performance was also correlated with 
acceptance  rates in this experiment. Specifically, high scores in ToM predicted acceptances of 
unfair offers. In relation to the points made above, it is also interesting to recall that the findings 
set out in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) are in line with these findings. Rejecters but not accepters 
engaged in moral judgements and this is more specific for ASD, which was furthered by results 
in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5). Similarly, results from Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), did not replicate 
earlier findings by van’t Wout et al., (2006) in suggesting that emotion-related somatic markers 
play a significant role in guiding decision behaviour in the UG. The assumption that such 
markers would play an important role stem from the perspective mentioned above that 
rejections are motivated by relatively automatic emotion related processes that are triggered by 
an aversion to unfairness or inequity. 
 Combining the above, with the results of Experiment 3 (Chapter 4), where rejection 
was related to VIQ, a measure of acquired knowledge, verbal reasoning, and attention to verbal 
materials, and the EPQ idealism, a scale that measures the extent to which an individual accepts 
or rejects universal moral rules, it may be that decision-behaviour is the result of judging the 
face value of the offer in reference to expected egalitarian fairness, an acquired cultural norm, 
but not necessarily by taking into consideration the proposer’s motives. As shown by 
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) and Rabin (1993) other regarding preferences are not 
exclusive to reciprocal fairness. Preferences such as kinship and altruism, or inequity aversion 
and egalitarian fairness have been shown to lead the individual to take into account  other’s 
payoff and wellbeing during decision making. The current research offers support to previous 
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theories suggesting that egalitarian-fairness considerations underlie decision behaviour in one-
shot interactions (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
Broadly speaking, the results from our research extend the evidence on ASD’s social 
behaviour. Although a combination of cognitive processes makes it possible for ASD to reach 
similar decision as TD in the UG, the  decision paths followed by ASD are believed to be 
cumbersome and time consuming, thus lack of the necessary flexibility to navigate the social 
world and its uncertainty. Unlike in day-today interactions, in the UG uncertainty is highly 
reduced by the fact that from the beginning of the interaction players know the consequences 
of their decisions and this  may have facilitated ASD performance in the task by continuously 
relying in moral and ethical rules.  
There is evidence (Baez et al., 2012; Heyes & Frith, 2014) suggesting that during social 
interaction adults with ASD can use social abstract rules, however since autistic adults do not 
automatically think about what others think of them (Cage et al., 2013), the use of these social 
rules cannot be directly interpreted as reciprocity as their decision behaviour may only 
represent adherence to the social norm (Perugini et al., 2003). Being good at following rules 
(Levin et al., 2015; Shulman et al.,2012; Sterponi, 2004) but having poor intuitive thinking can 
make ASD less prompt to endorse objectionable social behaviour but less accurate at 
identifying when other’s fail to endorse rules, thus make ASD more exposed to be taken 
advantage of (Hillier et al., 2007; Levin et al., 2015; Wilczynski, Trammell & Clarke, 2013) 
Across the four experimental conditions, whereas the pattern of correlations  differ in 
TDs, the ASD group show a similar pattern of correlations, this suggesting that ASD 
participants may be less flexible in shifting between intuitive vs. deliberative strategies. Our 
result is in line with previous research by Brosnan, Lewton, & Ashwin (2016) who reported 
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that ASD is characterized by a consistent bias towards deliberative reasoning, and by Levin et 
al., (2015) that compared to TDs, ASD group showed less engagement in intuitive thinking.  
Broader implications 
Beyond the implications for decision behaviour on game theoretical scenarios such as the UG, 
the current observations also have implications for the social-cognitive characteristics of ASD 
and for theories concerning social-economic decision making.  
In relation to ASD, the current findings are relevant to understanding that although the 
condition does not seem to hinder behavioural responses and these participants’ decision-
outcomes are similar to control TDs, the results from these four experiments showed that their 
cognitive system operate differently and probably more loaded. For instance, although ASD 
participants score lower than TD on the ToM task, their scores did not result in overall different 
rejection rate. However, in real life, bypassing the intentionality of others and their agency can 
result in significant difficulties in aspects that softly but consistent shape social exchange, for 
example, it can hinder tolerance attitudes towards the mistakes of others, diminish the effect of 
persuasion and the assertiveness to respond to or to produce persuasive acts; or delay the 
evolution of trust so necessary for the development of  stable relations and friendship.  
In terms of models of economic decision making, the current studies show how 
relatively difficult it is to identify and tease apart the various factors that contribute to 
seemingly ‘irrational’ decision behaviour. The terminology used in the field to describe and 
define behaviours, could help to make steady progress in identifying decision making factors. 
“Rationality” is by far one of the terms that seems to have a biased connotation in the literature.  
Rejecting an unfair offer, is frequently treated as an irrational decision or as a mechanism to 
re-stablish fairness. On the other hand, acceptances are mostly associated with selfish 
behaviour. However, evidence has shown that decision makers reject unfair split as a way to 
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defend the imposition of an inferior status (Yamagishi et al., 2012), hence not all rejections are 
prosocial, and neither are all acceptances selfish. Accepting an unfair offer may have more 
prosocial motives than it has been considered (e.g. gratitude and loyalty, Henrich et al., 2005). 
More recently, the evidence given by Nguyen et al., (2011) who investigated the effect of 
cognitive and personality traits in UG showed that personality variables and specifically the 
tendency to trust predicted UG acceptances. Individuals who accepted unfair offers reported to 
be trusting of others, agreeable and prosocial, less prompt to perceive hostile attitudes and less 
concerned with the unfairness of the offers.  
Most UG studies have been set up and behavioural result interpreted assuming players 
behave as if independent from a societal group, however a shift in this initial assumption to   
assume players recognize themselves as part of a group, gives rise to an alternative 
interpretation of acceptances. Accepting an unfair offer may not benefit the responder per se, 
but both players (proposer- responder), thus acceptances can be thought of as being prosocial, 
since the benefit of the interaction is distributed between  the dyad proposer- responder. 
More broadly, this frame, i.e. looking proposers and responder as a dyad, instead of two 
individuals, has implication for behavioural economics implementations. Targeting an 
intervention for individuals who consider themselves part of a group posit different demands 
than when individuals are considered independent individuals, thus in competition for 
resources. The dynamics of the XXI century may indeed benefit from social structures that 
instead of promoting donation and accumulation of resources triggers sharing and given 
attitudes to one and another as part of a society.  
Limitations and Future directions 
Before drawing this thesis to a close, it is important also to acknowledge some potential 
limitations and the implications of these for future research. Among the most difficult issues to 
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deal with in autism research, is the heterogeneity of the clinical phenotype. The experiments 
reported in the current thesis, focused exclusively on autistic participants who were adults and 
who had no (or very limited) language and/or intellectual impairments. Around 45% of autistic 
individuals, however, are estimated to have significant language and intellectual impairments 
(Baird et al., 2006), and it is unclear to what extent the findings presented here would be 
representative of this wider population. Similarly, it is unclear to what extent the findings 
would hold true for younger participants such as those studied in the experiments by Hill et al., 
(2006). Whilst it was useful to maintain a focus on adult participants across the experiments 
presented in the current thesis, to make it possible to compare results across these experiments, 
it is clearly also necessary for futures studies to extend this work to younger participant groups 
and participants with co-occurring language and/or intellectual impairments. The findings from 
Hill et al., (2006) and the evidence in the current thesis concerning correlations between 
decision performance and IQ, indicate that systematic examination of UG behaviour across 
development and across the full range of intellectual abilities, will be critical for developing a 
comprehensive picture of social –decision making in ASD. 
Another aspect to be considered as a possible limitation is the experience, with the UG 
task, gained by some participants who took part in more than one experiment. Across all 
experiments a total of 262 participants took place of which 29% took part in one, 35% in 2, 
19% in  3 and 17% in all four experiments. It is difficult to formally take this participant overlap 
into account in the analysis for any particular experiment as exclusion of anyone who took part 
in more than one experiment would reduce sample sizes significantly and any significant group 
differences that did emerge would be set against the lack of group differences in a larger 
sample, making the interpretation difficult. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent experience 
with the paradigm may have diluted the results in some experiments. However, it is important 
to note that with the exception of the first experiment, all subsequent experiments involved 
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multiple trials and the principle phenomenon of interest (the irrational rejection of unfair offers) 
was stable and robust across experiments. 
One more  potential limitation of the work presented in this thesis, is the exclusive focus 
on the UG as an experimental paradigm to represent the complexity of social-decision making. 
Whilst focusing on this paradigm made it possible to implement a series of manipulations 
relatively systematically across experiments, it also meant that only a relatively narrow 
perspective could be gained on social decision-making. Although the experiments in this thesis 
included multitrial games, adding the interaction with the same partner would make it possible 
to examine leaning effects but also to explore reputation building as a competitive motive for 
rejection in the UG. Testing the concept of reputation building in the ASD population during 
socio economic exchanges is likely to provide evidence for the understanding of the social 
motivation difficulties in ASDs. Furthermore, the combination of a set of games during a 
testing session may contribute to ecological validity of the study by simulating the dynamic of 
real-life decision scenarios, for instance moving from a UG to a dictator. In addition, a 
continuation of this research project may benefit from including additional features to enhance 
the  real nature of the interaction, for instance having the partner-player displayed in a video in 
real time; or by running group testing sessions. 
Along with behavioural measures, the introduction of qualitative measures could help 
to understand the motives behind decision making and making the shift from analysing 
outcomes per se will extend the evidence on how individual differences and cultural knowledge 
determine decision behaviour.  
Final Thoughts 
This research project aimed  to better understand how the decisions of others may  affect 
us and how our decisions affect others, an area commonly known as social decision making. 
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Results from the series of UGs presented in this thesis nicely replicate previous findings in 
showing that individuals consistently decline unfair monetary offers from others despite 
forgoing personal gains. The experiments also extended the evidence concerning the roles  of 
certain social-cognitive processes (ToM, moral judgment and the balance of  systemizing vs. 
empathising) and less social-cognitive processes (cognitive reflection, behavioural inhibition 
vs. activation and Verbal IQ) in decision behaviour. Although questions remain to be addressed 
about the role of these processes and factors, the evidence from analysis of correlations within 
groups and comparisons between groups (ASD vs. TD) suggest that, in both groups, rejection 
in the UG are motivated by societal rules of inequity aversion, yet compared to TDs, autistic 
individuals  engage different and less flexible cognitive mechanism to make decision that can 
affect them but at the same affect others.  Knowing the factors involved in judgment and 
decision making in social scenarios could help us to identify our own cognitive bias  and to 
recognize them when interacting with others,  ideally aiming to promote wellbeing among 
those with whom we interact.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Cognitive Reflection Task as used in the current research project with both type 
of answers (7i-CRT Toplak et al., 2014).  
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than 
the ball. How much does the ball cost? 
____cents 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would 
it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?  
minutes ____ 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles 
in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how 
long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?  
 
____ days 
(4) f John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink 
one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink 
one barrel of water together? 
_____ days 
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the 
class. How many students are in the class? 
______students 
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and 
sells it finally for $90. How much has he made?  
_____ dollars 
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 
2008. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had 
purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to 
October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75% 
At this point, 
Simon has:  
a. broken even in the stock market 
b. is ahead of where he began  
c. has lost money  
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Correct (incorrect answer) 
1. Correct answer 5 cents; intuitive answer 10 cents 
2. Correct answer 5 minutes; intuitive answer 100 minutes 
3. Correct answer 47 days; intuitive answer 24 days 
4. Correct answer 4 days; intuitive answer 9 
5. Correct answer 29 students; intuitive answer 30 
6. Correct answer $20; intuitive answer $10 
7. Correct answer c, because the value at this point is $7,000; intuitive response b 
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